| V-265980 | | The F5 BIG-IP DNS implementation must prohibit recursion on authoritative name servers. | A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-... |
| V-265981 | | The validity period for the RRSIGs covering a zone's DNSKEY RRSet must be no less than two days and no more than one week. | The best way for a zone administrator to minimize the impact of a key compromise is by limiting the validity period of RRSIGs in the zone and in the p... |
| V-265982 | | An authoritative name server must be configured to enable DNSSEC Resource Records. | The specification for a digital signature mechanism in the context of the DNS infrastructure is in IETF's DNSSEC standard. In DNSSEC, trust in the pub... |
| V-265983 | | Primary authoritative name servers must be configured to only receive zone transfer requests from specified secondary name servers. | Authoritative name servers (especially primary name servers) must be configured with an allow-transfer access control substatement designating the lis... |
| V-265984 | | The F5 BIG-IP DNS must use valid root name servers in the local root zone file. | All caching name servers must be authoritative for the root zone because, without this starting point, they would have no knowledge of the DNS infrast... |
| V-265985 | | The platform on which the name server software is hosted must be configured to respond to DNS traffic only. | Hosts that run the name server software must not provide any other services and therefore must be configured to respond to DNS traffic only. In other ... |
| V-265987 | | The F5 BIG-IP DNS server implementation must validate the binding of the other DNS server's identity to the DNS information for a server-to-server transaction (e.g., zone transfer). | Validation of the binding of the information prevents the modification of information between production and review. The validation of bindings can be... |
| V-265988 | | A BIG-IP DNS server implementation must provide additional data origin artifacts along with the authoritative data the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries. | The underlying feature in the major threat associated with DNS query/response (e.g., forged response or response failure) is the integrity of DNS data... |
| V-265989 | | The validity period for the RRSIGs covering the DS RR for a zones delegated children must be no less than two days and no more than one week. | The best way for a zone administrator to minimize the impact of a key compromise is by limiting the validity period of RRSIGs in the zone and in the p... |
| V-265991 | | The F5 BIG-IP DNS server implementation must manage excess capacity, bandwidth, or other redundancy to limit the effects of information flooding types of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. | DoS is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. When this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or m... |
| V-265986 | | The digital signature algorithm used for DNSSEC-enabled zones must be set to use RSA/SHA256 or RSA/SHA512. | The choice of digital signature algorithm will be based on recommended algorithms in well-known standards. NIST's Digital Signature Standard (DSS) (FI... |
| V-265990 | | The F5 BIG-IP DNS implementation must protect the authenticity of communications sessions for zone transfers. | DNS is a fundamental network service that is prone to various attacks, such as cache poisoning and man-in-the middle attacks.
If communication sessio... |
