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The F5 BIG-IP DNS implementation must prohibit recursion on authoritative name servers.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-265980F5BI-DN-300011SV-265980r1024486_ruleCCI-000366medium
Description
A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-IP address mappings from bogus name servers that respond with incorrect information. Once a name server has been poisoned, legitimate clients may be directed to nonexistent hosts (which constitutes a denial of service), or worse, hosts that masquerade as legitimate ones to obtain sensitive data or passwords. To guard against poisoning, name servers authoritative for .mil domains must be separated functionally from name servers that resolve queries on behalf of internal clients. Organizations may achieve this separation by dedicating machines to each function or, if possible, by running two instances of the name server software on the same machine: one for the authoritative function and the other for the resolving function. In this design, each name server process may be bound to a different IP address or network interface to implement the required segregation. DNSSEC ensures that the answer received when querying for name resolution actually comes from a trusted name server. Since DNSSEC is still far from being globally deployed external to DOD, and many resolvers either have not been updated or do not support DNSSEC, maintaining cached zone data separate from authoritative zone data mitigates the gap until all DNS data is validated with DNSSEC. Since DNS forwarding of queries can be accomplished in some DNS applications without caching locally, DNS forwarding is the method to be used when providing external DNS resolution to internal clients.
STIGDate
F5 BIG-IP TMOS DNS Security Technical Implementation Guide2024-09-09

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (8) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CFG-01Configuration Management Program
1.00
END-01Endpoint Device Management (EDM)
1.00
END-04Malicious Code Protection (Anti-Malware)
1.00
END-06Endpoint File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
MON-01Continuous Monitoring
1.00
MON-01.7File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
0.50
CFG-02.7Approved Configuration Deviations
0.50
NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (100) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-12Session Termination
1.00
AC-16(1)Dynamic Attribute Association
1.00
AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-2Account Management
1.00
AC-2(1)Automated System Account Management
1.00
AC-2(11)Usage Conditions
1.00
AC-2(3)Disable Accounts
1.00
AC-2(4)Automated Audit Actions
1.00
AC-24(1)Transmit Access Authorization Information
1.00
AC-25Reference Monitor
1.00

+90 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (2) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.4.1
1.00
3.4.2
1.00
CCI1 mapping
CCI-000366
1.00
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (5) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

DE.CM-09
1.00
PR.PS-01
1.00
PR.DS-10
0.50
PR.PSPlatform Security
0.50
PR.PS-05
0.50

Who does this work

10 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-265980r1024486_chk)

If the BIG-IP does not have the role of authoritative DNS server, this is not applicable. From the BIG-IP GUI: 1. DNS. 2. Delivery. 3. Profiles. 4. DNS. 5. Click the name of the profile used for the authoritative listener. 6. Verify the following settings: a. Use BIND Server on BIG-IP: Disabled b. DNS Cache: Disabled If the BIG-IP appliance is not configured to prohibit recursion on authoritative name servers, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-69806r1023196_fix)

If the BIG-IP has the role of authoritative DNS server, then configure as follows. From the BIG-IP GUI: 1. DNS. 2. Delivery. 3. Profiles. 4. DNS. 5. Click the name of the profile used for the authoritative listener. 6. Configure the following settings: a. Use BIND Server on BIG-IP: Disabled b. DNS Cache: Disabled 7. Click "Update".