The vCenter Server must have new Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) reissued at regular intervals for vSAN encrypted datastore(s).
Overview
| Finding ID | Version | Rule ID | IA Controls | Severity |
| V-256367 | VCSA-70-000287 | SV-256367r885712_rule | CCI-000366 | medium |
| Description | ||||
| The KEK for a vSAN encrypted datastore is generated by the Key Management Server (KMS) and serves as a wrapper and lock around the Disk Encryption Key (DEK). The DEK is generated by the host and is used to encrypt and decrypt the datastore. A shallow rekey is a procedure in which the KMS issues a new KEK to the ESXi host, which rewraps the DEK but does not change the DEK or any data on disk. This operation must be done on a regular, site-defined interval and can be viewed as similar in criticality to changing an administrative password. If the KMS is compromised, a standing operational procedure to rekey will put a time limit on the usefulness of any stolen KMS data. | ||||
| STIG | Date | |||
| VMware vSphere 7.0 vCenter Security Technical Implementation Guide | 2023-12-21 | |||
Details
Check Text (C-256367r885712_chk)
If vSAN is not in use, this is not applicable.
Interview the system administrator (SA) to determine that a procedure has been put in place to perform a shallow rekey of all vSAN encrypted datastores at regular, site-defined intervals.
VMware recommends a 60-day rekey task, but this interval must be defined by the SA and the information system security officer (ISSO).
If vSAN encryption is not in use, this is not a finding.
If vSAN encryption is in use and a regular rekey procedure is not in place, this is a finding.
Fix Text (F-59985r885711_fix)
If vSAN encryption is in use, ensure a regular rekey procedure is in place.