STIGViewer Support

The operating system must prevent internal users from sending out packets which attempt to manipulate or spoof invalid IP addresses.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-216400SOL-11.1-050470SV-216400r959010_ruleCCI-000366medium
Description
Manipulation of IP addresses can allow untrusted systems to appear as trusted hosts, bypassing firewall and other security mechanism and resulting in system penetration.
STIGDate
Solaris 11 SPARC Security Technical Implementation Guide2026-05-13

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (8) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CFG-01Configuration Management Program
1.00
END-01Endpoint Device Management (EDM)
1.00
END-04Malicious Code Protection (Anti-Malware)
1.00
END-06Endpoint File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
MON-01Continuous Monitoring
1.00
MON-01.7File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
0.50
CFG-02.7Approved Configuration Deviations
0.50
NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (100) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-12Session Termination
1.00
AC-16(1)Dynamic Attribute Association
1.00
AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-2Account Management
1.00
AC-2(1)Automated System Account Management
1.00
AC-2(11)Usage Conditions
1.00
AC-2(3)Disable Accounts
1.00
AC-2(4)Automated Audit Actions
1.00
AC-24(1)Transmit Access Authorization Information
1.00
AC-25Reference Monitor
1.00

+90 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (2) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.4.1
1.00
3.4.2
1.00
CCI1 mapping
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (5) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

PR.PSPlatform Security
0.50

Who does this work

10 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-216400r959010_chk)

Determine the zone that you are currently securing. # zonename If the command output is "global", then only the "phys" and "SR-IOV" interfaces assigned to the global zone require inspection. If using a non-Global zone, then all "phys" and "SR-IOV" interfaces assigned to the zone require inspection. Identify if this system has physical interfaces. # dladm show-link -Z | grep -v vnic LINK ZONE CLASS MTU STATE OVER net0 global phys 1500 unknown -- e1000g0 global phys 1500 up -- e1000g1 global phys 1500 up -- zoneD/net2 zoneD iptun 65515 up -- If "phys" appears in the third column, then the interface is physical. For each physical interface, determine if the network interface is Ethernet or InfiniBand: # dladm show-phys [interface name] LINK MEDIA STATE SPEED DUPLEX DEVICE [name] Ethernet unknown 0 half dnet0 The second column indicates either "Ethernet" or "Infiniband". For each physical interface, determine if the host is using ip-forwarding: # ipadm show-ifprop [interface name] | grep forwarding [name] forwarding ipv4 rw off -- off on,off [name] forwarding ipv6 rw off -- off on,off If "on" appears in the fifth column, then the interface is using ip-forwarding. For each interface, determine if the host is using SR-IOV’s Virtual Function (VF) driver: # dladm show-phys [interface name] | grep vf If the sixth column includes 'vf' in its name, it is using SR-IOV (ex: ixgbevf0). For each physical and SR-IOV interface, determine if network link protection capabilities are enabled. # dladm show-linkprop -p protection LINK PROPERTY PERM VALUE DEFAULT POSSIBLE net0 protection rw mac-nospoof, -- mac-nospoof, restricted, restricted, ip-nospoof, ip-nospoof, dhcp-nospoof dhcp-nospoof If the interface uses Infiniband and if restricted, ip-nospoof, and dhcp-nospoof do not appear in the "VALUE" column, this is a finding. If the interface uses ip-forwarding and if mac-nospoof, restricted, and dhcp-nospoof do not appear in the "VALUE" column, this is a finding. If the interface uses SR-IOV and if mac-nospoof, restricted, and dhcp-nospoof do not appear in the "VALUE" column, this is a finding. If the interface uses Ethernet without IP forwarding and if mac-nospoof, restricted, ip-nospoof, and dhcp-nospoof do not appear in the "VALUE" column, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-17634r371289_fix)

Determine the name of the zone that you are currently securing. # zonename If the command output is "global", then only the "phys" and "SR-IOV" interfaces assigned to the global zone require configuration. If using a non-Global zone, then all "phys" and "SR-IOV" interfaces assigned to the zone require configuration. The Network Link Security profile is required. Determine which network interfaces are available and what protection modes are enabled and required. Enable link protection based on each configured network interface type. For InfiniBand: # pfexec dladm set-linkprop -p protection=restricted,ip-nospoof,dhcp-nospoof [interface name] For IP forwarding: # pfexec dladm set-linkprop -p protection=mac-nospoof,restricted,dhcp-nospoof [interface name] For SR-IOV: # pfexec dladm set-linkprop -p protection=mac-nospoof,restricted,dhcp-nospoof [interface name] For Ethernet without IP forwarding: # pfexec dladm set-linkprop -p protection=mac-nospoof,restricted,ip-nospoof,dhcp-nospoof [interface name]