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The RUCKUS ICX PE router must be configured to block any traffic destined to IP core infrastructure.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-273611RCKS-RTR-000440SV-273611r1110876_ruleCCI-001097high
Description
IP/MPLS networks providing VPN and transit services must provide, at the least, the same level of protection against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and intrusions as layer 2 networks. Although the IP core network elements are hidden, security should never rely entirely on obscurity. IP addresses can be guessed. Core network elements must not be accessible from any external host. Protecting the core from any attack is vital for the integrity and privacy of customer traffic as well as the availability of transit services. A compromise of the IP core can result in an outage or, at a minimum, nonoptimized forwarding of customer traffic. Protecting the core from an outside attack also prevents attackers from using the core to attack any customer. Hence, it is imperative that all routers at the edge deny traffic destined to any address belonging to the IP core infrastructure.
STIGDate
RUCKUS ICX Router Security Technical Implementation Guide2025-06-03

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (18) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
1.00
CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
CRY-01.1Alternate Physical Protection
1.00
CRY-03Transmission Confidentiality
1.00
CRY-04Transmission Integrity
1.00
CRY-05Encrypting Data At Rest
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
IAC-21Least Privilege
1.00
MON-01Continuous Monitoring
1.00
MON-01.1Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems (IDS & IPS)
1.00

+8 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (10) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CM-6Configuration Settings
1.00
SC-24Fail in Known State
1.00
SC-47Alternate Communications Paths
1.00
SC-5Denial-of-service Protection
1.00
SC-7Boundary Protection
1.00
SC-7(11)Restrict Incoming Communications Traffic
1.00
SC-7(29)Separate Subnets to Isolate Functions
1.00
SC-7(5)Deny by Default — Allow by Exception
1.00
SI-4System Monitoring
1.00
SI-4(11)Analyze Communications Traffic Anomalies
1.00
NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (3) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.13.1
1.00
3.13.2
1.00
3.13.5
1.00
CCI1 mapping
CCI-001097
1.00
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (5) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

DE.CM-01
1.00
PR.DS-01
1.00
PR.DS-02
1.00
PR.DS-10
1.00
PR.IR-01
1.00

Who does this work

15 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-273611r1110876_chk)

Review the router configuration to verify an ingress ACL is applied to all CE-facing interfaces and verify the ingress ACL rejects and logs packets destined to the IP core address block. 1. Review the router configuration to verify that an ingress ACL is applied to all external or CE-facing interfaces. interface ethernet 1/1/1 ip address x.1.1.2/30 ip access-group BLOCK_TO_CORE in logging enable ! 2. Verify the ingress ACL discards and logs packets destined to the IP core address space. ip access-list extended BLOCK_TO_CORE sequence 10 deny ip any 10.x.0.0 0.0.255.255 log remark permit other traffic sequence 20 permit ip any any ! If the PE router is not configured to block any traffic with a destination address assigned to the IP core infrastructure, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-77607r1109854_fix)

Configure protection for the IP core to be implemented at the edges by blocking any traffic with a destination address assigned to the IP core infrastructure. 1. Configure an ingress ACL to discard and log packets destined to the IP core address space. ICX(config)#ip access-list ext BLOCK_TO_CORE ICX(config-ext-ipacl-BLOCK_TO_CORE)#deny ip any 10.x.0.0/16 log ICX(config-ext-ipacl-BLOCK_TO_CORE)#remark permit other traffic ICX(config-ext-ipacl-BLOCK_TO_CORE)#permit ip any any 2. Apply the ACL inbound to all external or CE-facing interfaces. ICX(config)#interface ethernet 1/1/1 ICX(config-if-e10000-1/1/1)#port-name CE_port ICX(config-if-e10000-1/1/1)#ip access-group BLOCK_TO_CORE in logging enable