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The RUCKUS ICX router must be configured to authenticate all routing protocol messages using NIST-validated FIPS 198-1 message authentication code algorithm.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-273597RCKS-RTR-000300SV-273597r1110916_ruleCCI-000803medium
Description
A rogue router could send a fictitious routing update to convince a site's perimeter router to send traffic to an incorrect or even a rogue destination. This diverted traffic could be analyzed to learn confidential information about the site's network or used to disrupt the network's ability to communicate with other networks. This is known as a "traffic attraction attack" and is prevented by configuring neighbor router authentication for routing updates. However, using clear-text authentication provides little benefit since an attacker can intercept traffic and view the authentication key. This would allow the attacker to use the authentication key in an attack. Since MD5 is vulnerable to "birthday" attacks and may be compromised, routing protocol authentication must use FIPS 198-1 validated algorithms and modules to encrypt the authentication key. This requirement applies to all IPv4 and IPv6 protocols that are used to exchange routing or packet forwarding information; this includes all Interior Gateway Protocols (such as OSPF, EIGRP, and IS-IS) and Exterior Gateway Protocols (such as BGP), MPLS-related protocols (such as LDP), and multicast-related protocols. Satisfies: SRG-NET-000168-RTR-000078, SRG-NET-000168-RTR-000077
STIGDate
RUCKUS ICX Router Security Technical Implementation Guide2025-06-03

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 4 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (7) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

IAC-01.2Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA)
1.00
IAC-02Identification & Authentication for Organizational Users
1.00
IAC-03Identification & Authentication for Non-Organizational Users
1.00
IAC-04Identification & Authentication for Devices
1.00
IAC-05Identification & Authentication for Third-Party Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS)
1.00
CRY-02Automated Authentication Through Cryptographic Modules
0.50
IAC-12Cryptographic Module Authentication
0.50
NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (36) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-17(2)Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption
1.00
AC-2(4)Automated Audit Actions
1.00
AC-3Access Enforcement
1.00
AC-4Information Flow Enforcement
1.00
AC-4(17)Domain Authentication
1.00
AC-6(9)Log Use of Privileged Functions
1.00
AU-12Audit Record Generation
1.00
AU-3Content of Audit Records
1.00
CM-5(1)Automated Access Enforcement and Audit Records
1.00

+26 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

CCI1 mapping
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (2) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

Who does this work

7 NICE work roles and 5 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-273597r1110916_chk)

Review configuration for routing protocol authentication and encryption. OSPF: router ospf area 0 ! interface ethernet 1/1/1 ip ospf area 0 ip ospf authentication hmac-sha-256 key-id 10 key 2 $Nlx9cy1TR31TIS0tfURuXA== ipv6 address fd00:12::2/32 ! BGP: keychain mykeychain tcp key-id 1 password 2 $Uyt9R3NVfURuXH1a authentication-algorithm aes-128-cmac send-lifetime start 03-05-2024 00:00:00 end 09-01-2024 00:00:00 no accept-ao-mismatch send-id 1 recv-id 1 router bgp local-as xxxx neighbor x.x.x.x remote-as 10 neighbor x.x.x.x ao mykeychain If OSPF or BGP is configured and does not use authentication/encryption, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-77593r1109812_fix)

Configure OSPF or BGP keychain as appropriate: ICX(config)# router ospf ICX(config-ospf-router)# area 0 ICX(config)# interface ve 1 ICX(config-vif-1)#ip ospf area 0 ICX(config-vif-1)#ip ospf authentication hmac-sha-256 key 10 key my_ospf_pass_key --------------------- ICX(config)# keychain mykeychain ICX(config-keychain-tcp-mykeychain)# key 1 ICX(config-keychain-tcp-mykeychain-key-1)# authentication-algorithm aes-128-cmac ICX(config-keychain-tcp-mykeychain-key-1)# no accept-ao-mismatch ICX(config-keychain-tcp-mykeychain-key-1)# include-tcp-options ICX(config-keychain-tcp-mykeychain-key-1)# send-id 1 ICX(config-keychain-tcp-mykeychain-key-1)# recv-id 1 ICX(config-keychain-tcp-mykeychain-key-1)# accept-lifetime start 03-05-24 10:10:10 end 15552000 !!! 180 days in seconds ICX(config-keychain-tcp-mykeychain-key-1)# send-lifetime start 03-05-24 10:10:10 end 09-01-24 10:10:10 ICX(config)# router bgp ICX(config-bgp-router)# local-as xxxx ICX(config-bgp-router)# neighbor x.x.x.x remote-as 10 ICX(config-bgp-router)#neighbor x.x.x.x ao mykeychain