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The RUCKUS ICX Multicast Source Discovery Protocol router must be configured to filter source-active multicast advertisements to external MSDP peers to avoid global visibility of local-only multicast sources and groups.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-273576RCKS-RTR-000080SV-273576r1110885_ruleCCI-001368low
Description
To avoid global visibility of local information, there are a number of source-group (S, G) states in a PIM-SM domain that must not be leaked to another domain, such as multicast sources with private address, administratively scoped multicast addresses, and the auto-RP groups (224.0.1.39 and 224.0.1.40). Allowing a multicast distribution tree, local to the core, to extend beyond its boundary could enable local multicast traffic to leak into other autonomous systems and customer networks.
STIGDate
RUCKUS ICX Router Security Technical Implementation Guide2025-06-03

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (17) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AST-04Network Diagrams & Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs)
1.00
AST-04.2Control Applicability Boundary Graphical Representation
1.00
CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
1.00
CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
DCH-19Geographic Location of Data
1.00
END-01Endpoint Device Management (EDM)
1.00
END-04Malicious Code Protection (Anti-Malware)
1.00
END-06Endpoint File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
IAC-21Least Privilege
1.00

+7 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (42) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-2(1)Automated System Account Management
1.00
AC-2(10)Shared and Group Account Credential Change
1.00
AC-2(2)Automated Temporary and Emergency Account Management
1.00
AC-2(3)Disable Accounts
1.00
AC-2(4)Automated Audit Actions
1.00
AC-3Access Enforcement
1.00
AC-3(7)Role-based Access Control
1.00
AC-4Information Flow Enforcement
1.00
AC-6(10)Prohibit Non-privileged Users from Executing Privileged Functions
1.00
AC-6(9)Log Use of Privileged Functions
1.00

+32 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (1) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.1.3
1.00
CCI1 mapping
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (4) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

Who does this work

18 NICE work roles and 10 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-273576r1110885_chk)

Check for SA filter on MSDP peer: ICX# show msdp peer x.x.x.x | include Output  Output SA Filter:Applicable Output (S,G) route-map:out_MSDP_SA_filter Output RP route-map:None If any configured MSDP peer is not configured to filter outbound advertisements to avoid local-only multicast sources and groups, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-77572r1109749_fix)

Create access list to filter source-active multicast advertisements for any undesirable multicast groups and sources: ip access-list extended out_MSDP_SA_filter sequence 10 deny ip 10.0.0.0/8 any sequence 20 permit ip any any route-map out_MSDP_SA_filter permit 10 match ip address out_MSDP_SA_filter router msdp msdp-peer x.x.x.x sa-filter originate route-map out_MSDP_SA_filter !