OpenControls Logo

STIG Viewer

STIGViewer Support

The RUCKUS ICX Multicast Source Discovery Protocol router must be configured to filter received source-active multicast advertisements for any undesirable multicast groups and sources.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-273575RCKS-RTR-000070SV-273575r1110884_ruleCCI-001368low
Description
The interoperability of BGP extensions for interdomain multicast routing and MSDP enables seamless connectivity of multicast domains between autonomous systems. MP-BGP advertises the unicast prefixes of the multicast sources used by Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) routers to perform RPF checks and build multicast distribution trees. MSDP is a mechanism used to connect multiple PIM sparse-mode domains, allowing RPs from different domains to share information about active sources. When RPs in peering multicast domains hear about active sources, they can pass on that information to their local receivers, thereby allowing multicast data to be forwarded between the domains. Configuring an import policy to block multicast advertisements for reserved, Martian, single-source multicast, and any other undesirable multicast groups, as well as any source-group (S, G) states with Bogon source addresses, would assist in avoiding unwanted multicast traffic from traversing the core.
STIGDate
RUCKUS ICX Router Security Technical Implementation Guide2025-06-03

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (17) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AST-04Network Diagrams & Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs)
1.00
AST-04.2Control Applicability Boundary Graphical Representation
1.00
CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
1.00
CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
DCH-19Geographic Location of Data
1.00
END-01Endpoint Device Management (EDM)
1.00
END-04Malicious Code Protection (Anti-Malware)
1.00
END-06Endpoint File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
IAC-21Least Privilege
1.00

+7 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (42) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-2(1)Automated System Account Management
1.00
AC-2(10)Shared and Group Account Credential Change
1.00
AC-2(2)Automated Temporary and Emergency Account Management
1.00
AC-2(3)Disable Accounts
1.00
AC-2(4)Automated Audit Actions
1.00
AC-3Access Enforcement
1.00
AC-3(7)Role-based Access Control
1.00
AC-4Information Flow Enforcement
1.00
AC-6(10)Prohibit Non-privileged Users from Executing Privileged Functions
1.00
AC-6(9)Log Use of Privileged Functions
1.00

+32 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (1) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.1.3
1.00
CCI1 mapping
CCI-001368
1.00
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (4) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

DE.CM-09
1.00
ID.AM-03
1.00
PR.DS-10
1.00
PR.IR-01
1.00

Who does this work

18 NICE work roles and 10 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-273575r1110884_chk)

Check for SA filter on MSDP peer: ICX# show msdp peer x.x.x.x | include Input Input SA Filter:Applicable Input (S,G) route-map:MSDP_SA_filter Input RP route-map:None If any configured MSDP peer is not configured to filter undesirable multicast groups and sources, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-77571r1109746_fix)

Create access-list to filter source-active multicast advertisements for any undesirable multicast groups and sources: ip access-list extended in_MSDP_SA_filter sequence 10 deny ip any host 224.0.1.3 sequence 20 deny ip any host 224.0.1.24 sequence 30 deny ip any host 224.0.1.22 sequence 40 deny ip any host 224.0.1.2 sequence 50 deny ip any host 224.0.1.35 sequence 60 deny ip any host 224.0.1.60 sequence 70 deny ip any host 224.0.1.39 sequence 80 deny ip any host 224.0.1.40 sequence 90 deny ip any 232.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 sequence 100 deny ip any 239.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 sequence 110 deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any sequence 120 deny ip 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any sequence 130 deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any sequence 140 deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any sequence 150 permit ip any any route-map MSDP_SA_filter permit 10 match ip address in_MSDP_SA_filter router msdp msdp-peer x.x.x.x sa-filter in x.x.x.x route-map MSDP_SA_filter !