STIGViewer Support

The Nokia Provider Edge (PE) router providing virtual private local area network services (VPLS) must be configured to have all attachment circuits defined to the virtual forwarding instance (VFI) with the globally unique VPN ID assigned for each customer VLAN.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-283826NOKI-RT-000080SV-283826r1203727_ruleCCI-000366high
Description
VPLS defines an architecture that delivers Ethernet multipoint services over a Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) network. Customer layer 2 frames are forwarded across the MPLS core via pseudowires using IEEE 802.1q Ethernet bridging principles. A pseudowire is a virtual bidirectional connection between two attachment circuits (virtual connections between PE and CE routers). A pseudowire contains two unidirectional label-switched paths (LSP) between two PE routers. Each MAC virtual forwarding instance (VFI) table is interconnected using pseudowires provisioned for the bridge domain, thereby maintaining privacy and logical separation between each VPLS bridge domain. The VFI specifies the pseudowires associated with connecting PE routers and the customer-facing attachment circuits belonging to a given VLAN. Resembling a layer 2 switch, the VFI is responsible for learning MAC addresses and providing loop-free forwarding of customer traffic to the appropriate end nodes. Each VPLS domain is identified by a globally unique VPN ID; hence, VFIs of the same VPLS domain must be configured with the same VPN ID on all participating PE routers. To guarantee traffic separation for all customer VLANs and that all packets are forwarded to the correct destination, the correct attachment circuits must be associated with the appropriate VFI, and each VFI must be associated to the unique VPN ID assigned to the customer VLAN.
STIGDate
Nokia Service Router OS 25.x Router Security Technical Implementation Guide2026-06-15

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (8) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CFG-01Configuration Management Program
1.00
END-01Endpoint Device Management (EDM)
1.00
END-04Malicious Code Protection (Anti-Malware)
1.00
END-06Endpoint File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
MON-01Continuous Monitoring
1.00
MON-01.7File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
0.50
CFG-02.7Approved Configuration Deviations
0.50
NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (100) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-12Session Termination
1.00
AC-16(1)Dynamic Attribute Association
1.00
AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-2Account Management
1.00
AC-2(1)Automated System Account Management
1.00
AC-2(11)Usage Conditions
1.00
AC-2(3)Disable Accounts
1.00
AC-2(4)Automated Audit Actions
1.00
AC-24(1)Transmit Access Authorization Information
1.00
AC-25Reference Monitor
1.00

+90 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (2) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.4.1
1.00
3.4.2
1.00
CCI1 mapping
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (5) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

PR.PSPlatform Security
0.50

Who does this work

10 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-283826r1203727_chk)

Review the implementation plan and the Service IDs assigned to customer VLANs for the VPLS deployment. Review the PE router configuration to verify customer attachment circuits (i.e., VLANs) are associated to the appropriate VFI. In the example below, the attached circuit at port 1/1/c5/1 is associated to Service ID 20. Use the following command: - show service id 20 base Service Basic Information Service Id : 20 Vpn Id : 20 Service Type : VPLS —--- snip —--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Service Access & Destination Points ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Identifier Type AdmMTU OprMTU Adm Opr ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sap:1/1/c5/1:100 q-tag 1518 1518 Up Up sdp:30:20 M(3.3.3.3) Mesh 0 9190 Up Up If the attachment circuits have not been bound to VFI configured with the assigned Service ID for each VLAN, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-88296r1203726_fix)

Assign globally unique Service IDs for each customer VLAN using VPLS for carrier Ethernet services between multiple sites, and configure the attachment circuits to the appropriate VFI: - configure service vpls 20 vpn 20 customer 1 create - config>service>vpls# mesh-sdp 40:20 create - config>service>vpls>mesh-sdp# exit - config>service>vpls# sap 1/1/c5/1:100 create - config>service>vpls>sap# exit - config>service>vpls# no shutdown - config>service>vpls# exit all