STIGViewer Support

The Nokia perimeter router must be configured to filter traffic destined to the enclave in accordance with the guidelines contained in DOD Instruction (DODI) 8551.1.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-283823NOKI-RT-000050SV-283823r1203718_ruleCCI-001097medium
Description
Vulnerability assessments must be reviewed by the system administrator, and protocols must be approved by the information assurance staff before entering the enclave. Access control lists (ACLs) are the first line of defense in a layered security approach. They permit authorized packets and deny unauthorized packets based on port or service type. They enhance the posture of the network by not allowing packets to reach a potential target within the security domain. The lists provided are highly susceptible ports and services that should be blocked or limited as much as possible without adversely affecting customer requirements. Auditing packets attempting to penetrate the network but that are stopped by an ACL will allow network administrators to broaden their protective ring and more tightly define the scope of operation. If the perimeter is in a Deny-by-Default posture and what is allowed through the filter is in accordance with DODI 8551.1, and if the permit rule is explicitly defined with explicit ports and protocols allowed, then all requirements related to ports, protocols, and services being blocked would be satisfied.
STIGDate
Nokia Service Router OS 25.x Router Security Technical Implementation Guide2026-06-15

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (18) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
1.00
CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
CRY-01.1Alternate Physical Protection
1.00
CRY-03Transmission Confidentiality
1.00
CRY-04Transmission Integrity
1.00
CRY-05Encrypting Data At Rest
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
IAC-21Least Privilege
1.00
MON-01Continuous Monitoring
1.00
MON-01.1Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems (IDS & IPS)
1.00

+8 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (10) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CM-6Configuration Settings
1.00
SC-24Fail in Known State
1.00
SC-47Alternate Communications Paths
1.00
SC-5Denial-of-service Protection
1.00
SC-7Boundary Protection
1.00
SC-7(11)Restrict Incoming Communications Traffic
1.00
SC-7(29)Separate Subnets to Isolate Functions
1.00
SC-7(5)Deny by Default — Allow by Exception
1.00
SI-4System Monitoring
1.00
SI-4(11)Analyze Communications Traffic Anomalies
1.00
NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (3) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.13.1
1.00
3.13.2
1.00
3.13.5
1.00
CCI1 mapping
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (5) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

Who does this work

15 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-283823r1203718_chk)

This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify the ingress filter is in accordance with DODI 8551. Verify all interfaces have ingress filters for IPv4 and IPv6 assigned, as shown in the example below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 10 - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 20 If the router does not filter traffic in accordance with the guidelines contained in DODI 8551, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-88293r1203717_fix)

This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the router to use ingress ACLs to restrict traffic in accordance with the guidelines in DODI 8551.1 for all services and protocols required for operational commitments, as shown in the example below: IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match src-ip 172.200.200.2/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit all IPv6 filter: - configure filter ipv6-filter 20 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match src-ip 2001:acad:1234:200::2/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit all Apply the filter to the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 10 - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 20