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The Windows DNS Server must protect the integrity of transmitted information.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-259397WDNS-22-000069SV-259397r961632_ruleCCI-002418high
Description
Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality and integrity may be compromised because unprotected communications can be intercepted and either read or altered. Communication paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility of interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., employing physical distribution systems) or by logical means (e.g., employing cryptographic techniques). If physical means of protection are employed, logical means (cryptography) do not have to be employed, and vice versa. Confidentiality is not an objective of DNS, but integrity is. DNSSEC and TSIG/SIG(0) both digitally sign DNS information to authenticate its source and ensure its integrity.
STIGDate
Microsoft Windows Server Domain Name System (DNS) Security Technical Implementation Guide2026-02-23

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 4 hops (4) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
CRY-03Transmission Confidentiality
1.00
CRY-04Transmission Integrity
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (29) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-10Concurrent Session Control
1.00
AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-17(2)Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption
1.00
AC-18(1)Authentication and Encryption
1.00
AC-3Access Enforcement
1.00
CM-6Configuration Settings
1.00
CM-7Least Functionality
1.00
IA-11Re-authentication
1.00
IA-2(8)Access to Accounts — Replay Resistant
1.00
IA-2(9)Network Access to Non-privileged Accounts — Replay Resistant
1.00

+19 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (1) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.13.8
1.00
CCI1 mapping
CCI-002418
1.00
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (1) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

PR.DS-02
1.00

Who does this work

8 NICE work roles and 7 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-259397r961632_chk)

Note: This check is not applicable for Windows DNS Servers that host only Active Directory-integrated zones or for Windows DNS Servers on a classified network. Validate this check from the Windows DNS Server being configured/reviewed. Log on to the Windows DNS Server using the account designated as Administrator or DNS Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows DNS Server being configured/reviewed. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> Note: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer, and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-63044r945338_fix)

Sign or re-sign the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the Windows DNS Server using the account designated as Administrator or DNS Administrator. Press the Windows key + R and execute "dnsmgmt.msc". On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server and then expand "Forward Lookup Zones". From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click "Sign the Zone" using either approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.