| V-206647 | | The layer 2 switch must uniquely identify all network-connected endpoint devices before establishing any connection. | Controlling LAN access via 802.1x authentication can assist in preventing a malicious user from connecting an unauthorized PC to a switch port to inje... |
| V-206646 | | The layer 2 switch must be configured to disable non-essential capabilities. | A compromised switch introduces risk to the entire network infrastructure as well as data resources that are accessible via the network. The perimeter... |
| V-206648 | | The layer 2 switch must authenticate all VLAN Trunk Protocol (VTP) messages with a hash function using the most secured cryptographic algorithm available. | VLAN Trunk Protocol (VTP) provides central management of VLAN domains, thus reducing administration in a switched network. When configuring a new VLAN... |
| V-206649 | | The layer 2 switch must manage excess bandwidth to limit the effects of packet flooding types of denial of service (DoS) attacks. | Denial of service is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. Packet flooding DDoS attacks are referred to as volumetric att... |
| V-206650 | | The layer 2 switch must be configured to fail securely in the event of an operational failure. | If the switch fails in an unsecure manner (open), unauthorized traffic originating externally to the enclave may enter or the device may permit unauth... |
| V-206653 | | The layer 2 switch must authenticate all network-connected endpoint devices before establishing any connection. | Without authenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity.
For distributed architect... |
| V-206655 | | The layer 2 switch must have BPDU Guard enabled on all user-facing or untrusted access switch ports. | If a rogue switch is introduced into the topology and transmits a Bridge Protocol Data Unit (BPDU) with a lower bridge priority than the existing root... |
| V-206656 | | The layer 2 switch must have STP Loop Guard enabled on all non-designated STP switch ports. | The Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) loop guard feature provides additional protection against STP loops. An STP loop is created when an STP blocking port... |
| V-206657 | | The layer 2 switch must have Unknown Unicast Flood Blocking (UUFB) enabled. | Access layer switches use the Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table to direct traffic to specific ports based on the VLAN number and the destination ... |
| V-206658 | | The layer 2 switch must have DHCP snooping for all user VLANs to validate DHCP messages from untrusted sources. | In an enterprise network, devices under administrative control are trusted sources. These devices include the switches, routers, and servers in the ne... |
| V-206659 | | The layer 2 switch must have IP Source Guard enabled on all user-facing or untrusted access switch ports. | IP Source Guard provides source IP address filtering on a Layer 2 port to prevent a malicious host from impersonating a legitimate host by assuming th... |
| V-206660 | | The layer 2 switch must have Dynamic Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Inspection (DAI) enabled on all user VLANs. | DAI intercepts Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests and verifies that each of these packets has a valid IP-to-MAC address binding before updatin... |
| V-206663 | | The layer 2 switch must implement Rapid STP where VLANs span multiple switches with redundant links. | Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is implemented on bridges and switches to prevent layer 2 loops when a broadcast domain spans multiple bridges and switch... |
| V-206664 | | The layer 2 switch must enable Unidirectional Link Detection (UDLD) to protect against one-way connections. | In topologies where fiber optic interconnections are used, physical misconnections can occur that allow a link to appear to be up when there is a mism... |
| V-206665 | | The layer 2 switch must have all trunk links enabled statically. | When trunk negotiation is enabled via Dynamic Trunk Protocol (DTP), considerable time can be spent negotiating trunk settings (802.1q or ISL) when a n... |
| V-206666 | | The layer 2 switch must have all disabled switch ports assigned to an unused VLAN. | It is possible that a disabled port that is assigned to a user or management VLAN becomes enabled by accident or by an attacker and as a result gains ... |
| V-206667 | | The layer 2 switch must not have the default VLAN assigned to any host-facing switch ports. | In a VLAN-based network, switches use the default VLAN (i.e., VLAN 1) for in-band management and to communicate with other networking devices using Sp... |
| V-206668 | | The layer 2 switch must have the default VLAN pruned from all trunk ports that do not require it. | The default VLAN (i.e., VLAN 1) is a special VLAN used for control plane traffic such as Spanning-Tree Protocol (STP), Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP)... |
| V-206669 | | The layer 2 switch must not use the default VLAN for management traffic. | Switches use the default VLAN (i.e., VLAN 1) for in-band management and to communicate with directly connected switches using Spanning-Tree Protocol (... |
| V-206670 | | The layer 2 switch must have all user-facing or untrusted ports configured as access switch ports. | Double encapsulation can be initiated by an attacker who has access to a switch port belonging to the native VLAN of the trunk port. Knowing the victi... |
| V-206671 | | The layer 2 switch must have the native VLAN assigned to an ID other than the default VLAN for all 802.1q trunk links. | VLAN hopping can be initiated by an attacker who has access to a switch port belonging to the same VLAN as the native VLAN of the trunk link connectin... |
| V-216507 | | The layer 2 switch must be configured in accordance with the security configuration settings based on DoD security configuration or implementation guidance, including STIGs, NSA configuration guides, CTOs, and DTMs. | Configuring the network device to implement organization-wide security implementation guides and security checklists ensures compliance with federal s... |
| V-263667 | | The layer 2 switch must implement physically or logically separate subnetworks to isolate organization-defined critical system components and functions. | Separating critical system components and functions from other noncritical system components and functions through separate subnetworks may be necessa... |
| V-263668 | | The layer 2 switch must establish organization-defined alternate communications paths for system operations organizational command and control. | An incident, whether adversarial- or nonadversarial-based, can disrupt established communications paths used for system operations and organizational ... |
| V-206654 | | The layer 2 switch must have Root Guard enabled on all switch ports connecting to access layer switches and hosts. | Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) does not provide any means for the network administrator to securely enforce the topology of the switched network. Any sw... |
| V-206661 | | The layer 2 switch must have Storm Control configured on all host-facing switch ports. | A traffic storm occurs when packets flood a LAN, creating excessive traffic and degrading network performance. Traffic storm control prevents network ... |
| V-206662 | | The layer 2 switch must have IGMP or MLD Snooping configured on all VLANs | IGMP and MLD snooping provides a way to constrain multicast traffic at Layer 2. By monitoring the IGMP or MLD membership reports sent by hosts within ... |
| V-206672 | | The layer 2 switch must not have any switch ports assigned to the native VLAN. | Double encapsulation can be initiated by an attacker who has access to a switch port belonging to the native VLAN of the trunk port. Knowing the victi... |
