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The Juniper BGP router must be configured to limit the prefix size on any inbound route advertisement to /24 or the least significant prefixes issued to the customer.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-254038JUEX-RT-000660SV-254038r844147_ruleCCI-002385low
Description
The effects of prefix deaggregation can degrade router performance due to the size of routing tables and also result in black-holing legitimate traffic. Initiated by an attacker or a misconfigured router, prefix deaggregation occurs when the announcement of a large prefix is fragmented into a collection of smaller prefix announcements.
STIGDate
Juniper EX Series Switches Router Security Technical Implementation Guide2024-06-10

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 4 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (13) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

MON-01Continuous Monitoring
1.00
MON-01.1Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems (IDS & IPS)
1.00
MON-01.3Inbound & Outbound Communications Traffic
1.00
MON-01.4System Generated Alerts
1.00
MON-01.8Security Event Monitoring
1.00
NET-01Network Security Controls (NSC)
1.00
NET-02Layered Network Defenses
1.00
SEA-01Secure Engineering Principles
1.00
SEA-02Alignment With Enterprise Architecture
1.00
CAP-01Capacity & Performance Management
0.50

+3 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (36) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-10Concurrent Session Control
1.00
AC-17(9)Disconnect or Disable Access
1.00
AC-2(4)Automated Audit Actions
1.00
AC-3Access Enforcement
1.00
AC-4Information Flow Enforcement
1.00
AC-6(9)Log Use of Privileged Functions
1.00
AU-12Audit Record Generation
1.00
AU-3Content of Audit Records
1.00
AU-5Response to Audit Logging Process Failures
1.00
CM-11(2)Software Installation with Privileged Status
1.00

+26 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

CCI1 mapping
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (3) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

Who does this work

12 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-254038r844147_chk)

This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify that there is a filter to reject inbound route advertisements that are greater than /24, or the least significant prefixes issued to the customer, whichever is larger. Verify each BGP neighbor implements an import policy. BGP import policies are supported in three locations: Global (at [edit protocols bgp]), group (at [edit protocols bgp group <name>]), and for each neighbor (at [edit protocols bgp group <name> neighbor <neighbor address>]) with the most specific import statement being applied. Multiple policy statements may be necessary to address each customer's requirements. [edit policy-options] policy-statement reject-long-prefixes { term 1 { from { route-filter 0.0.0.0/0 prefix-length-range /25-/32; } then reject; } <additional terms> } [edit protocols] bgp { group <group name> { type external; import <policy statement name>; << Applied instead of global BGP policy unless a more specific neighbor import filter exists. Excludes all terms in the global filter. local-as <local AS number>; neighbor <neighbor 1 address> { import <policy statement name>; << Most specific import filter. If configured, only this filter applies to this neighbor (all other terms in all other filters ignored). authentication-key "$8$aes256-gcm$hmac-sha2-256$100$cFQ99Gy83Og$SCMVXvnfna7/cZqH9fCECQ$bCVokm+es94xFJONmbKFNA$4561Uc/r"; ## SECRET-DATA } neighbor <neighbor 2 address> { import <policy statement name>; << Most specific import filter. If configured, only this filter applies to this neighbor (all other terms in all other filters ignored). ipsec-sa <SA name>; } } import <policy statement name>; << Least specific import filter. } If the router is not configured to limit the prefix size on any inbound route advertisement to /24 or the least significant prefixes issued to the customer, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-57441r844146_fix)

Configure all eBGP routers to use the prefix limit feature to protect against route table flooding and prefix deaggregation attacks. set policy-options policy-statement <statement name> term 1 from route-filter 0.0.0.0/0 prefix-length-range /25-/32 set policy-options policy-statement <statement name> term 1 then reject set protocols bgp group <group name> type external set protocols bgp group <group name> import <statement name> set protocols bgp group <group name> local-as <local AS number> set protocols bgp group <group name> neighbor <neighbor 1 address> import <statement name> set protocols bgp group <group name> neighbor <neighbor 1 address> authentication-key <PSK value> set protocols bgp group <group name> neighbor <neighbor 2 address> import <statement name> set protocols bgp group <group name> neighbor <neighbor 2 address> ipsec-sa <SA name> set protocols bgp import <statement name>