STIGViewer Support

The Juniper PE router must be configured to block any traffic that is destined to IP core infrastructure.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-254016JUEX-RT-000440SV-254016r997526_ruleCCI-001097high
Description
IP/MPLS networks providing VPN and transit services must provide, at the least, the same level of protection against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and intrusions as layer 2 networks. Although the IP core network elements are hidden, security should never rely entirely on obscurity. IP addresses can be guessed. Core network elements must not be accessible from any external host. Protecting the core from any attack is vital for the integrity and privacy of customer traffic as well as the availability of transit services. A compromise of the IP core can result in an outage or, at a minimum, nonoptimized forwarding of customer traffic. Protecting the core from an outside attack also prevents attackers from using the core to attack any customer. Hence, it is imperative that all routers at the edge deny traffic destined to any address belonging to the IP core infrastructure.
STIGDate
Juniper EX Series Switches Router Security Technical Implementation Guide2024-06-10

Related Frameworks

2 mappings across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (22) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
1.00
CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
CRY-01.1Alternate Physical Protection
1.00
CRY-03Transmission Confidentiality
1.00
CRY-04Transmission Integrity
1.00
CRY-05Encrypting Data At Rest
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
IAC-21Least Privilege
1.00
MON-01Continuous Monitoring
1.00
MON-01.1Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems (IDS & IPS)
1.00

+12 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (15) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-10Concurrent Session Control
1.00
AC-4Information Flow Enforcement
1.00
CM-6Configuration Settings
1.00
CM-7Least Functionality
1.00
SC-24Fail in Known State
1.00
SC-47Alternate Communications Paths
1.00
SC-5Denial-of-service Protection
1.00
SC-5(1)Restrict Ability to Attack Other Systems
1.00
SC-5(2)Capacity, Bandwidth, and Redundancy
1.00
SC-7Boundary Protection
1.00

+5 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (3) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.13.1
1.00
3.13.2
1.00
3.13.5
1.00
CCI2 mappings
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (6) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

Who does this work

15 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-254016r997526_chk)

Review the PE router configuration to verify that an ingress firewall filter is applied to all CE-facing interfaces. Verify that the ingress firewall filter rejects and logs packets destined to the IP core address block. For example: [edit policy-options] prefix-list ipv4-core { 192.0.2.0/24; } prefix-list ipv6-core { 2001:db8:2::/64; } [edit firewall] family inet { filter deny-core-ipv4 { term 1 { from { destination-prefix-list { ipv4-core; } } then { log; syslog; discard; } } term default { then accept; } } } family inet6 { filter deny-core-ipv6 { term 1 { from { destination-prefix-list { ipv6-core; } } then { log; syslog; discard; } } term default { then accept; } } } Verify the firewall filter is applied to CE-facing interfaces: [edit interfaces] ge-0/0/0 { unit 0 { family inet { filter { input deny-core-ipv4; } address <IPv4 address/mask>; } family inet6 { filter { input deny-core-ipv6; } address <IPv6 address/prefix>; } } } Note: Some Juniper devices support both monolithic filters and filter lists. Filter lists separate each term, or set of terms, into a separate filter that is applied sequentially to an interface. If using filter lists, the keywords "input" or "output" change to "input-list" or "output-list". Verify the final list item is a deny-all filter. The deny-all filter is created once per family and can be reused across multiple lists. For example: input-list [ permit_mgt permit_routing_protocols default-deny ]; If the PE router is not configured to block any traffic with a destination address assigned to the IP core infrastructure, this is a finding. Note: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo requests and traceroutes will be allowed to the edge from external adjacent peers.

Fix Text (F-57419r844080_fix)

Configure protection for the IP core to be implemented at the edges by blocking any traffic with a destination address assigned to the IP core infrastructure. Configure appropriate prefix lists and firewall filters. For example: set policy-options prefix-list ipv4-core 192.0.2.0/24 set policy-options prefix-list ipv6-core 2001:db8:2::/64 set firewall family inet filter deny-core-ipv4 term 1 from destination-prefix-list ipv4-core set firewall family inet filter deny-core-ipv4 term 1 then log set firewall family inet filter deny-core-ipv4 term 1 then syslog set firewall family inet filter deny-core-ipv4 term 1 then discard set firewall family inet filter deny-core-ipv4 term default then accept set firewall family inet6 filter deny-core-ipv6 term 1 from destination-prefix-list ipv6-core set firewall family inet6 filter deny-core-ipv6 term 1 then log set firewall family inet6 filter deny-core-ipv6 term 1 then syslog set firewall family inet6 filter deny-core-ipv6 term 1 then discard set firewall family inet6 filter deny-core-ipv6 term default then accept Configure the appropriate interfaces with the firewall filter. For example: [edit interfaces] set interfaces ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family inet filter input deny-core-ipv4 set interfaces ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family inet address <IPv4 address/mask> set interfaces ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family inet6 filter input deny-core-ipv6 set interfaces ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family inet6 address <IPv6 address/prefix>