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The Infoblox DNS service member implementation must follow procedures to promote a secondary DNS service member to the role of primary DNS service member in the event the current primary DNS service member permanently loses functionality.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-233896IDNS-8X-400038SV-233896r1156951_ruleCCI-000366medium
Description
Failing to an unsecure condition negatively impacts application security and can lead to system compromise. Failure conditions include, for example, loss of communications among critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe procedures include, for example, alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on subsequent steps to take (e.g., do nothing, reestablish system settings, shut down processes, restart the system, or contact designated organizational personnel). If a component such as DNSSEC signing capabilities were to fail, the DNS server must shut itself down to prevent continued execution without the necessary security components in place. Transactions such as zone transfers would not be able to work correctly in this state.
STIGDate
Infoblox 8.x DNS Security Technical Implementation Guide2026-06-03

Related Frameworks

2 mappings across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (9) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CFG-01Configuration Management Program
1.00
END-01Endpoint Device Management (EDM)
1.00
END-04Malicious Code Protection (Anti-Malware)
1.00
END-06Endpoint File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
MON-01Continuous Monitoring
1.00
MON-01.7File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
1.00
SEA-07.3Fail Safe
1.00
CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
0.50
CFG-02.7Approved Configuration Deviations
0.50
NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (100) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-12Session Termination
1.00
AC-16(1)Dynamic Attribute Association
1.00
AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-2Account Management
1.00
AC-2(1)Automated System Account Management
1.00
AC-2(11)Usage Conditions
1.00
AC-2(3)Disable Accounts
1.00
AC-2(4)Automated Audit Actions
1.00
AC-24(1)Transmit Access Authorization Information
1.00
AC-25Reference Monitor
1.00

+90 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (2) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.4.1
1.00
3.4.2
1.00
CCI2 mappings
CCI-000366
1.00
CCI-002775
1.00
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (5) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

DE.CM-09
1.00
PR.PS-01
1.00
PR.DS-10
0.50
PR.PSPlatform Security
0.50
PR.PS-05
0.50

Who does this work

10 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-233896r1156951_chk)

Validation of this configuration item requires review of the network architecture and security configuration in addition to DNS service member configuration to validate external DNS service members are not accessible from the internal network when a split DNS configuration is implemented. 1. Navigate to Data Management >> DNS >> Members tab. 2. Review the network configuration and access control of each Infoblox member that has the DNS service running. 3. Select each grid member and click "Edit". 4. Review the "Queries" tab to verify that both queries and recursion options are enabled and allowed only from the respective client networks. If a split DNS configuration is not used, this is not a finding. If there is no access control configured or access control does not restrict queries and recursion to the respective client network, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-37046r1082676_fix)

1. Refer to the Infoblox NIOS Administrator Guide, Chapters "Deploying a Grid", and "Configuring DNS Zones", section "Assigning Zone Authority to DNS service members", if necessary. 2. Configure a Grid Manager Candidate or define a local policy to promote a secondary DNS service member.