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The IBM RACF System REXX IRRPWREX security data set must be properly protected.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-223684RACF-ES-000360SV-223684r1137691_ruleCCI-000213high
Description
To mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information by entities that have been issued certificates by DoD-approved PKIs, all DoD systems (e.g., web servers and web portals) must be properly configured to incorporate access control methods that do not rely solely on the possession of a certificate for access. Successful authentication must not automatically give an entity access to an asset or security boundary. Authorization procedures and controls must be implemented to ensure each authenticated entity also has a validated and current authorization. Authorization is the process of determining whether an entity, once authenticated, is permitted to access a specific asset. Information systems use access control policies and enforcement mechanisms to implement this requirement. Security functions are the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection is based. Operating systems implement code separation (i.e., separation of security functions from nonsecurity functions) in a number of ways, including through the provision of security kernels via processor rings or processor modes. For non-kernel code, security function isolation is often achieved through file system protections that serve to protect the code on disk and address space protections that protect executing code. Developers and implementers can increase the assurance in security functions by employing well-defined security policy models; structured, disciplined, and rigorous hardware and software development techniques; and sound system/security engineering principles. Implementation may include isolation of memory space and libraries. Operating systems restrict access to security functions through the use of access control mechanisms and by implementing least privilege capabilities. Satisfies: SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048, SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068, SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100
STIGDate
IBM z/OS RACF Security Technical Implementation Guide2026-06-03

Related Frameworks

3 mappings across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (23) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
1.00
CHG-04.5Library Privileges
1.00
CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
HRS-02Position Categorization
1.00
HRS-11Separation of Duties (SoD)
1.00
IAC-01Identity & Access Management (IAM)
1.00
IAC-01.2Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA)
1.00
IAC-02Identification & Authentication for Organizational Users
1.00
IAC-03Identification & Authentication for Non-Organizational Users
1.00

+13 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (98) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-10Concurrent Session Control
1.00
AC-16Security and Privacy Attributes
1.00
AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-17(10)Authenticate Remote Commands
1.00
AC-17(2)Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption
1.00
AC-18(1)Authentication and Encryption
1.00
AC-2(1)Automated System Account Management
1.00
AC-2(10)Shared and Group Account Credential Change
1.00
AC-2(11)Usage Conditions
1.00
AC-2(2)Automated Temporary and Emergency Account Management
1.00

+88 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (2) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.1.1
1.00
3.1.2
1.00
CCI3 mappings
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (3) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

Who does this work

17 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-223684r1137691_chk)

Refer to the zOS system REXXLIB concatenation found in SYS1. PARMLIB (AXR) for the data set that contains the REXX for Password exit named IRRPWREX and the defined AXRUSER. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding. -RACF data set access authorizations restrict READ to AXRUSER, z/OS systems programming personnel, security personnel, and auditors. -RACF data set access authorizations restrict UPDATE to security personnel using a documented change management procedure to provide a mechanism for access and revoking of access after use. -All (i.e., failures and successes) data set access authorities (i.e., READ, UPDATE, and CONTROL) is logged. -RACF data set access authorizations specify UACC(NONE) and NOWARNING.

Fix Text (F-25345r767104_fix)

Configure read access to be restricted to security administrators, systems programmers, and auditors. Establish a procedure documented with the ISSM that defines a change management process to provide mechanism for granting Update access to security administrators on an exception basis. The process should contain procedures to revoke access when documented update is completed. Configure all failures and successes data set access authorities for RACF data set that contains the Password exit to be logged. Examples: ad 'sys3.racf.rexxlib.**' uacc(none) owner(sys3) - audit(all(read)) Permit 'sys3.racf.rexxlib.**' id(<syspsmpl> <secasmpl> <smplsmpl> AXRUSER) acc(r) Permit 'sys3.racf.rexxlib.**' id(<secasmpl>) acc(u)