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The Cisco switch must be configured to enable routing protocol authentication using FIPS 198-1 algorithms with keys not exceeding 180 days of lifetime.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-220423CISC-RT-000050SV-220423r929046_ruleCCI-000803medium
Description
A rogue router could send a fictitious routing update to convince a site's perimeter router to send traffic to an incorrect or even a rogue destination. This diverted traffic could be analyzed to learn confidential information about the site's network or used to disrupt the network's ability to communicate with other networks. This is known as a "traffic attraction attack" and is prevented by configuring neighbor router authentication using FIPS 198-1 algorithms for routing updates. If the keys used for authentication are guessed, the malicious user could create havoc within the network by advertising incorrect routes and redirecting traffic. Some routing protocols allow the use of key chains for authentication. A key chain is a set of keys that is used in succession, with each having a lifetime of no more than 180 days. Changing the keys frequently reduces the risk of them eventually being guessed. If a time period occurs during which no key is activated, neighbor authentication cannot occur, and therefore routing updates will fail.
STIGDate
Cisco IOS Switch RTR Security Technical Implementation Guide2026-03-04

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 4 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (7) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

IAC-01.2Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA)
1.00
IAC-02Identification & Authentication for Organizational Users
1.00
IAC-03Identification & Authentication for Non-Organizational Users
1.00
IAC-04Identification & Authentication for Devices
1.00
IAC-05Identification & Authentication for Third-Party Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS)
1.00
CRY-02Automated Authentication Through Cryptographic Modules
0.50
IAC-12Cryptographic Module Authentication
0.50
NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (36) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-17(2)Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption
1.00
AC-2(4)Automated Audit Actions
1.00
AC-3Access Enforcement
1.00
AC-4Information Flow Enforcement
1.00
AC-4(17)Domain Authentication
1.00
AC-6(9)Log Use of Privileged Functions
1.00
AU-12Audit Record Generation
1.00
AU-3Content of Audit Records
1.00
CM-5(1)Automated Access Enforcement and Audit Records
1.00

+26 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

CCI1 mapping
CCI-000803
1.00
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (2) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

PR.AA-01
1.00
PR.AA-03
1.00

Who does this work

7 NICE work roles and 5 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-220423r929046_chk)

Review the switch configuration using the configuration examples below for BGP and OSPF. EIGRP, RIP, and IS-IS only support MD5 and will incur a permanent finding for those protocols. Note: The 180-day key lifetime is Not Applicable for the DODIN Backbone. The remainder of the requirement still applies. Verify that neighbor router authentication is enabled for all routing protocols. If neighbor authentication is not enabled this is a finding. Verify that authentication is configured to use FIPS 198-1 message authentication algorithms. If the routing protocol authentication is not configured to use FIPS 198-1 algorithms this is a finding. Verify that the protocol key lifetime is configured to not exceed 180 days. If any protocol key lifetime is configured to exceed 180 days this is a finding. BGP Example: key chain <KEY-CHAIN-NAME> tcp key <KEY-ID> send-id <ID> recv-id <ID> cryptographic-algorithm hmac-sha256 key-string <KEY> accept-lifetime 00:00:00 Jan 1 2022 duration 180 send-lifetime 00:00:00 Jan 1 2022 duration 180 ! ! router bgp <ASN> no synchronization bgp log-neighbor-changes neighbor x.x.x.x remote-as <ASN> neighbor x.x.x.x ao <KEY-CHAIN-NAME> Note: TCP-AO is used to replace MD5 in BGP authentication. OSPF Example: key chain OSPF_KEY_CHAIN key 1 key-string xxxxxxx send-lifetime 00:00:00 Jan 1 2018 23:59:59 Mar 31 2018 accept-lifetime 00:00:00 Jan 1 2018 01:05:00 Apr 1 2018 cryptographic-algorithm hmac-sha-256 key 2 key-string yyyyyyy send-lifetime 00:00:00 Apr 1 2018 23:59:59 Jun 30 2018 accept-lifetime 23:55:00 Mar 31 2018 01:05:00 Jul 1 2018 cryptographic-algorithm hmac-sha-256 … … … interface GigabitEthernet0/1 ip address x.x.x.x 255.255.255.0 ip ospf authentication key-chain OSPF_KEY_CHAIN

Fix Text (F-22127r929045_fix)

Configure routing protocol authentication to use a NIST-validated FIPS 198-1 message authentication code algorithm with keys not exceeding 180 days of lifetime as shown in the examples. BGP Example: Step 1: Configure a keychain using a FIPS 198-1 algorithm with a key duration not exceeding 180 days. key chain <KEY-CHAIN-NAME> tcp key <KEY-ID> send-id <ID> recv-id <ID> cryptographic-algorithm hmac-sha256 key-string <KEY> accept-lifetime 00:00:00 Jan 1 2022 duration 180 send-lifetime 00:00:00 Jan 1 2022 duration 180 ! Step 2: Configure BGP autonomous system to use the keychain for authentication. router bgp <ASN> no synchronization bgp log-neighbor-changes neighbor x.x.x.x remote-as <ASN> neighbor x.x.x.x ao <KEY-CHAIN-NAME> OSPF Example: Step 1: Configure a keychain using a FIPS 198-1 algorithm with a key duration not exceeding 180 days. key chain OSPF_KEY_CHAIN key 1 key-string xxxxxxx send-lifetime 00:00:00 Jan 1 2018 23:59:59 Mar 31 2018 accept-lifetime 00:00:00 Jan 1 2018 01:05:00 Apr 1 2018 cryptographic-algorithm hmac-sha-256 key 2 key-string yyyyyyy send-lifetime 00:00:00 Apr 1 2018 23:59:59 Jun 30 2018 accept-lifetime 23:55:00 Mar 31 2018 01:05:00 Jul 1 2018 cryptographic-algorithm hmac-sha-256 Step 2: Configure OSPF to use the keychain for authentication. interface GigabitEthernet0/1 ip address x.x.x.x 255.255.255.0 ip ospf authentication key-chain OSPF_KEY_CHAIN