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The Cisco ASA must be configured to specify Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) for the IPsec Security Association (SA) during IKE Phase 2 negotiation.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-239954CASA-VN-000180SV-239954r916233_ruleCCI-002418medium
Description
PFS generates each new encryption key independently from the previous key. Without PFS, compromise of one key will compromise all communications. The Phase 2 (Quick Mode) Security Association (SA) is used to create an IPsec session key. Hence, its rekey or key regeneration procedure is very important. The Phase 2 rekey can be performed with or without Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). With PFS, every time a new IPsec Security Association is negotiated during the Quick Mode, a new Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange occurs. The new DH shared secret will be included with original keying material (SYKEID_d, initiator nonce, and responder nonce from Phase 1 for generating a new IPsec session key. If PFS is not used, the IPsec session key will always be completely dependent on the original keying material from Phase 1. Hence, if an older key is compromised at any time, it is possible that all new keys may be compromised. The DH exchange is performed in the same manner as was done in Phase 1 (Main or Aggressive Mode). However, the Phase 2 exchange is protected by encrypting the Phase 2 packets with the key derived from the Phase 1 negotiation. Because DH negotiations during Phase 2 are encrypted, the new IPsec session key has an added element of secrecy.
STIGDate
Cisco ASA VPN Security Technical Implementation Guide2024-08-22

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 4 hops (4) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
CRY-03Transmission Confidentiality
1.00
CRY-04Transmission Integrity
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (29) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-10Concurrent Session Control
1.00
AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-17(2)Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption
1.00
AC-18(1)Authentication and Encryption
1.00
AC-3Access Enforcement
1.00
CM-6Configuration Settings
1.00
CM-7Least Functionality
1.00
IA-11Re-authentication
1.00
IA-2(8)Access to Accounts — Replay Resistant
1.00
IA-2(9)Network Access to Non-privileged Accounts — Replay Resistant
1.00

+19 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (1) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.13.8
1.00
CCI1 mapping
CCI-002418
1.00
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (1) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

PR.DS-02
1.00

Who does this work

8 NICE work roles and 7 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-239954r916233_chk)

Review crypto maps that reference an IPsec proposal. Verify the ASA is configured to specify PFS as shown in the example below. crypto map IPSEC_CRYPTO_MAP 1 set pfs group5 crypto map IPSEC_CRYPTO_MAP 1 set peer x.x.x.x crypto map IPSEC_CRYPTO_MAP 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal IPSEC_TRANS If the ASA is not configured to specify PFS for the IPsec SA during IKE Phase 2 negotiation, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-43146r666267_fix)

Configure the ASA to specify PFS for the IPsec SA during IKE Phase 2 negotiation as shown in the example below. ASA3(config)# crypto map IPSEC_CRYPTO_MAP 1 set pfs group5