STIGViewer Support

The Cisco ASA perimeter firewall must be configured to filter traffic destined to the enclave in accordance with the specific traffic that is approved and registered in the Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM) Category Assurance List (CAL) and vulnerability assessments.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-239861CASA-FW-000170SV-239861r665904_ruleCCI-001097medium
Description
The enclave's internal network contains the servers where mission-critical data and applications reside. Malicious traffic can enter from an external boundary or originate from a compromised host internally. Vulnerability assessments must be reviewed by the SA and protocols must be approved by the IA staff before entering the enclave. Firewall filters (e.g., rules, access control lists [ACLs], screens, and policies) are the first line of defense in a layered security approach. They permit authorized packets and deny unauthorized packets based on port or service type. They enhance the posture of the network by not allowing packets to even reach a potential target within the security domain. The filters provided are highly susceptible ports and services that should be blocked or limited as much as possible without adversely affecting customer requirements. Auditing packets attempting to penetrate the network but stopped by the firewall filters will allow network administrators to broaden their protective ring and more tightly define the scope of operation. If the perimeter is in a Deny-by-Default posture and what is allowed through the filter is in accordance with the PPSM CAL and VAs for the enclave, and if the permit rule is explicitly defined with explicit ports and protocols allowed, then all requirements related to the database being blocked would be satisfied.
STIGDate
Cisco ASA Firewall Security Technical Implementation Guide2024-06-06

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (18) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CFG-02Secure Baseline Configurations
1.00
CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
CRY-01.1Alternate Physical Protection
1.00
CRY-03Transmission Confidentiality
1.00
CRY-04Transmission Integrity
1.00
CRY-05Encrypting Data At Rest
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
IAC-21Least Privilege
1.00
MON-01Continuous Monitoring
1.00
MON-01.1Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems (IDS & IPS)
1.00

+8 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (10) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CM-6Configuration Settings
1.00
SC-24Fail in Known State
1.00
SC-47Alternate Communications Paths
1.00
SC-5Denial-of-service Protection
1.00
SC-7Boundary Protection
1.00
SC-7(11)Restrict Incoming Communications Traffic
1.00
SC-7(29)Separate Subnets to Isolate Functions
1.00
SC-7(5)Deny by Default — Allow by Exception
1.00
SI-4System Monitoring
1.00
SI-4(11)Analyze Communications Traffic Anomalies
1.00
NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (3) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.13.1
1.00
3.13.2
1.00
3.13.5
1.00
CCI1 mapping
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (5) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

Who does this work

15 NICE work roles and 9 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-239861r665904_chk)

Review the inbound ACL to verify the ports and services allowed are in accordance with the PPSM CAL. Review the ASA configuration to determine if it only permits inbound traffic using authorized ports and services. Step 1: Verify that an ingress ACL has been applied to the external interface as shown in the example below. interface GigabitEthernet0/0 nameif OUTSIDE security-level 0 ip address x.1.11.1 255.255.255.0 … … … access-group OUTSIDE_IN in interface OUTSIDE Step 2: Verify that the ingress ACL only allows inbound traffic in accordance with the PPSM CAL as shown in the example below. access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq www access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq https access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq domain access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq ftp access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq ftp-data access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit udp any any eq sip access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended deny ip any any log If the ASA is not configured to only allow inbound traffic in accordance with the PPSM CAL, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-43053r665868_fix)

Step 1: Configure the ingress ACL similar to the example below. ASA(config)# access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq https ASA(config)# access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq http ASA(config)# access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq domain ASA(config)# access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq ftp ASA(config)# access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit tcp any any eq ftp-data ASA(config)# access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended permit udp any any eq sip ASA(config)# access-list OUTSIDE_IN extended deny ip any any log Step 2: Apply the ACL inbound on the external interface as shown in the example below. ASA(config)# access-group OUTSIDE_IN in interface OUTSIDE ASA(config)# end