STIGViewer Support

The BIND 9.x server implementation must uniquely identify and authenticate the other DNS server before responding to a server-to-server transaction, zone transfer, and/or dynamic update request using cryptographically based bidirectional authentication to protect the integrity of the information in transit.

Overview

Finding IDVersionRule IDIA ControlsSeverity
V-272435BIND-9X-002010SV-272435r1124068_ruleCCI-002418high
Description
Server-to-server (zone transfer) transactions are provided by TSIG, which enforces mutual server authentication using a key that is unique to each server pair (TSIG), thus uniquely identifying the other server. DNS does perform server authentication when TSIG is used, but this authentication is transactional in nature (each transaction has its own authentication performed). Enforcing mutually authenticated communication sessions during zone transfers provides the assurance that only authorized servers are requesting and receiving DNS zone data. Without authenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. Failure to properly implement transactional security may have significant effects on the overall security of the DNS infrastructure. The lack of mutual authentication between name servers during a DNS transaction would allow a threat actor to launch a Man-In-The-Middle attack against the DNS infrastructure. This attack could lead to unauthorized DNS zone data being introduced, resulting in network traffic being redirected to a rogue site. Satisfies: SRG-APP-000439-DNS-000063, SRG-APP-000394-DNS-000049, SRG-APP-000395-DNS-000050, SRG-APP-000440-DNS-000065
STIGDate
BIND 9.x Security Technical Implementation Guide2026-02-25

Related Frameworks

1 mapping across 5 frameworks
SCF0 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 4 hops (4) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

CRY-01Use of Cryptographic Controls
1.00
CRY-03Transmission Confidentiality
1.00
CRY-04Transmission Integrity
1.00
DCH-01Data Protection
1.00
NIST 800-530 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 2 hops (29) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

AC-10Concurrent Session Control
1.00
AC-17(1)Monitoring and Control
1.00
AC-17(2)Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption
1.00
AC-18(1)Authentication and Encryption
1.00
AC-3Access Enforcement
1.00
CM-6Configuration Settings
1.00
CM-7Least Functionality
1.00
IA-11Re-authentication
1.00
IA-2(8)Access to Accounts — Replay Resistant
1.00
IA-2(9)Network Access to Non-privileged Accounts — Replay Resistant
1.00

+19 more (top 10 by confidence shown)

NIST 800-1710 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (1) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

3.13.8
1.00
CCI1 mapping
NIST CSF 2.00 mappings

No source states a mapping between these directly.

Also reachable in 3 hops (1) derived by us, not asserted by any source

Each of these is a route we composed by chaining published mappings. No publisher states a relationship between the two endpoints.

Who does this work

8 NICE work roles and 7 EC-Council certifications.

This is an inference across published mappings, not a single claim by anyone. This check maps to a control, which maps to a Cybersecurity Framework outcome, which NIST assigns to the work roles below. EC-Council separately maps its certifications to those same roles.

A certification prepares someone for a role. It is not evidence that a holder is qualified, and neither NIST nor EC-Council has stated that any certification here addresses this check.

Work-role assignments published by NIST (NICE Framework Components 2.2.0 and the CSF 2.0 OLIR crosswalk). Certification mappings published by EC-Council.

Details

Check Text (C-272435r1124068_chk)

If zone transfers are disabled with the "allow-transfer { none; };" directive, this is not applicable. Verify that the BIND 9.x server is configured to uniquely identify a name server before responding to a zone transfer. Inspect the "named.conf" file for the presence of TSIG key statements. On the primary name server, this is an example of a configured key statement: key tsig_example. { algorithm hmac-SHA256; include "tsig-example.key"; }; zone "disa.mil" { type Primary; file "db.disa.mil"; allow-transfer { key tsig_example.; }; }; On the secondary name server, this is an example of a configured key statement: key tsig_example. { algorithm hmac-SHA256; include "tsig-example.key"; }; server <ip_address> { keys { tsig_example }; }; zone "disa.mil" { type Secondary; Primarys { <ip_address>; }; file "db.disa.mil"; }; If a primary name server does not have a key defined in the "allow-transfer" block, this is a finding. If a secondary name server does not have a server statement that contains a "keys" sub-statement, this is a finding.

Fix Text (F-76392r1123952_fix)

Configure the BIND 9.x server to use TSIG keys. Add a key statement to the "named.conf" file for TSIG that is being used: key tsig_example. { algorithm hmac-SHA256; include "tsig-example.key"; }; Add key statements to the allow-transfer statements on a primary name server: allow-transfer { key tsig_example.; }; Add key statements to the server statements on a secondary name server: server <ip_address> { keys { tsig_example }; }; Restart the BIND 9.x process.