acceptedThis Security Technical Implementation Guide is published as a tool to improve the security of Department of War (DoW) information systems. The requirements are derived from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-53 and related documents. Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via email to the following address: disa.stig_spt@mail.mil.DISASTIG.DOD.MILRelease: 1 Benchmark Date: 28 Apr 20263.5.21.10.01<ProfileDescription></ProfileDescription><ProfileDescription></ProfileDescription><ProfileDescription></ProfileDescription><ProfileDescription></ProfileDescription><ProfileDescription></ProfileDescription><ProfileDescription></ProfileDescription><ProfileDescription></ProfileDescription><ProfileDescription></ProfileDescription><ProfileDescription></ProfileDescription><GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000030<VulnDiscussion>When Proxy ARP is enabled on a router, it allows that router to extend the network (at layer 2) across multiple interfaces (local area network [LAN] segments). Because proxy ARP allows hosts from different LAN segments to look like they are on the same segment, proxy ARP is safe only when used between trusted LAN segments. Attackers can leverage the trusting nature of proxy ARP by spoofing a trusted host and then intercepting packets. Proxy ARP should always be disabled on router interfaces that do not require it unless the router is being used as a LAN bridge.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Disable Proxy ARP on all external interfaces, as shown in the example below: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" no local-proxy-arp - configure router interface "TO-PE2" no remote-proxy-arpThis requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to determine if IP Proxy ARP is enabled on any external interfaces, as shown in the example below. For each interface, use the command below, and in the "Proxy ARP Details" section, verify "Rem Proxy ARP" and "Local Proxy ARP" are disabled: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match Proxy Proxy ARP Details Rem Proxy ARP : Disabled Local Proxy ARP : Disabled Note: Proxy ARP is disabled by default. If IP Proxy ARP is enabled on any external interface, this is a finding. <GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000040<VulnDiscussion>When a new source starts transmitting in a PIM Sparse Mode network, the Designated Router will encapsulate the multicast packets into register messages and forward them to the RP using unicast. This process can be taxing on the CPU for both the Designated Router and the RP if the source is running at a high data rate and many new sources are starting at the same time. This scenario could occur immediately after a network failover. The rate limit for the number of register messages should be set to a relatively low value based on the known number of multicast sources within the multicast domain.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Configure the RP to rate limit the number of multicast register messages, as shown in the example below: Note: Limit may be set by packet-per-second or kilobit-per-second. - configure system security dist-cpu-protection - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection# policy "test-dcp" - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# static-policer "PIM-RATE-LIMIT" create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# rate packets 1 within 1 - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# exceed-action discard - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# exit - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# protocol pim - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# enforcement static "PIM-RATE-LIMIT" - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# exit all - configure router interface "TO-PE3" dist-cpu-protection "test-dcp"Review the configuration of the RP to verify it is rate limiting the number of multicast register messages. Verify the CPU-protection policy has been configured on the interface, as shown in the example below: - show router interface "TO-PE3" detail | match OperDCpuProtPlcy OperDCpuProtPlcy : test-dcp Verify if the policer state and exceed count: - show router interface "TO-PE3" dist-cpu-protection detail ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Statistics/Policer-State Information ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Static Policer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Policer-Name : PIM-RATE-LIMIT Card/FP : 1/1 Policer-State : Conform Protocols Mapped : pim Exceed-Count : 0 Total Exceed-Count : 0 Exceed-State-Count : 0 Detec. Time Remain : 0 seconds Hold-Down Remain. : none Operational (adapted) Rate Parameters: Oper. Packets : 1 ppi Oper. Within : 1 seconds Oper. Initial Delay: none Oper. Depth : 0 packets If the RP is not limiting multicast register messages, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000050<VulnDiscussion>Vulnerability assessments must be reviewed by the system administrator, and protocols must be approved by the information assurance staff before entering the enclave. Access control lists (ACLs) are the first line of defense in a layered security approach. They permit authorized packets and deny unauthorized packets based on port or service type. They enhance the posture of the network by not allowing packets to reach a potential target within the security domain. The lists provided are highly susceptible ports and services that should be blocked or limited as much as possible without adversely affecting customer requirements. Auditing packets attempting to penetrate the network but that are stopped by an ACL will allow network administrators to broaden their protective ring and more tightly define the scope of operation. If the perimeter is in a Deny-by-Default posture and what is allowed through the filter is in accordance with DODI 8551.1, and if the permit rule is explicitly defined with explicit ports and protocols allowed, then all requirements related to ports, protocols, and services being blocked would be satisfied.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the router to use ingress ACLs to restrict traffic in accordance with the guidelines in DODI 8551.1 for all services and protocols required for operational commitments, as shown in the example below: IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match src-ip 172.200.200.2/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit all IPv6 filter: - configure filter ipv6-filter 20 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match src-ip 2001:acad:1234:200::2/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit all Apply the filter to the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 10 - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 20This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify the ingress filter is in accordance with DODI 8551. Verify all interfaces have ingress filters for IPv4 and IPv6 assigned, as shown in the example below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 10 - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 20 If the router does not filter traffic in accordance with the guidelines contained in DODI 8551, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000060<VulnDiscussion>VPWS is a layer 2 virtual private network (L2VPN) technology that provides a virtual circuit between two PE routers to forward layer 2 frames between two customer-edge routers or switches through an MPLS-enabled IP core. The ingress PE router (virtual circuit head-end) encapsulates Ethernet frames inside MPLS packets using label stacking and forwards them across the MPLS network to the egress PE router (virtual circuit tail-end). During a virtual circuit setup, the PE routers exchange VC label bindings for the specified VC ID. The VC ID specifies a pseudowire associated with an ingress and egress PE router and the customer-facing attachment circuits. To guarantee that all frames are forwarded onto the correct pseudowire and to the correct customer and attachment circuits, the correct VC ID must be configured for each attachment circuit.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Assign globally unique VC IDs for each virtual circuit and configure the attachment circuits with the appropriate VC ID. Configure the same VC ID on both ends of the VC, as shown in the example below: - configure service epipe 10 customer 1 create - config>service>epipe# spoke-sdp 40:10 create - config>service>epipe>spoke-sdp# exit - config>service>epipe# sap 1/1/c3/1 create - config>service>epipe>sap# exit allReview the ingress and egress PE router configuration for each virtual circuit that has been provisioned and verify the correct and unique VCID has been configured for the appropriate attachment circuit. Use the following command to verify "SvcId" and "VCID" fields and confirm the correct VC ID has been configured for the correct service, as shown in the example below: - show router ldp bindings services | match "VCId" post-lines 5 Type VCId SDPId LMTU Peer SvcId IngLbl RMTU EgrLbl ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- E-Eth 10 40 1500 4.4.4.4:0 10 524282U 1500 Note: Ethernet over MPLS in VLAN mode transports Ethernet traffic from a source 802.1Q VLAN to a destination 802.1Q VLAN over a core MPLS network. The VC ID must be unique and the same on each end as it is used to connect the endpoints of the VC. If the correct VC ID has not been configured on both routers, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000070<VulnDiscussion>VPLS defines an architecture that delivers Ethernet multipoint services over a Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) network. Customer layer 2 frames are forwarded across the MPLS core via pseudowires using IEEE 802.1q Ethernet bridging principles. A pseudowire is a virtual bidirectional connection between two attachment circuits (virtual connections between PE and CE routers). A pseudowire contains two unidirectional label-switched paths (LSP). Each MAC forwarding table instance is interconnected using domain-specific LSPs, thereby maintaining privacy and logical separation between each VPLS domain. When a frame arrives on a bridge port (pseudowire or attachment circuit) and the source MAC address is unknown to the receiving PE router, the source MAC address is associated with the pseudowire or attachment circuit, and the forwarding table is updated accordingly. Frames are forwarded to the appropriate pseudowire or attachment circuit according to the forwarding table entry for the destination MAC address. Ethernet frames sent to broadcast and unknown destination addresses must be flooded out to all interfaces for the bridge domain; hence, a PE router must replicate packets across both attachment circuits and pseudowires. A malicious attacker residing in a customer network could launch a source MAC address spoofing attack by flooding packets to a valid unicast destination, each with a different MAC source address. The PE router receiving this traffic would try to learn every new MAC address and would quickly run out of space for the Virtual Forwarding Instance (VFI) forwarding table. Older, valid MAC addresses would be removed from the table, and traffic sent to them would have to be flooded until the storm threshold limit is reached. Therefore, it is essential that a limit is established to control the number of MAC addresses that will be learned and recorded into the forwarding table for each bridge domain.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001094Configure a MAC address learning limit for each VPLS bridge domain: - configure service vpls 20 fdb-table-size 500Review the Nokia PE router configuration to determine if a MAC address limit has been set for each VPLS bridge domain. Use the command below for each VPLS service and verify "Table Size" is set correctly, as shown in the example below: - show service id 20 fdb | match "Table Size" Table Size : 500 Allocated Count : 0 If a limit has not been configured, this is a finding. <GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000080<VulnDiscussion>VPLS defines an architecture that delivers Ethernet multipoint services over a Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) network. Customer layer 2 frames are forwarded across the MPLS core via pseudowires using IEEE 802.1q Ethernet bridging principles. A pseudowire is a virtual bidirectional connection between two attachment circuits (virtual connections between PE and CE routers). A pseudowire contains two unidirectional label-switched paths (LSP) between two PE routers. Each MAC virtual forwarding instance (VFI) table is interconnected using pseudowires provisioned for the bridge domain, thereby maintaining privacy and logical separation between each VPLS bridge domain. The VFI specifies the pseudowires associated with connecting PE routers and the customer-facing attachment circuits belonging to a given VLAN. Resembling a layer 2 switch, the VFI is responsible for learning MAC addresses and providing loop-free forwarding of customer traffic to the appropriate end nodes. Each VPLS domain is identified by a globally unique VPN ID; hence, VFIs of the same VPLS domain must be configured with the same VPN ID on all participating PE routers. To guarantee traffic separation for all customer VLANs and that all packets are forwarded to the correct destination, the correct attachment circuits must be associated with the appropriate VFI, and each VFI must be associated to the unique VPN ID assigned to the customer VLAN.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Assign globally unique Service IDs for each customer VLAN using VPLS for carrier Ethernet services between multiple sites, and configure the attachment circuits to the appropriate VFI: - configure service vpls 20 vpn 20 customer 1 create - config>service>vpls# mesh-sdp 40:20 create - config>service>vpls>mesh-sdp# exit - config>service>vpls# sap 1/1/c5/1:100 create - config>service>vpls>sap# exit - config>service>vpls# no shutdown - config>service>vpls# exit allReview the implementation plan and the Service IDs assigned to customer VLANs for the VPLS deployment. Review the PE router configuration to verify customer attachment circuits (i.e., VLANs) are associated to the appropriate VFI. In the example below, the attached circuit at port 1/1/c5/1 is associated to Service ID 20. Use the following command: - show service id 20 base Service Basic Information Service Id : 20 Vpn Id : 20 Service Type : VPLS —--- snip —--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Service Access & Destination Points ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Identifier Type AdmMTU OprMTU Adm Opr ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sap:1/1/c5/1:100 q-tag 1518 1518 Up Up sdp:30:20 M(3.3.3.3) Mesh 0 9190 Up Up If the attachment circuits have not been bound to VFI configured with the assigned Service ID for each VLAN, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000090<VulnDiscussion>Verifying the path a route has traversed will ensure the IP core is not used as a transit network for unauthorized or possibly internet traffic. All autonomous system boundary routers (ASBRs) must ensure updates received from eBGP peers list their AS number as the first AS in the AS_PATH attribute.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368Configure all ASBRs to deny updates received from eBGP peers that do not list their AS number as the first AS in the AS_PATH attribute: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" - config>router>bgp>group# enforce-first-asReview the router configuration to verify the router is configured to deny updates received from eBGP peers that do not list their AS number as the first AS in the AS_PATH attribute. Review the router bgp configuration to verify enforce-first-as is not configured, as shown in the example below: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" - config>router>bgp>group# info ---------------------------------------------- family ipv4 peer-as 65540 enforce-first-as neighbor 10.10.30.1 exit ---------------------------------------------- If the router is not configured to reject updates from peers that do not list their AS number as the first AS in the AS_PATH attribute, this is a finding. <GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000100<VulnDiscussion>Verifying the path a route has traversed will ensure the local AS is not used as a transit network for unauthorized traffic. To ensure the local AS does not carry any prefixes that do not belong to any customers, all Provider Edge (PE) routers must be configured to reject routes with an originating AS other than that belonging to the customer.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368Configure the router to reject updates from CE routers with an originating AS in the AS_PATH attribute that does not belong to that customer. Configure the as-path, as shown in the example below: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# as-path "accept-65560" - config>router>policy-options>as-path# expression "^65560$" - config>router>policy-options>as-path# - config>router>policy-options>as-path# exit Configure the policy statement, as shown in the example below: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement "Accept-routes" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# from protocol bgp - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# from as-path "accept-65560" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# default-action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply the import policy, as shown in the example below: - configure router bgp group "eBGP-65560" import "Accept-routes"This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify the router is configured to deny updates received from CE routers with an originating AS in the AS_PATH attribute that does not belong to that customer. Review the router policy as-path and policy statement, as shown in the example below: - show router policy as-path "accept-65560" as-path "accept-65560" expression "^65560$" - show router policy "Accept-routes" entry 10 from protocol bgp as-path "accept-65560" exit action accept exit exit default-action drop exit Review the import policy, as shown in the example below: - show router bgp neighbor 10.50.10.2 detail | match "Import Policy" Import Policy : Accept-routes If the router is not configured to reject updates from CE routers with an originating AS in the AS_PATH attribute that does not belong to that customer, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000110<VulnDiscussion>Using dedicated paths, the OOBM backbone connects the OOBM gateway routers located at the edge of the managed network and at the NOC. Dedicated links can be deployed using provisioned circuits or MPLS layer 2 and layer 3 VPN services or implementing a secured path with gateway-to-gateway IPsec tunnels. The tunnel mode ensures the management traffic will be logically separated from any other traffic traversing the same path.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Ensure that a dedicated circuit, MPLS/VPN service, or IPsec tunnel is deployed to transport management traffic between the managed network and the NOC. Create a VPRN/L3 VPN service for management traffic, as shown in the example below: - configure service vprn 30 customer 1 create - config>service>vprn# router-id 3.3.3.3 - config>service>vprn# autonomous-system 65100 - config>service>vprn# interface "management-network" create - config>service>vprn>if# address 172.x.x.x/30 - config>service>vprn>if# sap 1/1/c3/1 create - config>service>vprn>if>sap# exit - config>service>vprn>if# exit - config>service>vprn# bgp-ipvpn - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn# mpls - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# auto-bind-tunnel - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls>auto-bind-tunnel# resolution any - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls>auto-bind-tunnel# exit - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# route-distinguisher x.x.x.x:x - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# vrf-target target:x:x - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# no shutdown - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# exit - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn# exit - config>service>vprn# no shutdown - config>service>vprn#This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the network topology diagram to determine connectivity between the managed network and the NOC. Review the OOBM gateway router configuration to validate the path and interface that the management traffic traverses. Verify that only the routes and interfaces belonging to the management VPRN are present, as shown in the example below: - show router 30 route-table Route Table (Service: 30) Dest Prefix[Flags] Type Proto Age Pref Next Hop[Interface Name] Metric ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 172.150.x.0/30 Remote BGP VPN 00h00m50s 170 4.4.4.x (tunneled:RSVP:1) 30 172.200.x.0/30 Local Local 00h00m54s 0 management-network 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No. of Routes: 2 - show router 30 interface Interface Table (Service: 30) Interface-Name Adm Opr(v4/v6) Mode Port/SapId IP-Address PfxState ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "management-network" Up Up/Down VPRN 1/1/c3/1 172.200.x.x/30 n/a ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Interfaces : 1 If management traffic is not transported between the managed network and the NOC via dedicated circuit, MPLS/VPN service, or IPsec tunnel, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000120<VulnDiscussion>Using a loopback address as the source address offers a multitude of uses for security, access, management, and scalability of the BGP routers. It is easier to construct appropriate ingress filters for router management plane traffic destined to the network management subnet since the source addresses will be from the range used for loopback interfaces instead of a larger range of addresses used for physical interfaces. Log information recorded by authentication and syslog servers will record the router's loopback address instead of the numerous physical interface addresses. When the loopback address is used as the source for eBGP peering, the BGP session will be harder to hijack because the source address to be used is not known globally, making it more difficult for a hacker to spoof an eBGP neighbor. By using traceroute, a hacker can easily determine the addresses for an eBGP speaker when the IP address of an external interface is used as the source address. The routers within the iBGP domain should also use loopback addresses as the source address when establishing BGP sessions.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Ensure the router's loopback address is used as the source address when originating traffic. Configure the local address, as shown in the example below: - configure router bgp - config>router>bgp# group "iBGP" - config>router>bgp>group# local-address 3.3.3.3 - config>router>bgp>group# exit allReview the router configuration to verify a loopback address has been configured. Verify a loopback interface is used as the source address for all iBGP sessions. Use the command below and verify the "BGP Router ID" IP address matches the loopback address: - show router bgp neighbor 4.4.4.4 detail | match "Local Address" Local Address : 3.3.3.3 If the router does not use its loopback address as the source address for all iBGP sessions, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000130<VulnDiscussion>Using a loopback address as the source address offers a multitude of uses for security, access, management, and scalability of MSDP routers. It is easier to construct appropriate ingress filters for router management plane traffic destined to the network management subnet since the source addresses will be from the range used for loopback interfaces instead of a larger range of addresses used for physical interfaces. Log information recorded by authentication and syslog servers will record the router's loopback address instead of the numerous physical interface addresses.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Ensure the router's loopback address is used as the source address when originating traffic. Configure the local address for the MSDP, as shown in the example below: - configure router msdp local-address 3.3.3.3Review the router configuration to verify a loopback address has been configured. Verify a loopback interface is used as the source address for all MSDP packets generated by the router. Verify "Local Address" is defined using the example below: - show router msdp status | match "Local Address" Local Address : 3.3.3.3 If the router does not use its loopback address as the source address when originating MSDP traffic, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000140<VulnDiscussion>Using a loopback address as the source address offers a multitude of uses for security, access, management, and scalability of backbone routers. It is easier to construct appropriate ingress filters for router management plane traffic destined to the network management subnet since the source addresses will be from the range used for loopback interfaces instead of from a larger range of addresses used for physical interfaces. Log information recorded by authentication and syslog servers will record the router's loopback address instead of the numerous physical interface addresses.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Configure MPLS routers to use their loopback address as the source address for LDP peering sessions. Note: By default, the Nokia router uses the system/loopback address as the source for LDP peering sessions. Ensure the system address is configured. Configure the system address, as shown in the example below: - configure router interface system address 3.3.3.3/32Review the router configuration to determine if it uses its loopback address as the source address for LDP peering sessions. Verify a loopback address has been configured, as shown in the following example: - show router ldp discovery detail | match "Local Address" Local Address : 3.3.3.3:0 If the router is not configured to use its loopback address for LDP peering, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000150<VulnDiscussion>Unrestricted traffic may contain malicious traffic that poses a threat to an enclave or other connected networks. Unrestricted traffic may also transit a network, which uses bandwidth and other resources. Traffic can be restricted directly by an access control list (ACL), which is a firewall function, or by Policy Routing. Policy Routing is a technique used to make routing decisions based on several criteria other than the destination network, including source or destination network, source or destination address, source or destination port, protocol, packet size, and packet classification. This overrides the router's normal routing procedures used to control the specific paths of network traffic. It is normally used for traffic engineering but can also be used to meet security requirements; for example, traffic that is not allowed can be routed to the Null0 or discard interface. Policy Routing can also be used to control which prefixes appear in the routing table. This requirement is intended to allow network administrators the flexibility to use whatever technique is most effective.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the router to allow only incoming communications from authorized sources to be routed to authorized destinations, as shown in the example below: IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# dst-ip 172.150.x.x/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# src-ip 172.200.x.x/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit all - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 10 IPv6 filter: - configure filter ipv6-filter 20 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# dst-ip 2001:acad:1234:150::2/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# src-ip 2001:acad:1234:200::2/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit all - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 20This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to determine if the router allows only incoming communications from authorized sources to be routed to authorized destinations. Use the command below and verify "Ingress Filter" or "Egress Filter", if needed, are applied: - show filter ip 10 Entry : 10 Description : (Not Specified) Log Id : n/a Src. IP : 172.200.200.2/32 Src. Port : n/a Dest. IP : 172.150.150.2/32 Dest. Port : n/a - show filter ipv6 20 Filter Match Criteria : IPv6 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entry : 10 Description : (Not Specified) Log Id : n/a Src. IP : 2001:acad:1234:200::2/128 Src. Port : n/a Dest. IP : 2001:acad:1234:150::2/128 Dest. Port : n/a If the router does not restrict incoming communications to allow only authorized sources and destinations, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000160<VulnDiscussion>To reduce any risk of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack from a rogue or misconfigured MSDP router, the router must be configured to limit the number of source-active messages it accepts from each peer.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368Configure the MSDP router to limit the amount of source-active messages it accepts from each peer. Configure the active-source limit, as shown in the example below: - configure router msdp active-source-limit 2Review the Nokia router configuration to determine if the "SA Limit" has been configured to limit the number of source-active messages it accepts on a per-peer basis. Verify the source-active limit, as shown in the example below: - show router msdp status | match "SA Limit" SA Limit : 2 SA Limit Excd : 0 If the router is not configured to limit the source-active messages it accepts, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000170<VulnDiscussion>To avoid global visibility of local information, a number of source-group (S, G) states in a Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) domain must not be leaked to another domain, such as multicast sources with private address, administratively scoped multicast addresses, and the Automatic Rendezvous Point (auto-RP) groups (224.0.1.39 and 224.0.1.40). Allowing a multicast distribution tree, local to the core, to extend beyond its boundary could enable local multicast traffic to leak into other autonomous systems and customer networks.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368Ensure an export policy is implemented on all MSDP routers to avoid global visibility of local multicast (S, G) states. Create an export policy. Configure prefix-list, as shown in the example below: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Multicast-Group-Source" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# prefix 233.0.0.0/8 exact - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# prefix 172.200.200.2/32 exact - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# exit Configure policy, as shown in the example below: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement "MSDP-EXPORT-SA" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# from prefix-list "Multicast-Group-Source" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# default-action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply the export policy to the MSDP peer: - configure router msdp peer 1.1.1.1 export "MSDP-EXPORT-SA"Review the Nokia router configuration to determine if there is export policy to block local source-active multicast advertisements. Verify the export policy, as shown in the example below: - show router msdp peer 1.1.1.1 detail | match "Export Policy" Export Policy : MSDP-EXPORT-SA If the router is not configured with an export policy to filter local source-active multicast advertisements, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000180<VulnDiscussion>These options are intended to be for the Hop-by-Hop header only. The optional and extensible natures of the IPv6 extension headers require higher scrutiny since many implementations do not always drop packets with headers that can be recognized. This could cause a denial of service on the target device. In addition, the type, length, value (TLV) formatting provides the ability for headers to be very large.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure the router to drop IPv6 packets containing a Destination Option header with option type values of 0x05 (Router Alert) or 0xC2 (Jumbo Payload). Configure an IPv6 filter to drop packets with a next-header value of 60 (value 60 corresponds to the Destination Option header). This will drop all packets with a Destination Option header. Configure an IPv6 filter: - config>filter# ipv6-filter 40 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header 60 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# back - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit all Apply the IPv6 filter to the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 40This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration and determine if filters are bound to the external interfaces to drop IPv6 packets containing a Destination Option header with option type values of 0x05 (Router Alert) or 0xC2 (Jumbo Payload). Verify the IPv6 filter has the next header value set to 60, as shown in the example below: - show filter ipv6 40 Entry : 10 Description : (Not Specified) Log Id : n/a Src. IP : ::/0 Src. Port : n/a Dest. IP : ::/0 Dest. Port : n/a Next Header : 60 Verify an "Ing IPv6 Flt" has been applied to the interface, as shown in the example below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 40 If the router is not configured to drop IPv6 packets containing a Destination Option header with invalid option type values, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000190<VulnDiscussion>These options are intended to be for the Destination Option header only. The optional and extensible natures of the IPv6 extension headers require higher scrutiny since many implementations do not always drop packets with headers that can be recognized. This could cause a denial of service on the target device. In addition, the type, length, value (TLV) formatting provides the ability for headers to be very large.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure the router to drop IPv6 packets containing a Hop-by-Hop header with option type values of 0x04 (Tunnel Encapsulation Limit), 0xC9 (Home Address Destination), or 0xC3 (NSAP Address). Configure an IPv6 filter, as shown in the example below: - config>filter# ipv6-filter 40 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match hop-by-hop-opt true - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# back - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit all Apply the IPv6 filter to the interfaces: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 40This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to determine if filters are bound to the applicable interfaces to drop IPv6 packets containing a Hop-by-Hop header with option type values of 0x04 (Tunnel Encapsulation Limit), 0xC9 (Home Address Destination), or 0xC3 (NSAP Address). Verify the IPv6 filter has the HopByHop option set to "True", as shown in the example below: - show filter ipv6 40 Entry : 10 (Inactive) Description : (Not Specified) Log Id : n/a Src. IP : ::/0 Src. Port : n/a Dest. IP : ::/0 Dest. Port : n/a Next Header : Undefined Dscp : Undefined ICMP Type : Undefined ICMP Code : Undefined Sampling : Off Int. Sampling : On Tcp-flag : (Not Specified) Fragment : Off HopByHop Opt : True Routing Type0 : Off Verify an "Ing IPv6 Flt" has been applied to the interface, as shown in the example below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 40 If the router is not configured to drop IPv6 packets containing a Hop-by-Hop header with invalid option type values, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000200<VulnDiscussion>The use of Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) lines to modems connecting to network devices provides clear text of authentication traffic over commercial circuits that could be captured and used to compromise the network. Additional war dial attacks on the device could degrade the device and the production network. Secured modem devices must be able to authenticate users and must negotiate a key exchange before full encryption takes place. The modem will provide full encryption capability (Triple DES) or stronger. The technician who manages these devices will be authenticated using a key fob and granted access to the appropriate maintenance port; thus, the technician will gain access to the managed device (router, switch, etc.). The token provides a method of strong (two-factor) user authentication. The token works in conjunction with a server to generate one-time user passwords that will change values at second intervals. The user must know a personal identification number (PIN) and possess the token to be allowed access to the device.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414Disable the auxiliary port and disable Bluetooth using the following commands. - configure port A/3 shutdown - configure system bluetooth power off If used for out-of-band administrative access, the port must be connected to a secured modem providing encryption and authentication.Review the configuration and verify Bluetooth is powered off and the auxiliary port is disabled unless a secured modem providing encryption and authentication is connected to it. Use the command below and verify "Power State" is set to "off": - show system bluetooth | match "Power State" Power State : off Pairing Button : Disabled If the power state is not set to "off", this is a finding. Use the command below to verify the auxiliary/management port "Admin State" is down: - show port A/3 | match "Admin State" Admin State : down Oper Duplex : N/A If the auxiliary port is not disabled or is not connected to a secured modem when it is enabled, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000210<VulnDiscussion>The uRPF feature is a defense against spoofing and denial-of-service attacks by verifying if the source address of any ingress packet is reachable. To mitigate attacks that rely on forged source addresses, all PE routers must enable uRPF loose mode to guarantee that all packets received from a CE router contain source addresses that are in the route table.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097Enable uRPF "loose" mode on all CE-facing interfaces, as shown in the example below: - configure router interface "TO-CE" urpf-check mode looseReview the router configuration to determine if uRPF loose mode is enabled on all CE-facing interfaces, as shown in the example below. Verify "uRPF Chk" is set to "enabled" and "uRPF Chk Mode" is set to "loose": - show router interface "TO-CE" detail | match "uRPF Chk" uRPF Chk : enabled uRPF Chk Mode : loose If "uRPF Chk" is not enabled and "uRPF Chk Mode" is not set to "loose" on all CE-facing interfaces, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000220<VulnDiscussion>The Routing Header can be used maliciously to send a packet through a path where less robust security is in place, rather than through the presumably preferred path of routing protocols. Use of the Routing Extension Header has few legitimate uses other than as implemented by Mobile IPv6. The Type 0 Routing Header (RFC 5095) is dangerous because it allows attackers to spoof source addresses and obtain traffic in response, rather than the real owner of the address. Also, a packet with an allowed destination address could be sent through a Firewall using the Routing Header functionality, only to bounce to a different node once inside. The Type 1 Routing Header is defined by a specification called "Nimrod Routing", a discontinued project funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Assuming that most implementations will not recognize the Type 1 Routing Header, it must be dropped. The Type 3-255 Routing Header values in the routing type field are currently undefined and should be dropped inbound and outbound.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure the router to drop IPv6 packets with Routing Header of type 0, 1, or 3-255. Configure an IPv6 filter, as shown in the example below: - configure filter ipv6-filter 20 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 20 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ match routing-type0 true - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ exit all Apply the IPv6 filter to the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 20This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to determine if it is configured to drop IPv6 packets containing a Routing Header of type 0, 1, or 3-255. Use the command below and determine if any "Ingr IPv6 Flt" is applied: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 20 If the router is not configured to drop IPv6 packets containing a Routing Header of type 0, 1, or 3-255, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000230<VulnDiscussion>The route processor handles traffic destined to the router, which is the key component used to build forwarding paths and is instrumental with all network management functions. Therefore, any disruption or denial-of-service attack to the route processor can result in mission-critical network outages.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097Configure all routers with receive path filters to restrict traffic destined to the router. Create a cpm-filter to control traffic to the control plane module, as shown below: CPM-filter for IPv4 traffic: - configure system security cpm-filter - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# default-action accept - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# ip-filter - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 10 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match src-ip 100.100.100.100/32 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "icmp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# back - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action drop - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# no shutdown - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# exit all CPM-Filter for IPv6 traffic: - configure system security cpm-filter - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# default-action accept - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# ipv6-filter - config>sys>sec>cpm>ipv6-filter# entry 20 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ipv6-filter>entry# match src-ip 2001:acad:1234:200::2/128 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ipv6-filter>entry# action drop - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ipv6-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ipv6-filter# no shutdown - config>sys>sec>cpm>ipv6-filter# exit allReview the access control list (ACL) or filter for the router receive path and verify it will only process specific management plane and control plane traffic from specific sources, as shown in the example below: - show system security cpm-filter ip-filter entry 10 CPM IP Filter Entry Entry Id : 10 Description : (Not Specified) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Filter Entry Match Criteria : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Log Id : n/a Src. IP : 100.100.100.100/32 Src. Port : n/a Dst. IP : n/a Dest. Port : n/a Protocol : icmp Dscp : Undefined - show system security cpm-filter ipv6-filter entry 20 CPM IPv6 Filter Entry Entry Id : 20 Description : (Not Specified) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Filter Entry Match Criteria : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Log Id : n/a Src. IP : 2001:acad:1234:200::2/128 If the router is not configured with a receive-path filter to restrict traffic destined to itself, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000240<VulnDiscussion>The Route Processor (RP) is critical to all network operations because it is the component used to build all forwarding paths for the data plane via control plane processes. It is also instrumental with ongoing network management functions that keep the routers and links available for providing network services. Any disruption to the RP or the control and management planes can result in mission-critical network outages. A DoS attack targeting the RP can result in excessive CPU and memory utilization. To maintain network stability and RP security, the router must be able to handle specific control plane and management plane traffic that is destined to the RP. In the past, one method of filtering was to use ingress filters on forwarding interfaces to filter both forwarding path and receiving path traffic. However, this method does not scale well as the number of interfaces grows and the size of the ingress filters grows. Control plane policing increases the security of routers and multilayer switches by protecting the RP from unnecessary or malicious traffic. Filtering and rate limiting the traffic flow of control plane packets can be implemented to protect routers against reconnaissance and DoS attacks, allowing the control plane to maintain packet forwarding and protocol states despite an attack or heavy load on the router or multilayer switch.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Implement control plane protection by classifying traffic types based on importance and configure filters to restrict and rate limit the traffic directed to and processed by the RP according to each class. Create a CPM filter to drop the traffic to protect the control plane, as shown in the commands below: - configure system security cpm-filter - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# ip-filter - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 10 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match src-ip 100.100.100.x/32 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "icmp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action drop - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# no shutdown - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# exit all Create a dist-cpu-protection policy to rate-limit traffic before it reaches the CPM, as shown in the commands below: - configure system security dist-cpu-protection - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection# policy "protect-cpm" create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# static-policer Rate-Limit-ICMP-Traffic create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static$ rate packets 1 within 1 - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static$ exceed-action discard - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static$ exit - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# protocol icmp create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol$ enforcement static "Rate-Limit-ICMP-Traffic" -config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol$ exit all Apply a Distributed CPU Protection Policy on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" dist-cpu-protection "protect-cpm"Determine whether control plane protection has been implemented on the device by verifying that traffic types have been classified based on importance levels and a policy has been configured to filter and rate limit the traffic according to each class, as shown below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" dist-cpu-protection detail Interface "TO-PE2" (Router: Base) Distributed CPU Protection Policy : protect-cpm ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Statistics/Policer-State Information ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Static Policer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Policer-Name : Rate-Limit-ICMP-Traffic Card/FP : 1/1 Policer-State : Conform Protocols Mapped : icmp Exceed-Count : 0 Total Exceed-Count : 0 Exceed-State-Count : 0 Detec. Time Remain : 0 seconds Hold-Down Remain. : none Operational (adapted) Rate Parameters: Oper. Packets : 1 ppi Oper. Within : 1 seconds Oper. Initial Delay: none Oper. Depth : 0 packets If the router does not have control plane protection implemented, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000250<VulnDiscussion>The primary security model for an MPLS L3VPN infrastructure is traffic separation. The service provider must guarantee the customer that traffic from one VPN does not leak into another VPN or into the core and that core traffic does not leak into any VPN. Hence, it is imperative that each CE-facing interface is associated to only one VRF. This alone is the fundamental framework for traffic separation.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Configure the PE router to have each VRF bound to the appropriate physical or logical interfaces to maintain traffic separation between all MPLS L3VPNs. Add appropriate physical and logical interfaces to each MPLS L3VPN service, as shown in the example below: - configure service vprn 30 customer 1 create - config>service>vprn# interface "TO-CE" create - config>service>vprn>if# address 172.200.x.x/30 - config>service>vprn>if# sap 1/1/c3/1 create - config>service>vprn>if>sap# exit - config>service>vprn>if# exit - config>service>vprn#Review the design plan for deploying L3VPN and VRF-lite. Review all CE-facing interfaces and verify the proper VRF is defined. Use the command below and verify CE-facing interfaces and the physical ports: - show router 30 interface "TO-CE" Interface Table (Service: 30) Interface-Name Adm Opr(v4/v6) Mode Port/SapId IP-Address PfxState ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TO-CE Up Up/Down VPRN 1/1/c3/1 172.200.200.1/30 n/a ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Interfaces : 1 If any VRFs are not bound to the appropriate physical or logical interface, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000260<VulnDiscussion>The primary security model for a Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Layer 3 virtual private network (L3VPN), as well as a VRF-lite infrastructure, is traffic separation. Each interface can be associated to only one VRF, which is the fundamental framework for traffic separation. Forwarding decisions are made based on the routing table belonging to the VRF. Control of what routes are imported into or exported from a VRF is based on the RT. It is critical that traffic does not leak from one Community of Interest tenant or L3VPN to another; hence, it is imperative that the correct RT is configured for each VRF.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Configure all PE routers to have the correct VRF defined with the appropriate RT, as shown in the example below: - configure service vprn 30 customer 1 create - config>service>vprn# bgp-ipvpn mpls vrf-target target:65100:30 - config>service>vprn# bgp-ipvpn mpls no shutdownVerify the correct RT is configured for each VRF. Review the design plan for MPLS/L3VPN and VRF-lite to determine what RTs have been assigned for each VRF. Use the command below to verify "Vrf Target" fields: - show service id 30 base | match "Vrf Target" Vrf Target : target:65100:30 If any VRFs are configured with the wrong RT, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000270<VulnDiscussion>The optional and extensible natures of the IPv6 extension headers require higher scrutiny because many implementations do not always drop packets with headers that cannot be recognized, which could cause a denial of service on the target device. In addition, the type, length, value (TLV) formatting provides the ability for headers to be very large.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure the router to drop all inbound IPv6 packets containing an undefined option type value regardless of whether they appear in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination Option header. Configure the IPv6 filter, as shown in the example below: Note: This will drop all Hop-by-Hop Option headers. - configure filter ipv6-filter 40 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# default-action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ match hop-by-hop-opt true - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ exit all Apply the IPv6 filter to the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 40This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration and determine if filters are bound to the applicable interfaces to drop all inbound IPv6 packets containing an undefined option type value regardless of whether they appear in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination Option header. Undefined values are 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x9 - 0xE, 0x10 - 0x22, 0x24, 0x25, 0x27 - 0x2F, and 0x31 - 0xFF. Verify the IPv6 filter has the HopByHop option set to "True", as shown in the example below: - show filter ipv6 40 Entry : 10 (Inactive) Description : (Not Specified) Log Id : n/a Src. IP : ::/0 Src. Port : n/a Dest. IP : ::/0 Dest. Port : n/a Next Header : Undefined Dscp : Undefined ICMP Type : Undefined ICMP Code : Undefined Sampling : Off Int. Sampling : On Tcp-flag : (Not Specified) Fragment : Off HopByHop Opt : True Routing Type0 : Off Verify an "Ing IPv6 Flt" has been applied to the interface, as shown in the example below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 40 If the router is not configured to drop IPv6 packets containing a Hop-by-Hop or Destination Option extension header with an undefined option type, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000280<VulnDiscussion>The optional and extensible natures of the IPv6 extension headers require higher scrutiny since many implementations do not always drop packets with headers they cannot recognize, which could cause a denial of service on the target device. In addition, the type, length, value (TLV) formatting enables headers to be very large. This option type is associated with the Nimrod Routing system and has no defining RFC document.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure the router to drop IPv6 packets containing an option type value of 0x8A (Endpoint Identification) regardless of whether it appears in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination Option header. Configure the IPv6 filter, as shown in the example below: Note: This will drop all Hop-by-Hop Option headers. - configure filter ipv6-filter 40 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# default-action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ match hop-by-hop-opt true - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ exit all Apply the IPv6 filter to the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 40This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router switch configuration and determine if filters are bound to the applicable interfaces to drop IPv6 packets containing an option type value of 0x8A (Endpoint Identification) regardless of whether it appears in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination Option header. Verify the IPv6 filter has the HopByHop option set to "True", as shown in the example below: - show filter ipv6 40 Entry : 10 (Inactive) Description : (Not Specified) Log Id : n/a Src. IP : ::/0 Src. Port : n/a Dest. IP : ::/0 Dest. Port : n/a Next Header : Undefined Dscp : Undefined ICMP Type : Undefined ICMP Code : Undefined Sampling : Off Int. Sampling : On Tcp-flag : (Not Specified) Fragment : Off HopByHop Opt : True Routing Type0 : Off Verify an "Ing IPv6 Flt" has been applied to the interface, as shown in the example below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 40 If the router is not configured to drop IPv6 packets containing an extension header with the Endpoint Identification option, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000290<VulnDiscussion>The optional and extensible natures of the IPv6 extension headers require higher scrutiny since many implementations do not always drop packets with headers they cannot recognize, and hence could cause a denial of service on the target device. In addition, the type, length, value (TLV) formatting enables headers to be very large. This option type from RFC 1888 (Open Systems Interconnection [OSI] NSAPs and IPv6) has been deprecated by RFC 4048.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure the router to drop IPv6 packets containing a Destination Option header with the option type value of 0xC3 (NSAP address). Configure an IPv6 filter: - config>filter# ipv6-filter 40 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header 60 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# back - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit all Apply the IPv6 filter to the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 40This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration and determine if filters are bound to the applicable interfaces to drop IPv6 packets containing a Destination Option header with option type value of 0xC3 (NSAP address). Verify the IPv6 filter has the Next Header value set to "60", as shown in the example below: - show filter ipv6 40 Entry : 10 Description : (Not Specified) Log Id : n/a Src. IP : ::/0 Src. Port : n/a Dest. IP : ::/0 Dest. Port : n/a Next Header : 60 Verify an "Ing IPv6 Flt" has been applied to the interface, as shown in the example below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 40 If the router is not configured to drop IPv6 packets containing the NSAP address option within the Destination Option header, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000300<VulnDiscussion>The OOBM network is an IP network used exclusively for the transport of Operations, Administration, Maintenance, and Provisioning (OAM&P) data from the network being managed to the Operational Support Systems (OSS) components located at the NOC. Its design provides connectivity to each managed network device, enabling network management traffic to flow between the managed network elements and the NOC. This allows the use of paths separate from those used by the managed network.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the management-access-filter, as shown in the example below: - configure system security management-access-filter - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter# ip-filter - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter# default-action permit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter# entry 10 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# description SSH - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-port cpm - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-ip 192.168.100.0/24 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# protocol "tcp" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# dst-port 22 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# action permit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# log - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# exit+I29 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter# entry 20 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# description "snmp" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-port cpm - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-ip 192.168.100.0/24 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# protocol "udp" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# dst-port 161 65535 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# action permit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# log - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter# entry 30 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# description "tacacs" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-port cpm - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-ip 192.168.100.0/24 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# protocol "tcp" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# dst-port 49 65535 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# action permit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# log - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter# entry 50 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# description "snmp-trap" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-port cpm - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-ip 192.168.100.0/24 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# protocol "udp" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# dst-port 162 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# action permit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# log - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter# entry 60 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# description "syslog" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-port cpm - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-ip 192.168.100.0/24 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# protocol "udp" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# action permit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# dst-port 514 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# action permit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# log - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter# entry 70 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# description "icmp" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-port cpm - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-ip 192.168.100.0/24 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# protocol "icmp" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# action permit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# log - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter# entry 80 - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# description "Deny all" - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# src-port cpm - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# action deny - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# log - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter>ip-filter# exit - config>system>security>mgmt-access-filter# exit allThis requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the network topology diagram to determine connectivity between the managed network and the NOC. Verify the management-access-filter, as shown in the example below: - show system security management-access-filter ip-filter IPv4 Management Access Filter filter type : ip Def. Action : permit Admin Status : enabled (no shutdown) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entry : 10 Description : SSH Src-ip : 192.168.100.0/24 Mgmt-port : cpm Protocol : tcp Dst-port : 22 Src-port : undefined Router-instance: undefined Action : permit Log : enabled Matches : 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entry : 20 Description : snmp Src-ip : 192.168.100.0/24 Mgmt-port : cpm Protocol : udp Dst-port : 161 Src-port : undefined Router-instance: undefined Action : permit Log : enabled Matches : 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entry : 30 Description : tacacs Src-ip : 192.168.100.10/32 Mgmt-port : cpm Protocol : tcp Dst-port : 49 Src-port : undefined Router-instance: undefined Action : permit Log : enabled Matches : 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entry : 50 Description : snmp-trap Src-ip : 192.168.100.0/24 Mgmt-port : cpm Protocol : udp Dst-port : 162 Src-port : undefined Router-instance: undefined Action : permit Log : enabled Matches : 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entry : 60 Description : syslog Src-ip : 192.168.100.0/24 Mgmt-port : cpm Protocol : udp Dst-port : 514 Src-port : undefined Router-instance: undefined Action : permit Log : enabled Matches : 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entry : 70 Description : icmp Src-ip : 192.168.100.0/24 Mgmt-port : cpm Protocol : icmp Dst-port : undefined Src-port : undefined Router-instance: undefined Action : permit Log : enabled Matches : 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entry : 80 Description : Deny all Src-ip : undefined Mgmt-port : cpm Protocol : undefined Dst-port : undefined Src-port : undefined Router-instance: undefined Action : deny Log : enabled Matches : 0 If traffic other than authorized management traffic is permitted through the OOBM interface or IPsec tunnel, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000310<VulnDiscussion>The Neighbor Discovery protocol allows routers to advertise a hop limit value, instead of the standardized default value, in a Router Advertisement message being used by hosts. If a very small value was configured and advertised to hosts on the local area network (LAN) segment, communications would fail due to the hop limit reaching zero before the packets sent by a host reached their destination.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Configure the router to advertise a hop limit of at least 32 in Router Advertisement messages, as shown in the example below: - configure router router-advertisement interface "TO-PE2" current-hop-limit 32This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to determine if the hop limit has been configured for Router Advertisement messages, as shown in the example below: - show router rtr-advertisement | match "Hop Limit" Retransmit Time : 00h00m00s0ms Hop Limit : 32 If the hop limit has been configured and has not been set to at least 32, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000320<VulnDiscussion>The interoperability of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) extensions for interdomain multicast routing and MSDP enables seamless connectivity of multicast domains between autonomous systems. Multiprotocol BGP (MP-BGP) advertises the unicast prefixes of the multicast sources used by Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) routers to perform Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) checks and build multicast distribution trees. MSDP is a mechanism used to connect multiple PIM sparse-mode domains, allowing RPs from different domains to share information about active sources. When Rendezvous Points (RPs) in peering multicast domains hear about active sources, they can pass that information on to their local receivers, thereby allowing multicast data to be forwarded between the domains. Configuring an import policy to block multicast advertisements for reserved, Martian, single-source multicast, and any other undesirable multicast groups, as well as any source-group (S, G) states with Bogon source addresses, would assist in avoiding unwanted multicast traffic from traversing the core.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368Configure the MSDP router to implement an import policy to block multicast advertisements for undesirable multicast groups and sources. Configure the prefix-list: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Multicast Group and Source" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# prefix 172.200.200.2/32 exact - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# prefix 233.0.0.0/8 exact - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# exit Configure the policy statement: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement "MSDP-IMPORT-SA" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# from prefix-list "Multicast Group and Source" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# default-action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply the import policy: - configure router msdp peer 1.1.1.1 import "MSDP-IMPORT-SA"Review the Nokia router configuration to determine if there is export policy to block local source-active multicast advertisements. Use the command below to view the details of the policy: - show router policy "MSDP-IMPORT-SA" entry 10 from prefix-list "Multicast Group and Source" exit action drop exit exit Verify the appropriate "Import Policy" has been applied to msdp peers using the command below: - show router msdp peer detail | match "Import Policy" Import Policy : MSDP-IMPORT-SA Verify an export policy is bound to each MSDP peer. If no export policy is applied, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000330<VulnDiscussion>The ICMP supports IP traffic by relaying information about paths, routes, and network conditions. Routers automatically send ICMP messages under a wide variety of conditions. Redirect ICMP messages are commonly used by attackers for network mapping and diagnosis.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Disable ICMP redirects on all external interfaces, as shown in the example below: - configure router interface "TO-PE1" icmp no redirects Review the device configuration to determine if controls have been defined to ensure the router does not send ICMP Redirect messages out to any external interfaces. Use the command below to verify "Redirects " is set to "Disabled": - show router interface "TO-PE1" detail | match "Redirects" Redirects : Disabled Redirects : Number - 100 Time (seconds) - 10 If ICMP Redirect messages are enabled on any external interfaces, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000340<VulnDiscussion>The ICMP supports IP traffic by relaying information about paths, routes, and network conditions. Routers automatically send ICMP messages under a wide variety of conditions. Mask Reply ICMP messages are commonly used by attackers for network mapping and diagnosis.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Disable ICMP mask replies on all external interfaces, as shown in the example below: - configure router interface "TO-PE1" icmp no mask-replyReview the device configuration to determine if controls have been defined to ensure the router does not send ICMP Mask Reply messages out to any external interfaces. Use the command below to verify "ICMP Mask Reply" is set to "False": - show router interface "TO-PE1" detail | match "ICMP Mask Reply" ICMP Mask Reply : False If ICMP Mask Reply messages are enabled on any external interfaces, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000350<VulnDiscussion>The ICMP supports IP traffic by relaying information about paths, routes, and network conditions. Routers automatically send ICMP messages under a wide variety of conditions. Host unreachable ICMP messages are commonly used by attackers for network mapping and diagnosis.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Disable ICMP unreachable notifications on all external interfaces, as shown in the example below: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" icmp no unreachablesReview the device configuration to determine if controls have been defined to ensure the router does not send ICMP unreachable notifications out to any external interfaces. Use the command below to verify "ICMP Unreachable" is set to Disable: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Unreachables" Unreachables : Disabled Unreachables : Number - 100 Time (seconds) - 10 If ICMP unreachable notifications are enabled on any external interfaces, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000360<VulnDiscussion>The head end of the label-switched path (LSP), the label edge router (LER) will decrement the IP packet's TTL value by one and then copy the value to the MPLS TTL field. At each label-switched router (LSR) hop, the MPLS TTL value is decremented by one. The MPLS router that pops the label (either the penultimate LSR or the egress LER) will copy the packet's MPLS TTL value to the IP TTL field and decrement it by one. This TTL propagation is the default behavior. Because the MPLS TTL is propagated from the IP TTL, a traceroute will list every hop in the path, whether routed or label switched, thereby exposing core nodes. With TTL propagation disabled, LER decrements the IP packet's TTL value by one and then places a value of 255 in the packet's MPLS TTL field. This is then decremented by one as the packet passes through each LSR in the MPLS core. Because the MPLS TTL never drops to zero, none of the LSP hops triggers an ICMP TTL exceeded message. Consequently, these hops are not recorded in a traceroute, and nodes within the MPLS core cannot be discovered by an attacker.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Disable the propagation of the TTL for locally generated packets and transit packets for all LSP shortcuts originating on this ingress LER, as shown in the configuration below: - configure router mpls no shortcut-local-ttl-propagate - configure router mpls no shortcut-transit-ttl-propagateReview the router configuration to verify TTL propagation is disabled. Use the command below to verify "Local TTL Prop" and/or "Transit TTL Prop" has been disabled: - show router mpls status | match "TTL Prop" Local TTL Prop : Disabled Transit TTL Prop : Disabled If the router is not configured to disable TTL propagation, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000370<VulnDiscussion>The effects of prefix deaggregation can degrade router performance due to the size of routing tables and can result in black-holing legitimate traffic. Initiated by an attacker or a misconfigured router, prefix deaggregation occurs when the announcement of a large prefix is fragmented into a collection of smaller prefix announcements.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Ensure all eBGP routers are configured to limit the prefix size on any route advertisement to /24 or the least significant prefixes issued to the customer, as shown in the example below: Create Prefix-List: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Filter-Prefix-Length" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# prefix 0.0.0.0/0 prefix-length-range 8-24 Create a policy statement: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement "Accept-routes" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# from prefix-list "Filter-Prefix-Length" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action# back - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# default-action reject - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# back - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply import policy: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" import "Accept-routes"This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Use the command below to verify the import policy is applied: - show router bgp neighbor 10.50.10.2 detail | match "Import Policy" Import Policy : Accept-routes If the router is not configured to limit the prefix size on any inbound route advertisement to /24 or the least significant prefixes issued to the customer, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000380<VulnDiscussion>The effects of prefix deaggregation can degrade router performance due to the size of routing tables and also result in black-holing legitimate traffic. Initiated by an attacker or a misconfigured router, prefix deaggregation occurs when the announcement of a large prefix is fragmented into a collection of smaller prefix announcements. In 1997, misconfigured routers in the Florida Internet Exchange network (AS7007) deaggregated every prefix in their routing table and started advertising the first /24 block of each of these prefixes as their own. Faced with this additional burden, the internal routers became overloaded and crashed repeatedly. This caused prefixes advertised by these routers to disappear from routing tables and reappear when the routers came back online. As the routers came back after crashing, they were flooded with the routing table information by their neighbors. The flood of information again overwhelmed the routers and caused them to crash. This process of route flapping destabilized not only the surrounding network but also the entire internet. Routers trying to reach those addresses would choose the smaller, more specific /24 blocks first. This caused backbone networks throughout North America and Europe to crash. Maximum prefix limits on peer connections combined with aggressive prefix-size filtering of customers' reachability advertisements will effectively mitigate the deaggregation risk. BGP maximum prefix must be used on all eBGP routers to limit the number of prefixes that it should receive from a particular neighbor, whether customer or peering autonomous system. Consider each neighbor and how many routes they should be advertising and set a threshold slightly higher than the number expected.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Configure all eBGP routers to use the maximum prefixes feature to protect against route table flooding and prefix deaggregation attacks, as shown in the example below: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" prefix-limit 500 ipv4 - configure router bgp group "eBGP" prefix-limit 500 ipv6Review the router configuration to verify the number of received prefixes from each eBGP neighbor is controlled. Use the command below to verify the prefix limit for IPv4 and IPv6: - show router bgp neighbor 20.20.20.2 detail | match "Prefix Limit" post-lines 6 Prefix Limits Per Address Family Family Limit IdleTimeout TH LogOnly PostImport ExcessInact ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ipv4 500 forever 90 Disabled Disabled N/A ipv6 500 forever 90 Disabled Disabled N/A If the router is not configured to control the number of prefixes received from each peer to protect against route table flooding and prefix deaggregation attacks, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000390<VulnDiscussion>The current multicast paradigm can let any host join any multicast group at any time by sending an IGMP or MLD membership report to the DR. In a Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) Sparse Mode network, the DR will send a PIM Join message for the group to the Rendezvous Point (RP). Without any form of admission control, this can pose a security risk to the entire multicast domain, specifically the multicast routers along the shared tree from the DR to the RP that must maintain the mroute state information for each group join request. Hence, it is imperative that the DR is configured to limit the number of mroute states that must be maintained to mitigate the risk of IGMP or MLD flooding.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Configure the DR on a global or interface basis to limit the number of mroute states resulting from IGMP or MLD membership reports, as shown in the example below: - configure router igmp interface "TO-CE" max-groups 200 - configure router mld interface "TO-CE" max-groups 200Review the DR configuration to verify it is limiting the number of mroute states via IGMP or MLD. Verify the maximum number of IGMP or MLD groups and maximum group sources is configured using the command below: - show router igmp interface "TO-CE" detail | match "Max Groups Allowed" Max Groups Allowed : 200 Max Groups Till Now: 0 - show router mld interface "TO-CE" detail | match "Max Groups Allowed" Max Groups Allowed : 200 Max Groups Till Now: 0 Note: If both global and per-interface state limiters are configured, the limits configured for per-interface state limiters are still enforced but are constrained by the global limit. If the DR is not limiting multicast join requests via IGMP or MLD on a global or interface basis, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000400<VulnDiscussion>SM can have many sources for the same groups (many-to-many). For many receivers, the path via the Rendezvous Point (RP) may not be ideal compared with the shortest path from the source to the receiver. By default, the last-hop router will initiate a switch from the shared tree to a source-specific SPT to obtain lower latencies. This is accomplished by the last-hop router sending a source-group Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) Join toward S (the source). When the last-hop router begins to receive traffic for the group from the source via the SPT, it will send a PIM Prune message to the RP for the source group. The RP will then send a Prune message toward the source. The SPT switchover becomes a scaling issue for large multicast topologies that have many receivers and sources for many groups because source-group entries require more memory than (*, G). Hence, it is imperative to minimize the amount of source-group state to be maintained by increasing the threshold that determines when the SPT switchover occurs.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Configure the multicast router to increase the SPT threshold or set it to infinity to minimize the source-group state within the multicast topology where ASM is deployed, as shown in the example below: - configure router pim spt-switchover-threshold 239.4.4.0/24 "infinity"Review the multicast last-hop router configuration to verify the SPT switchover threshold is increased (default is "0") or set to infinity (never switch over). Use the command below to verify the "Spt threshold" value: - show router pim group detail | match "Spt threshold" Spt threshold : 4294967295 kbps ECMP opt threshold : 7 If any multicast router is not configured to increase the SPT threshold or set to infinity to minimize source-group state, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000410<VulnDiscussion>Separating critical system components and functions from other noncritical system components and functions through separate subnetworks may be necessary to reduce susceptibility to a catastrophic or debilitating breach or compromise that results in system failure. For example, physically separating the command and control function from the in-flight entertainment function through separate subnetworks in a commercial aircraft provides an increased level of assurance in the trustworthiness of critical system functions.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-004891Configure the router to implement physically or logically separate subnetworks to isolate organization-defined critical system components and functions. Configure logically separate subnetworks by configuring the VPRN service, as shown in the example below: - configure service vprn 30 customer 1 create - config>service>vprn# router-id 3.3.3.3 - config>service>vprn# autonomous-system 65100 - config>service>vprn# interface "TO-CE" create - config>service>vprn>if# address 172.10.10.1/24 - config>service>vprn>if# sap 1/1/c5/1 create - config>service>vprn>if>sap# exit - config>service>vprn>if# exit - config>service>vprn# bgp-ipvpn - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn# mpls - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# auto-bind-tunnel resolution any - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# route-distinguisher 3.3.3.3:30 - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# vrf-target target:65100:30 - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# no shutdown - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# exit - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn# exit - config>service>vprn# exit allVerify the router is configured to implement physically or logically separate subnetworks to isolate organization-defined critical system components and functions. Verify the Virtual Private Routed Network (VPRN) service information, as shown in the example below: - show service id 30 base Service Basic Information Service Id : 30 Vpn Id : 0 Service Type : VPRN MACSec enabled : no Name : 30 Description : (Not Specified) Customer Id : 1 Creation Origin : manual Last Status Change: 12/11/2025 17:17:26 Last Mgmt Change : 12/11/2025 17:17:26 Admin State : Up Oper State : Up Router Oper State : Up Route Dist. : 3.3.3.3:30 VPRN Type : regular Oper Route Dist : 3.3.3.3:30 Oper RD Type : configured AS Number : 65100 Router Id : 3.3.3.3 ECMP : Enabled ECMP Max Routes : 1 Max IPv4 Routes : No Limit Local Rt Domain-Id: None D-Path Lng Ignore : Disabled Auto Bind Tunnel Allow Flex-Alg-Fb : Disabled Resolution : any Weighted ECMP : Disabled ECMP Max Routes : 1 Strict Tnl Tag : Disabled Max IPv6 Routes : No Limit Ignore NH Metric : Disabled Hash Label : Disabled Entropy Label : Disabled Vrf Target : target:65100:30 Vrf Import : None Vrf Export : None MVPN Vrf Target : None MVPN Vrf Import : None MVPN Vrf Export : None Car. Sup C-VPN : Disabled Label mode : vrf BGP VPN Backup : Disabled BGP Export Inactv : Disabled LOG all events : Disabled SAP Count : 1 SDP Bind Count : 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Service Access & Destination Points ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Identifier Type AdmMTU OprMTU Adm Opr ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sap:1/1/c5/1 null 1514 1514 Up Up If the router is not configured to implement physically or logically separate subnetworks to isolate organization-defined critical system components and functions, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000420<VulnDiscussion>RSVP-TE can be used to perform constraint-based routing when building label-switched path (LSP) tunnels within the network core that will support quality of service and traffic engineering requirements. RSVP-TE is also used to enable MPLS Fast Reroute, a network restoration mechanism that will reroute traffic onto a backup LSP in case of a node or link failure along the primary path. When there is a disruption in the MPLS core, such as a link flap or router reboot, the result is a significant amount of RSVP signaling, such as "PathErr" and "ResvErr" messages that need to be sent for every LSP using that link. When RSVP messages are sent either hop by hop or with the router alert bit set in the IP header. This means that every router along the path must examine the packet to determine if additional processing is required for these RSVP messages. If there is enough signaling traffic in the network, an interface could receive more packets for its input queue than it can hold, resulting in dropped RSVP messages and slower RSVP convergence. Increasing the size of the interface input queue can help prevent dropping packets; however, there is still the risk of having a burst of signaling traffic that can fill the queue. Solutions to mitigate this risk are RSVP message pacing or refresh reduction to control the rate at which RSVP messages are sent. RSVP refresh reduction includes the following features: RSVP message bundling, RSVP Message ID to reduce message processing overhead, reliable delivery of RSVP messages using Message ID, and summary refresh to reduce the amount of information transmitted during every refresh interval.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001095Ensure all routers with RSVP-TE enabled have message pacing configured that will adjust maximum burst and maximum number of RSVP messages to an output queue based on the link speed and input queue size of adjacent core routers. Configure to enable message pacing for RSVP with a specified number of RSVP messages in the max-burst command, as shown in the example below: - configure router rsvp msg-pacing max-burst 200 - configure router rsvp msg-pacing period 200Review the Nokia router configuration to verify the router has been configured to prevent a burst of RSVP traffic engineering signaling messages from overflowing the input queue of any neighbor core router. Use the command below and verify "Message Pacing" is enabled: - show router rsvp status | match "Message Pacing" post-lines 1 Message Pacing : Enabled Pacing Period : 200 msec Max Packet Burst : 200 msgs Refresh Bypass : Disabled If the router with RSVP-TE enabled does not have message pacing configured based on the link speed and input queue size of adjacent core routers, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000430<VulnDiscussion>ARP Learn Unsolicited is an ARP broadcast in which the source and destination MAC addresses are the same. It is used to inform the network about a host IP address. A spoofed ARP Learn Unsolicited message can cause network mapping information to be stored incorrectly, causing network malfunction.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Disable ARP Learn Unsolicited on all external interfaces, as shown in the example below: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" no arp-learn-unsolicited Note: By default, arp-learn-unsolicited is disabled to deny GARP messages.Review the configuration to determine if ARP Learn Unsolicited is disabled on all external interfaces. Use the command below to verify the "ARP Learn Unsoli*" field for each configured interface is "Disabled": - show router interface "TO-CE" detail | match "ARP Learn Unsoli*" ARP Learn Unsoli*: Disabled ND Learn Unsolici*: None If ARP Learn Unsolicited is enabled on any external interface, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000440<VulnDiscussion>Real-time multicast traffic can entail multiple large flows of data. Large unicast flows tend to be fairly isolated (i.e., someone doing a file download here or there), whereas multicast can have broader impact on bandwidth consumption, resulting in extreme network congestion. Hence, it is imperative that there is multicast admission control to restrict which multicast groups the hosts are allowed to join via IGMP or MLD.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure the DR to filter the IGMP and MLD report messages to allow hosts to join only multicast groups that have been approved, as shown in the example below: Create Prefix-List IPv4 Multicast Group: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list Multicast-Group - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 239.8.0.0/16 exact - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit Create Prefix-List IPv6 Multicast Group: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list Multicast-Group-IPv6 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix ff3e::/16 exact - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit Create a policy statement for IGMP: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement IMPORT_IGMP_JOIN - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# from prefix-list "Multicast-Group" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit Create a policy statement for MLD: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement IMPORT_MLD_JOIN - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "Multicast-Group-IPv6" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply import policy to the IGMP and MLD interface: - configure router igmp interface "TO-CE" import "IMPORT_IGMP_JOIN" - configure router mld interface "TO-CE" import "IMPORT_MLD_JOIN"Review the configuration of the DR to verify it is filtering IGMP and MLD report messages, allowing hosts to join only groups that have been approved. Verify the import policy is applied on the IGMP and MLD interface using the command below: - show router igmp interface "TO-CE" detail | match "Import-Policy" Import-Policy : IMPORT_IGMP_JOIN Subnet Check : Enabled - show router mld interface "TO-CE" detail | match "Import-Policy" Import-Policy : IMPORT_MLD_JOIN If the DR is not filtering IGMP and MLD report messages, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000450<VulnDiscussion>Real-time multicast traffic can entail multiple large flows of data. Large unicast flows tend to be fairly isolated (i.e., someone doing a file download here or there), whereas multicast can have broader impact on bandwidth consumption, resulting in extreme network congestion. Hence, it is imperative that there is multicast admission control to restrict which multicast groups the hosts are allowed to join via IGMP or MLD.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure the DR to filter the IGMP and MLD report messages to allow hosts to join only multicast groups from sources that have been approved, as shown in the example below: Create Prefix-List IPv4 Multicast Source: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list Multicast-Source-IPv4 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 172.200.200.2/32 exact - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit Create Prefix-List IPv6 Multicast Source: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list Multicast-Source-IPv6 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 2001:acad:1234:200::2/128 exact - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit Create a policy statement for IGMP: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement IMPORT_IGMP_JOIN - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# from prefix-list "Multicast-Source-IPv4" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit Create a policy statement for MLD: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement IMPORT_MLD_JOIN - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "Multicast-Source-IPv6" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply import policy to the IGMP and MLD interface: - configure router igmp interface "TO-CE" import "IMPORT_IGMP_JOIN" - configure router mld interface "TO-CE" import "IMPORT_MLD_JOIN"Review the configuration of the DR to verify it is filtering IGMP and MLD report messages, allowing hosts to only join multicast groups from sources that have been approved. Verify the import policy is applied on the IGMP and MLD interface using the command below: - show router igmp interface "TO-CE" detail | match "Import-Policy" Import-Policy : IMPORT_IGMP_JOIN Subnet Check : Enabled - show router mld interface "TO-CE" detail | match "Import-Policy" Import-Policy : IMPORT_IGMP_JOIN If the DR is not filtering IGMP and MLD report messages, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000460<VulnDiscussion>Real-time multicast traffic can entail multiple large flows of data. An attacker can flood a network segment with multicast packets, overusing the available bandwidth and creating a denial-of-service condition. Hence, it is imperative that join messages are accepted only for authorized multicast groups.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414Configure the RP routers peering with customer PIM-SM routers to implement a PIM import policy to block join messages for reserved and any undesirable multicast groups, as shown in the example below: Create a prefix-list: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list PIM-JOIN-GROUP - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 224.0.0.1/32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit Create a policy statement: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement PIM-JOIN-POLICY - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "PIM-JOIN-GROUP" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply the policy: - configure router pim import join-policy "PIM-JOIN-POLICY"Verify the RP router is configured to filter PIM register messages. Use the command below to verify the join policy: - show router pim status | match Policy Policy Join Policy : PIM-JOIN-POLICY If the RP router peering with PIM-SM routers is not configured with a PIM import policy to block registration messages for any undesirable multicast groups and sources, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000470<VulnDiscussion>Real-time multicast traffic can entail multiple large flows of data. An attacker can flood a network segment with multicast packets, overusing the available bandwidth and creating a denial-of-service condition. Hence, it is imperative that register messages are accepted only for authorized multicast groups and sources.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414Configure the RP router to filter PIM register messages received from a multicast DR for any undesirable multicast groups or sources, as shown in the example below: Create a prefix-list: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list PIM-JOIN-GROUP - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 224.0.0.1/32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit Create a policy statement: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement PIM-JOIN-POLICY - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "PIM-JOIN-GROUP" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply the policy: - configure router pim import register-policy "PIM-JOIN-POLICY"Verify the RP router is configured to filter PIM register messages. Use the command below to verify the Register Policy: - show router pim status | match Policy post-lines 1 Policy Register Policy : PIM-JOIN-POLICY If the RP router peering with PIM-SM routers is not configured with a PIM import policy to block registration messages for any undesirable multicast groups and sources, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000480<VulnDiscussion>PIM is a routing protocol used to build multicast distribution trees for forwarding multicast traffic across the network infrastructure. PIM traffic must be limited to only known PIM neighbors by configuring and binding a PIM neighbor filter to interfaces that have PIM enabled. If a PIM neighbor filter is not applied to interfaces that have PIM enabled, unauthorized routers can join the PIM domain, discover and use the rendezvous points, and also advertise their rendezvous points into the domain. This can result in a denial of service by traffic flooding or result in the unauthorized transfer of data.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure IPv4 and IPv6 filters to only accept PIM control plane traffic from documented PIM neighbors and apply them to all PIM-enabled interfaces, as shown in the example below: Configure IPv4 and IPv6 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 50 create - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 10 - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "pim" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 192.100.50.1/30 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ default-action drop - config>filter>ip-filter$ exit all - configure filter ipv6-filter 60 - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header 103 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit all Apply the IPv4 filter and IPv6 on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE3" ingress filter ip 50 - configure router interface "TO-PE3" ingress filter ipv6 60This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the multicast topology diagram and determine if router interfaces are enabled for IPv4 or IPv6 multicast routing. Verify the IPv4 and IPv6 filter is applied on the PIM-enabled interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE3" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 50 - show router interface "TO-PE3" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 60 If PIM neighbor filters are not bound to all interfaces that have PIM enabled, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000490<VulnDiscussion>Packets with IP options are not fast switched and therefore must be punted to the router processor. Hackers who initiate denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on routers commonly send large streams of packets with IP options. Dropping the packets with IP options reduces the load of IP options packets on the router. The end result is a reduction in the effects of the DoS attack on the router and downstream routers.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097Configure the router to drop all packets with IP options, as shown in the example below: Create an IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match option-present true - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit all Apply an IP-filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE3" ingress filter ip 10Review the router configuration to determine if it will block all packets with IP options. Verify the IPv4 filter is applied on the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE3" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 10 If the router is not configured to drop all packets with IP options, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000500<VulnDiscussion>Packets with IP options are not fast switched and therefore must be punted to the router processor. Hackers who initiate denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on routers commonly send large streams of packets with IP options. Dropping the packets with IP options reduces the load of IP options packets on the router. The end result is a reduction in the effects of the DoS attack on the router and downstream routers.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the router to drop all packets with IP options, as shown in the example below: Create an IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match option-present true - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit all Apply an IP-filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE3" ingress filter ip 10This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to determine if it will block all packets with IP options. Verify the IPv4 filter is applied on the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE3" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 10 If the router is not configured to drop all packets with IP options, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000510<VulnDiscussion>Packet loss can occur when an IGP adjacency is established and the router begins forwarding packets using the new adjacency before the LDP label exchange completes between the peers on that link. Packet loss can also occur if an LDP session closes and the router continues to forward traffic using the link associated with the LDP peer rather than an alternate pathway with a fully synchronized LDP session. The MPLS LDP-IGP Synchronization feature provides a means to synchronize LDP with Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) or Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) to minimize MPLS packet loss. When an IGP adjacency is established on a link but LDP-IGP synchronization is not yet achieved or is lost, the IGP will advertise the max-metric on that link.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Configure the MPLS router to synchronize IGP and LDP, minimizing packet loss when an IGP adjacency is established prior to LDP peers completing label exchange, as shown in the example below: - configure router interface "TO-PE3" ldp-sync-timer 100Review the router OSPF or IS-IS configuration. Verify LDP will synchronize with the link-state routing protocol using the command below: - show router isis interface "TO-PE3" detail | match Ldp Ldp Sync : inService Ldp Sync Wait : Disabled Ldp Timer State : Disabled Ldp Tm Left : 0 If the router Ldp Sync is not "inService", this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000520<VulnDiscussion>Outbound route advertisements belonging to the core can result in traffic either looping or being black holed, or at a minimum, using a nonoptimized path.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097Configure all eBGP routers to filter outbound route advertisements belonging to the IP core, as shown in the example below: Create a prefix-list: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Core-IP-Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# prefix 192.168.100.10/32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# exit Create a policy statement: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement "Export-Route-EBGP" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# from prefix-list "Core-IP-Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply the export policy to the BGP: - configure router bgp group "eBGP-65560" export "Export-Route-EBGP" Review the router configuration to verify a filter is defined to block route advertisements for prefixes that belong to the IP core. Verify a BGP "Export Policy" is applied to the neighbor using the command below: - show router bgp neighbor 10.50.10.2 detail | match "Export Policy" Export Policy : Export-Route-EBGP If the router is not configured to reject outbound route advertisements that belong to the IP core, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000530<VulnDiscussion>One of the fragmentation weaknesses known in IPv6 is the undetermined transport packet. This packet contains an undetermined protocol due to fragmentation. Depending on the length of the IPv6 extension header chain, the initial fragment may not contain the layer 4 port information of the packet.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure the router to drop IPv6 undetermined transport/ first fragment packets, as shown in the example below: Create an IPv6 filter: - configure filter ipv6-filter 40 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ match fragment first-only - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ exit all Apply the IPv6 filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 40This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to determine if it is configured to drop IPv6 undetermined transport packets. Verify the IPv6 filter is applied on the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 40 If the router is not configured to drop IPv6 undetermined transport packets, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000540<VulnDiscussion>Nokia network devices that are configured via a zero-touch deployment or auto-loading feature can have their startup configuration or image pushed to the device for installation via Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) or Remote Copy (RCP). Loading an image or configuration file from the network is taking a security risk because the file could be intercepted by an attacker who could corrupt the file, resulting in a denial of service.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Disable the auto-boot feature in the bof, as show in the example below: - bof no auto-bootReview the device configuration to determine if the auto-boot feature is enabled. Verify "auto-boot" is not configured when using the command below: - show bof | match "auto-boot" Note: If auto-boot is enabled, it will appear as "auto-boot". If it is disabled, it will not appear. If a configuration auto-boot is enabled, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000550<VulnDiscussion>MSDP peering with customer network routers presents additional risks to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) Core, whether from a rogue or misconfigured MSDP-enabled router. To guard against an attack from malicious MSDP traffic, the receive path or interface filter for all MSDP-enabled Rendezvous Point (RP) routers must be configured to only accept MSDP packets from known MSDP peers.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403Configure MSDP routers to only accept MSDP packets from known MSDP peers, as shown in the example below: Create an IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# src-port 639 eq - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# src-ip 2.2.2.2/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# dst-ip 1.1.1.1/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action accept - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit all Apply the IPv4 filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 10Review the router configuration to determine if there is a receive path or interface filter to only accept MSDP packets from known MSDP peers. Verify the filter is applied on the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 10 If the router is not configured to only accept MSDP packets from known MSDP peers, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000560<VulnDiscussion>MSDP peering with customer network routers presents additional risks to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) core, whether from a rogue or misconfigured MSDP-enabled router. MSDP password authentication is used to validate each segment sent on the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection between MSDP peers, protecting the MSDP session against the threat of spoofed packets being injected into the TCP connection stream.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001958Configure the MSDP router to authenticate all MSDP packets received, as shown in the example below: - configure router msdp peer 1.1.1.1 authentication-key pass123Review the router configuration to determine if received MSDP packets are authenticated. Verify "Auth Status" is enabled using the command below: - show router msdp peer 2.2.2.2 detail | match "Auth Status" Auth Status : Enabled If the router does not require MSDP authentication, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000570<VulnDiscussion>MSDP peering between networks enables sharing of multicast source information. Enclaves with an existing multicast topology using PIM-SM can configure their RP routers to peer with MSDP routers. As a first step of defense against a denial-of-service attack, all RP routers must limit the multicast forwarding cache to ensure that router resources are not saturated managing an overwhelming number of PIM and MSDP source-active entries.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Configure MSDP-enabled RP routers to limit the multicast forwarding cache for source-active entries, as shown in the example below: Create a prefix-list: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list PIM-JOIN-GROUP - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 224.0.0.1/32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit Create a policy statement: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement PIM-JOIN-POLICY - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "PIM-JOIN-GROUP" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply the import register-policy: - configure router pim import register-policy "PIM-JOIN-POLICY" Create a dist-cpu-protection policy: - configure system security dist-cpu-protection - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection# policy "test-dcp" create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# static-policer "PIM-RATE-LIMIT" create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# rate packets 1 within 1 - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# exceed-action discard - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# exit - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# protocol pim create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# enforcement static "PIM-RATE-LIMIT" - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# exit all Apply the dist-cpu-protection policy on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE3" dist-cpu-protection "test-dcp" Create an IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# src-port 639 eq - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# src-ip 2.2.2.2/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# dst-ip 1.1.1.1/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit all Apply the IPv4 filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 10 Review the router configuration to determine if forwarding cache thresholds are defined. Verify the dist-cpu-policy applied to the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE3" detail | match OperDCpuProtPlcy OperDCpuProtPlcy : test-dcp Verify the IPv4 filter is applied on the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 10 Verify the Register-Policy is applied using the command below: - show router pim status | match Policy post-lines 1 Policy Register Policy : PIM-JOIN-POLICY If the RP router is not configured to limit the multicast forwarding cache to ensure that its resources are not saturated, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000580<VulnDiscussion>Many of the known attacks in stateless autoconfiguration are defined in RFC 3756 and were present in IPv4 ARP attacks. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, links that have no hosts connected, such as the interface connecting to external gateways, must be configured to suppress Router Advertisements.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Configure the router to suppress Router Advertisements on all external IPv6-enabled interfaces, as shown in the example below: - configure router router-advertisement interface "TO-PE2" shutdownThis requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify Router Advertisements are suppressed on all external IPv6-enabled interfaces. Use the command below and verify for each interface the "RtrAdvertisement Tx" value: - show router rtr-advertisement Router Advertisement Interface: TO-PE2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rtr Advertisement Tx : 4 Last Sent : 00h05m01s Nbr Solicitation Tx : 3097 Last Sent : 00h00m53s Nbr Advertisement Tx : 3078 Last Sent : 00h00m53s Rtr Advertisement Rx : 0 Rtr Solicitation Rx : 0 Nbr Advertisement Rx : 3095 Nbr Solicitation Rx : 3078 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Max Advert Interval : 600 Min Advert Interval : 200 Managed Config : FALSE Other Config : FALSE Reachable Time : 00h00m00s0ms Router Lifetime : 00h30m00s Retransmit Time : 00h00m00s0ms Hop Limit : 64 Link MTU : 0 ND Router Preference : medium MAC Addr To Use : Interface Creation Origin : manual No Prefixes If the router is not configured to suppress Router Advertisements on all external IPv6-enabled interfaces, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000590<VulnDiscussion>LLDPs are primarily used to obtain protocol addresses of neighboring devices and discover platform capabilities of those devices. Use of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) with the LLDP Management Information Base (MIB) allows network management applications to learn the device type and the SNMP agent address of neighboring devices, enabling the application to send SNMP queries to those devices. LLDPs are also media and protocol independent as they run over the data link layer; therefore, two systems that support different network-layer protocols can still learn about each other. Allowing LLDP messages to reach external network nodes is dangerous as it provides an attacker a method to obtain information about the network infrastructure that can be useful to plan an attack.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Disable LLDP on the system level using the command below: - configure system lldp shutdown Disable LLDP on the port using the command below: - configure port 1/1/c2/1 - config>port# ethernet lldp dest-mac nearest-bridge admin-status disabled - config>port# exit allThis requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review all router configurations to ensure LLDPs are not included in the global configuration or LLDPs are not included for each active external interface. Verify LLDP "Admin Enabled" sis et to "False" in the system level using the command below: - show system lldp | match "Admin Enabled" Admin Enabled : False Verify LLDP is in "Admin State" and set to "disabled" for all active external ports using the command below: - show port 1/1/c2/1 ethernet lldp | match "Admin State" Admin State : disabled Notifications : Disabled Admin State : disabled Notifications : Disabled Admin State : disabled Notifications : Disabled If LLDPs are configured on the system and any external interface, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000600<VulnDiscussion>LDP provides the signaling required for setting up and tearing down pseudowires (virtual circuits used to transport layer 2 frames) across an MPLS IP core network. Using a targeted LDP session, each PE router advertises a virtual circuit label mapping that is used as part of the label stack imposed on the frames by the ingress PE router during packet forwarding. Authentication provides protection against spoofed Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) segments that can be introduced into the LDP sessions.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001958Configure all targeted LDP sessions using a FIPS-approved message authentication code algorithm, as shown in the example below: - configure router ldp tcp-session-parameters authentication-key pass123Review the router configuration to determine if LDP messages are being authenticated for the targeted LDP sessions. Verify "Authentication Key" is enabled using the command below: - show router ldp tcp-session-parameters | match "Authentication Key" Authentication Key : Enabled If authentication is not being used for the LDP sessions using a FIPS-approved message authentication code algorithm, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000610<VulnDiscussion>Internet Service Providers (ISPs) use BGP to share route information with other autonomous systems (i.e., other ISPs and corporate networks). If the perimeter router was configured to BGP peer with an ISP, NIPRNet routes could be advertised to the ISP; creating a backdoor connection from the internet to the NIPRNet.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure a static route on the perimeter router to reach the autonomous system of a router connecting to an alternate gateway, as shown in the example below: - configure router static-route-entry 0.0.0.0/0 next-hop 10.50.10.1 no shutdownThis requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the configuration of the router connecting to the alternate gateway. Verify the alternate gateway using the command below: - show router static-route 0.0.0.0/0 Static Route Table (Router: Base) Family: IPv4 Prefix Nexthop Tag Met Pref Type Act Next Hop Interface ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0.0.0.0/0 0 1 5 NH N 10.50.10.1 n/a ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No. of Static Routes: 1 If BGP neighbors are connecting the remote AS of the alternate gateway service provider, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000620<VulnDiscussion>IP/Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) networks providing VPN and transit services must provide, at the least, the same level of protection against denial-of-service attacks and intrusions as layer 2 networks. Although the IP core network elements are hidden, security should never rely entirely on obscurity. IP addresses can be guessed. Core network elements must not be accessible from any external host. Protecting the core from any attack is vital for the integrity and privacy of customer traffic as well as the availability of transit services. A compromise of the IP core can result in an outage or, at a minimum, nonoptimized forwarding of customer traffic. Protecting the core from an outside attack also prevents attackers from using the core to attack any customer. Hence, it is imperative that all routers at the edge deny traffic destined to any address belonging to the IP core infrastructure.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097Configure protection for the IP core to be implemented at the edges by blocking any traffic with a destination address assigned to the IP core infrastructure, as shown in the example below: Create an IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 10 - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match dst-ip 172.150.150.2/30 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit all Apply the IPv4 filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 10Review the router configuration to verify an ingress ACL is applied to all customer edge-facing interfaces. Verify the filter is applied using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 10 If the PE router is not configured to block any traffic with a destination address assigned to the IP core infrastructure, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000630<VulnDiscussion>Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel within a network and between interconnected networks. The flow of all network traffic must be monitored and controlled so it does not introduce any unacceptable risk to the network infrastructure or data. Information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms are commonly employed by organizations to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations (e.g., networks, individuals, and devices) within information systems. Enforcement occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices (e.g., gateways, routers, guards, encrypted tunnels, and firewalls) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services, provide a packet filtering capability based on header information, or provide a message filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics).</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure a filter to allow or deny traffic for specific source and destination addresses as well as ports and protocols, as shown in the example below: Create a port list: - configure filter match-list port-list Filter-Server-Port-list create - config>filter>match-list>port-list$ port 515 - config>filter>match-list>port-list$ port 631 - config>filter>match-list>port-list$ port 9100 - config>filter>match-list>port-list$ exit Create an IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 20 create - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.23.1.0/24 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-port port-list "Filter-Server-Port-list" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 20 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.23.2.0/24 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-port port-list "Filter-Server-Port-list" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 30 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "icmp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 40 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "ospf-igp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ default-action drop - config>filter>ip-filter$ exit all Apply the IPv4 filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 20This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify access control lists (ACLs) and filters are configured to allow or deny traffic for specific source and destination addresses as well as ports and protocols. Verify the IPv4 filter is applied on the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 20 If the router is not configured to enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the network based on organization-defined information flow control policies, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000650<VulnDiscussion>IGMP snooping provides a way to constrain multicast traffic at layer 2. By monitoring the IGMP membership reports sent by hosts within the bridge domain, the snooping application can set up layer 2 multicast forwarding tables to deliver traffic only to ports with at least one interested member within the VPLS bridge, significantly reducing the volume of multicast traffic that would otherwise flood an entire VPLS bridge domain. The IGMP snooping operation applies to both access circuits and pseudowires within a VPLS bridge domain.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Configure IGMP or MLD snooping for IPv4 and IPv6 multicast traffic, respectively, for each VPLS bridge domain, as shown in the example below: - configure service vpls 10 igmp-snooping no shutdown - configure service vpls 10 mld-snooping no shutdownReview the router configuration to verify IGMP or MLD snooping has been configured for IPv4 and IPv6 multicast traffic, respectively, for each VPLS bridge domain. Verify igmp-snooping and mld-snooping are enabled using the command below: - show service id 10 igmp-snooping all | match "Admin State" Admin State : Up IGMP Snooping Admin State : Up - show service id 10 mld-snooping all | match "Admin State" Admin State : Up MLD Snooping Admin State : Up If the router is not configured to implement IGMP or MLD snooping for each VPLS bridge domain, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000660<VulnDiscussion>If the static routes to the alternate gateway are being redistributed into an Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) or IGP to a NIPRNet gateway, this could make traffic on NIPRNet flow to that particular router and not to the internet Access Point routers. This could wreak havoc with traffic flows on NIPRNet, overwhelm the connection from the router to the NIPRNet gateway(s), and cause traffic destined for outside of NIPRNet to bypass the defenses of the internet Access Points.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the router so static routes are not redistributed to an alternate gateway into either an EGP or IGP to the NIPRNet or to other autonomous systems, as shown in the example below: Create a policy statement: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement EXPORT-STATIC - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from protocol static - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ to protocol bgp - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit Apply the export policy: - configure router bgp group eBGP export "EXPORT-STATIC"This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Nokia routers do not automatically distribute static routes to IGP protocols unless a routing policy is applied to distribute these routes. Review the configuration of the router connecting to the alternate gateway and verify redistribution of static routes to the alternate gateway is not occurring. Use this command for BGP neighbors and verify an "Export Policy" is defined: - show router bgp neighbor 50.50.50.1 detail | match "Export Policy" Export Policy : EXPORT-STATIC If the static routes to the alternate gateway are being redistributed into BGP or any IGP peering with a NIPRNet gateway or another autonomous system, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000670<VulnDiscussion>If the same keys are used between eBGP neighbors, the chance of a hacker compromising any of the BGP sessions increases. A malicious user could exist in one autonomous system who would know the key used for the eBGP session. This user would then be able to hijack BGP sessions with other trusted neighbors.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001184Configure all eBGP routers with unique keys for each eBGP neighbor that it peers with, as shown in the example below: Configure a key chain: - configure system security keychain "test" tcp-option-number send tcp-ao - configure system security keychain "test" tcp-option-number receive tcp-ao - configure system security keychain "test" direction bi entry 1 key 12345678901 algorithm aes-128-cmac-96 begin-time 2025/12/28 UTC 00:00:00 - configure system security keychain "test" direction bi entry 2 key 12345678901 algorithm aes-128-cmac-96 begin-time 2026/06/28 UTC 00:00:00 Apply the key chain to the BGP neighbor: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" auth-keychain "test"Interview the information system security manager (ISSM) and router administrator to determine if unique keys are being used. Verify the key-chain is enabled for the BGP protocol using the command below: - show system security keychain "test" detail Key chain:test Description : (Not Specified) TCP-Option number send : tcp-ao Admin state : Up TCP-Option number receive : tcp-ao Oper state : Up Used by : BGP Expired : No Key entries for key chain: test Id : 1 Direction : send-receive Algorithm : aes-128-cmac-96 Option : none Admin State : Up RX Valid : Yes TX Active : Yes Tolerance : 300 Begin Time : 2025/12/28 00:00:00 Begin Time (UTC) : 2025/12/28 00:00:00 End Time : 2026/06/28 00:00:00 End Time (UTC) : 2026/06/28 00:00:00 NOTE: Nokia router is limited to MD5, HMAC-sha-1-96, and AES-128-CMAC-96 for BGP authentication. Configure the router with AES-128-CMAC-96, which will be FIPS compliant once SP 800-224 is finalized. Until then, this is a finding because it is not FIPS compliant but may be downgraded to a CAT III. If the key-chain is not enabled for the BGP protocol, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000690<VulnDiscussion>If the keys used for routing protocol authentication are guessed, the malicious user could create havoc within the network by advertising incorrect routes and redirecting traffic. Some routing protocols allow the use of key chains for authentication. A key chain is a set of keys that is used in succession, with each having a lifetime of no more than 180 days. Changing the keys frequently reduces the risk of them eventually being guessed. Keys cannot be used during time periods for which they are not activated. If a time period occurs during which no key is activated, neighbor authentication cannot occur, and routing updates will fail. Ensure that for a given key chain, key activation times overlap to avoid any period during which no key is activated.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001184This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure each key to have a lifetime of no more than 180 days, as shown in the example below: - configure system security keychain "test" tcp-option-number send tcp-ao - configure system security keychain "test" tcp-option-number receive tcp-ao - configure system security keychain "test" direction bi entry 1 key 12345678901 algorithm aes-128-cmac-96 begin-time 2025/12/28 UTC 00:00:00 - configure system security keychain "test" direction bi entry 2 key 12345678901 algorithm aes-128-cmac-96 begin-time 2026/06/28 UTC 00:00:00This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. For each authenticated routing protocol session, review the configured key expiration dates. Use the command below and verify "Begin Time" between two consecutive entries does not exceed 180 days: - show system security keychain "test" detail Key chain:test Description : (Not Specified) TCP-Option number send : tcp-ao Admin state : Up TCP-Option number receive : tcp-ao Oper state : Up Used by : BGP Expired : No Key entries for key chain: test Id : 1 Direction : send-receive Algorithm : aes-128-cmac-96 Option : none Admin State : Up RX Valid : Yes TX Active : Yes Tolerance : 300 Begin Time : 2025/12/28 00:00:00 Begin Time (UTC) : 2025/12/28 00:00:00 End Time : 2026/06/28 00:00:00 End Time (UTC) : 2026/06/28 00:00:00 NOTE: Nokia router is limited to MD5, HMAC-sha-1-96, and AES-128-CMAC-96 for BGP authentication. Configure the router with AES-128-CMAC-96, which will be FIPS compliant once SP 800-224 is finalized. Until then, this is a finding because it is not FIPS compliant but may be downgraded to a CAT III. If any key has a lifetime of more than 180 days, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000700<VulnDiscussion>If the gateway router is not a dedicated device for the OOBM network, several safeguards must be implemented for containment of management and production traffic boundaries; otherwise, it is possible that management traffic will not be separated from production traffic. Because the managed network and the management network are separate routing domains, separate Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) routing instances must be configured on the router, one for the managed network and one for the OOBM network. In addition, the routes from the two domains must not be redistributed to each other. Satisfies: SRG-NET-000019-RTR-000012, SRG-NET-000019-RTR-000011</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the IGP instance used for the managed network to prohibit redistribution of routes into the IGP instance used for the management network, and vice versa. Configure VPRN services for MGMT using the commands below: - configure service vprn 30 customer 1 create - config>service>vprn# autonomous-system 65100 - config>service>vprn# interface "TO-MGMT" create - config>service>vprn>if# address 192.168.1.1/30 - config>service>vprn>if# sap 1/1/c5/1 create - config>service>vprn>if>sap# exit - config>service>vprn>if# exit - config>service>vprn# bgp-ipvpn - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn# mpls - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# auto-bind-tunnel resolution any - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# route-distinguisher 3.3.3.3:30 - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# vrf-target target:65100:300 - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# no shutdown - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# exit - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn# exit - config>service>vprn# ospf - config>service>vprn>ospf# area 0.0.0.0 - config>service>vprn>ospf>area# interface "TO-MGMT" - config>service>vprn>ospf>area>if# no shutdown - config>service>vprn>ospf>area>if# exit - config>service>vprn>ospf>area# exit - config>service>vprn>ospf# no shutdown - config>service>vprn>ospf# exit - config>service>vprn# no shutdown - config>service>vprn# exit all Configure VPRN service for PROD using the commands below: - configure service vprn 40 customer 1 create - config>service>vprn$ router-id 3.3.3.3 - config>service>vprn$ autonomous-system 65100 - config>service>vprn$ interface TO-PROD create - config>service>vprn>if$ address 192.168.2.1/30 - config>service>vprn>if$ sap 1/1/c6/1 create - config>service>vprn>if>sap$ exit - config>service>vprn>if$ exit - config>service>vprn$ bgp-ipvpn - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn$ mpls - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls$ auto-bind-tunnel resolution any - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls$ route-distinguisher 3.3.3.3:40 - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls$ vrf-target target:65100:40 - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls$ no shutdown - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls$ exit - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn$ exit - config>service>vprn$ ospf - config>service>vprn>ospf$ area 0 - config>service>vprn>ospf>area$ interface "TO-PROD" - config>service>vprn>ospf>area>if$ no shutdown - config>service>vprn>ospf>area>if$ exit - config>service>vprn>ospf>area$ exit - config>service>vprn>ospf$ no shutdown - config>service>vprn>ospf$ exit - config>service>vprn# no shutdown - config>service>vprn# exit allThis requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Verify the IGP instance used for the managed network does not redistribute routes into the Interior Gateway Protocol instance used for the management network and vice versa. Verify Virtual Private Routed Network (VPRN) services for MGMT and PROD using the command below: - show service id 30 base Service Basic Information Service Id : 30 Vpn Id : 0 Service Type : VPRN MACSec enabled : no Name : 30 Description : (Not Specified) Customer Id : 1 Creation Origin : manual Last Status Change: 12/18/2025 02:36:25 Last Mgmt Change : 12/18/2025 02:36:25 Admin State : Up Oper State : Up Router Oper State : Up Route Dist. : 3.3.3.3:30 VPRN Type : regular Oper Route Dist : 3.3.3.3:30 Oper RD Type : configured AS Number : 65100 Router Id : 3.3.3.3 ECMP : Enabled ECMP Max Routes : 1 Max IPv4 Routes : No Limit Local Rt Domain-Id: None D-Path Lng Ignore : Disabled Auto Bind Tunnel Allow Flex-Alg-Fb : Disabled Resolution : any Weighted ECMP : Disabled ECMP Max Routes : 1 Strict Tnl Tag : Disabled Max IPv6 Routes : No Limit Ignore NH Metric : Disabled Hash Label : Disabled Entropy Label : Disabled Vrf Target : target:65100:300 Vrf Import : None Vrf Export : None MVPN Vrf Target : None MVPN Vrf Import : None MVPN Vrf Export : None Car. Sup C-VPN : Disabled Label mode : vrf BGP VPN Backup : Disabled BGP Export Inactv : Disabled LOG all events : Disabled SAP Count : 1 SDP Bind Count : 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Service Access & Destination Points ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Identifier Type AdmMTU OprMTU Adm Opr ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sap:1/1/c5/1 null 1514 1514 Up Up - show service id 40 base Service Basic Information Service Id : 40 Vpn Id : 0 Service Type : VPRN MACSec enabled : no Name : 40 Description : (Not Specified) Customer Id : 1 Creation Origin : manual Last Status Change: 12/18/2025 16:09:25 Last Mgmt Change : 12/18/2025 16:09:25 Admin State : Up Oper State : Up Router Oper State : Up Route Dist. : 3.3.3.3:40 VPRN Type : regular Oper Route Dist : 3.3.3.3:40 Oper RD Type : configured AS Number : 65100 Router Id : 3.3.3.3 ECMP : Enabled ECMP Max Routes : 1 Max IPv4 Routes : No Limit Local Rt Domain-Id: None D-Path Lng Ignore : Disabled Auto Bind Tunnel Allow Flex-Alg-Fb : Disabled Resolution : any Weighted ECMP : Disabled ECMP Max Routes : 1 Strict Tnl Tag : Disabled Max IPv6 Routes : No Limit Ignore NH Metric : Disabled Hash Label : Disabled Entropy Label : Disabled Vrf Target : target:65100:40 Vrf Import : None Vrf Export : None MVPN Vrf Target : None MVPN Vrf Import : None MVPN Vrf Export : None Car. Sup C-VPN : Disabled Label mode : vrf BGP VPN Backup : Disabled BGP Export Inactv : Disabled LOG all events : Disabled SAP Count : 1 SDP Bind Count : 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Service Access & Destination Points ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Identifier Type AdmMTU OprMTU Adm Opr ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sap:1/1/c6/1 null 1514 1514 Up Up If the IGP instance used for the managed network redistributes routes into the IGP instance used for the management network, or vice versa, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000710<VulnDiscussion>If the gateway router is not a dedicated device for the OOBM network, several safeguards must be implemented for containment of management and production traffic boundaries. It is imperative that hosts from the managed network are not able to access the OOBM gateway router.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure cpm-filter using the example below: - configure system security cpm-filter - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# default-action drop - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# ip-filter - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 10 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match src-ip 192.168.50.0/24 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# no shutdown - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# exit allThis requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the CPM filter for the router receive path using the example below: - show system security cpm-filter ip-filter entry 10 CPM IP Filter Entry Entry Id : 10 Description : (Not Specified) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Filter Entry Match Criteria : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Log Id : n/a Src. IP : 192.168.50.0/24 Src. Port : n/a Dst. IP : n/a Dest. Port : n/a Protocol : none Dscp : Undefined ICMP Type : Undefined ICMP Code : Undefined Fragment : Off Option-present : Off IP-Option : n/a Multiple Option : Off TCP-syn : Off TCP-ack : Off Action : Forward Match Router ID : n/a Dropped pkts : 0 Forwarded pkts : 0 If the CPM filter is not configured to only allow traffic to the route processor from the OOBM local area network (LAN), this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000730<VulnDiscussion>If multicast traffic is forwarded beyond the intended boundary, it could be intercepted by unauthorized or unintended personnel. Administrative scoped multicast addresses are locally assigned and are to be used exclusively by the enterprise network or enclave. Administrative scoped multicast traffic must not cross the enclave perimeter in either direction. Restricting multicast traffic makes it more difficult for a malicious user to access sensitive traffic. Admin-Local scope is encouraged for any multicast traffic within a network intended for network management, as well as for control plane traffic that must reach beyond link-local destinations.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414Create an IPv4 filter using the example below: - configure filter ip-filter 10 - config>filter>ip-filter# default-action forward - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match dst-ip 239.0.0.0/8 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit all Apply an IPv4 filter on the interface using the example below: - configure router interface "TO-PE3" ingress filter ip 10Review the router configuration and verify admin-scope multicast traffic is blocked at the external edge. Use the command below to display the IPv4 filter applied. - show router interface "TO-PE3" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 10 If the router is not configured to establish boundaries for administratively scoped multicast traffic, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000740<VulnDiscussion>If multicast traffic is forwarded beyond the intended boundary, it could be intercepted by unauthorized or unintended personnel. Limiting where within the network a given multicast group's data is permitted to flow is an important first step in improving multicast security. A scope zone is an instance of a connected region of a given scope. Zones of the same scope cannot overlap, while zones of a smaller scope will fit completely within a zone of a larger scope. For example, Admin-local scope is smaller than Site-local scope, so the administratively configured boundary fits within the bounds of a site. According to RFC 4007 IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture (section 5), scope zones are also required to be "convex from a routing perspective"; that is, packets routed within a zone must not pass through any links that are outside of the zone. This requirement forces each zone to be one contiguous island rather than a series of separate islands. As stated in the DoW IPv6 IA Guidance for MO3, "One should be able to identify all interfaces of a zone by drawing a closed loop on their network diagram, engulfing some routers and passing through some routers to include only some of their interfaces." Therefore, it is imperative that the network engineers have documented their multicast topology and know which interfaces are enabled for multicast. Once this is done, the zones can be scoped as required.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414Document all enabled interfaces for PIM in the network's multicast topology diagram. Disable support for PIM on interfaces that are not required to support it. Configure the multicast router to disable the PIM interface using the example below: - configure router pim interface "TO-PE1" shutdownIf IPv4 or IPv6 multicast routing is enabled, verify all interfaces enabled for PIM are documented in the network's multicast topology diagram. Determine if the PIM interface is disabled using the command below: - show router pim interface "TO-PE1" PIM Interface ipv4 TO-PE1 Interface Adm Opr DR Prty Hello Intvl Mcast Send DR ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TO-PE1 Down Down N/A 30 auto N/A ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Interfaces : 1 If an interface is not required to support multicast routing and is enabled, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000750<VulnDiscussion>GTSM is designed to protect a router's IP-based control plane from denial-of-service attacks. Many attacks focused on CPU load and line-card overload can be prevented by implementing GTSM on all Exterior Border Gateway Protocol speaking routers. GTSM is based on the fact that the vast majority of control plane peering is established between adjacent routers; that is, the Exterior Border Gateway Protocol peers are either between connecting interfaces or between loopback interfaces. Because TTL spoofing is considered nearly impossible, a mechanism based on an expected TTL value provides a simple and reasonably robust defense from infrastructure attacks based on forged control plane traffic.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Configure all Exterior Border Gateway Protocol peering sessions to use GTSM using the example below: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" ttl-security 1Review the router configuration. Use the command below and verify "TTL Security" is "Enabled" and the "Min TTL Value" is configured correctly: - show router bgp group "eBGP" detail | match TTL TTL Security : Enabled Min TTL Value : 1 If the router is not configured to use GTSM for all Exterior Border Gateway Protocol peering sessions, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000760<VulnDiscussion>Fragmented ICMP packets can be generated by hackers for denial-of-service attacks such as Ping O' Death and Teardrop. It is imperative that all fragmented ICMP packets are dropped.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097Configure the CPM filter to drop all fragmented ICMP packets destined to itself, as shown in the example below: - configure system security cpm-filter - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# default-action accept - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# ip-filter - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 10 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "icmp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# fragment true - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action drop - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# no shutdown - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# exit - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# exit all Review the access control list (ACL) or filter for the router receive path. Review the CPM filter to verify the router is configured to drop all fragmented ICMP packets destined to itself using the example below: - show system security cpm-filter ip-filter entry 10 CPM IP Filter Entry Entry Id : 10 Description : (Not Specified) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Filter Entry Match Criteria : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Log Id : n/a Src. IP : n/a Src. Port : n/a Dst. IP : n/a Dest. Port : n/a Protocol : icmp Dscp : Undefined ICMP Type : Undefined ICMP Code : Undefined Fragment : True Option-present : Off IP-Option : n/a Multiple Option : Off TCP-syn : Off TCP-ack : Off Action : Drop Match Router ID : n/a Dropped pkts : 0 Forwarded pkts : 0 If the router is not configured with a receive-path filter to drop all fragmented ICMP packets, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000770<VulnDiscussion>For in-band management, the management network must have its own subnet to enforce control and access boundaries provided by layer 3 network nodes, such as routers and firewalls. Management traffic between the managed network elements and the management network is routed via the same links and nodes that are used for production or operational traffic. Safeguards must be implemented to ensure the management traffic does not leak past the perimeter of the managed network.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the perimeter router of the managed network with IPv4 and IPv6 filters on the egress interface to block all outbound management traffic using the example below: Create an IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 10 - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match dst-ip 172.10.1.0/24 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter# default-action forward - config>filter>ip-filter# exit all Create an IPv6 filter: - configure filter ipv6-filter 20 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter$ entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ match dst-ip 2001:acad:1234:200::1/64 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter$ default-action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter$ exit all Apply the IPv4 filter and IPv6 filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" egress filter ip 10 - configure router interface "TO-PE2" egress filter ipv6 20This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. The perimeter router of the managed network must be configured with an access control list (ACL) or filter on the egress interface to block all management traffic. Verify IPv4 and IPv6 filters are applied on the interface using the commands below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Egress Filter" Egress Filter : 10 Ingress Filter : 10 - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Egr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : 20 Ingr IPv6 Flt : none If management traffic is not blocked at the perimeter, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000790<VulnDiscussion>Enclaves with alternate gateway connections must take additional steps to ensure there is no compromise on the enclave network or NIPRNet. Without verifying the destination address of traffic coming from the site's alternate gateway, the perimeter router could be routing transit data from the internet into the NIPRNet. This could also make the perimeter router vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack and provide a back door into the NIPRNet. The DoW enclave must ensure the ingress filter applied to external interfaces on a perimeter router connecting to an approved gateway is secure through filters permitting packets with a destination address belonging to the DoW enclave's address block.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the ingress filter of the perimeter router connected to an alternate gateway to only permit packets with destination addresses of the site's NIPRNet address space or a destination address belonging to the address block assigned by the alternate gateway network service provider. Create an IPv4 filter using the example below: - configure filter ip-filter 10 - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 20 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "icmp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.16/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.2.17/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ icmp-type "echo-request" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 30 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "icmp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.16/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.2.17/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ icmp-type "echo-reply" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 40 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.2.17/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-port 80 eq - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 50 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match dst-ip 10.12.2.17/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# dst-port 80 eq - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 60 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match protocol 50 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 70 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# match protocol 51 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>filter>ip-filter# default-action drop - config>filter>ip-filter# exit all Create an IPv6 filter using the example below: - configure filter ipv6-filter 80 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header "tcp" - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# tcp-established - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 20 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header "ipv6-icmp" - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# dst-ip 2001:acad:1234:50::2/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# src-ip 2001:acad:1234:50::1/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match#icmp-type echo-request - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 30 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header "ipv6-icmp" - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# dst-ip 2001:acad:1234:50::2/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# src-ip 2001:acad:1234:50::1/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# icmp-type echo-reply - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 40 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header "tcp" - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# dst-ip 2001:acad:1234:50::2/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# dst-port eq 80 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 50 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header "tcp" - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# dst-ip 2001:acad:1234:50::10/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# dst-port eq 80 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 60 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header 50 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 70 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# match next-header 51 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry>match# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry# exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter# default-action drop - config>filter>ipv6-filter# Apply IPv4 and IPv6 filters on the interface using the example below: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 10 - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 80This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the configuration of each router interface connecting to an alternate gateway. Verify IPv4 and IPv6 filters are applied on the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 10 - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : none Ingr IPv6 Flt : 80 If the ingress filter permits packets with addresses other than those specified, such as destination addresses of the site's NIPRNet address space or a destination address belonging to the address block assigned by the alternate gateway network service provider, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000800<VulnDiscussion>DoS is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. Packet flooding distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are referred to as volumetric attacks and have the objective of overloading a network or circuit to deny or seriously degrade performance, which denies access to the services that normally traverse the network or circuit. Volumetric attacks have become relatively easy to launch using readily available tools such as Low Orbit Ion Cannon or botnets. Measures to mitigate the effects of a successful volumetric attack must be taken to ensure that sufficient capacity is available for mission-critical traffic. Managing capacity may include, for example, establishing selected network usage priorities or quotas and enforcing them using rate limiting, QoS, or other resource reservation control methods. These measures may also mitigate the effects of sudden decreases in network capacity that are the result of accidental or intentional physical damage to telecommunications facilities (such as cable cuts or weather-related outages). Satisfies: SRG-NET-000193-RTR-000112, SRG-NET-000193-RTR-000114, SRG-NET-000193-RTR-000113</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001095Implement a mechanism for traffic prioritization and bandwidth reservation. This mechanism must enforce the traffic priorities specified by the Combatant Commands/Services/Agencies. Nokia routers support multiple QoS policy types. Below is an example of how to configure and apply the SAP Ingress QoS policy. Configure scheduler-policy using the example below: - configure qos scheduler-policy TEST create - config>qos>scheduler-policy$ tier 1 - config>qos>scheduler-policy>tier$ scheduler root create - config>qos>scheduler-policy>tier>scheduler$ rate 107520 cir 107520 - config>qos>scheduler-policy>tier>scheduler$ exit - config>qos>scheduler-policy>tier$ exit all Configure QoS sap-ingress policy using the example below: - configure qos sap-ingress 90 create - config>qos>sap-ingress# queue 1 create - config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# parent "root" cir-level 1 - config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# adaptation-rule pir max cir min - config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# rate 107520 cir 40960 - config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# mbs 135 kilobytes -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# cbs 52 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# exit -config>qos>sap-ingress# queue 2 create -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ parent "root" level 2 cir-level 2 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ adaptation-rule pir max cir min -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ rate 107520 cir 10240 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ mbs 135 kilobytes -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ cbs 13 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ exit -config>qos>sap-ingress# queue 3 create -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ parent "root" level 3 cir-level 3 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ adaptation-rule pir max cir min -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ rate 107520 cir 10240 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ mbs 135 kilobytes -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ cbs 13 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ exit -config>qos>sap-ingress# queue 4 create -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ parent "root" level 4 cir-level 4 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ adaptation-rule pir max cir min -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ rate 40960 cir 40960 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ mbs 52 kilobytes -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ cbs 52 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue$ exit -config>qos>sap-ingress# queue 11 multipoint create -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# parent "root" cir-level 1 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# adaptation-rule pir max cir min -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# rate 20480 cir 5120 -config>qos>sap-ingress>queue# exit -config>qos>sap-ingress# fc af create -config>qos>sap-ingress>fc$ queue 3 -config>qos>sap-ingress>fc$ exit -config>qos>sap-ingress# fc be create -config>qos>sap-ingress>fc$ queue 1 -config>qos>sap-ingress>fc$ exit -config>qos>sap-ingress# fc l1 create -config>qos>sap-ingress>fc$ queue 4 -config>qos>sap-ingress>fc$ exit -config>qos>sap-ingress# fc l2 create -config>qos>sap-ingress>fc$ queue 2 -config>qos>sap-ingress>fc$ exit -config>qos>sap-ingress# dscp "ef" fc l1 -config>qos>sap-ingress# dscp "cp9" fc l2 -config>qos>sap-ingress# dscp "af11" fc af -config>qos>sap-ingress# exit all Apply scheduler policy using the example below: - configure service epipe 10 sap 1/1/c7/1 ingress scheduler-policy "TEST" Apply QoS policy using the example below: - configure service epipe 10 sap 1/1/c7/1 ingress qos 90 Review the router configuration and interview the system administrator to verify a mechanism for traffic prioritization and bandwidth reservation exists. This arrangement must ensure that sufficient capacity is available for mission-critical traffic and enforce the traffic priorities specified by the Combatant Commands/Services/Agencies. Verify QoS scheduler policy and service access point (SAP)-ingress policies are applied on the service access point using the command below: - show service id 10 sap 1/1/c7/1 detail | match QOS post-lines 6 QOS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ingress qos-policy : 90 Egress qos-policy : 1 Ingress FP QGrp : (none) Egress Port QGrp : (none) Ing FP QGrp Inst : (none) Egr Port QGrp Inst: (none) Ing ip-match tag : none Ing ipv6-match tag: none I. Sched Pol : TEST If QoS scheduler-policy and SAP-ingress are not configured, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000810<VulnDiscussion>DoS events may occur due to a variety of internal and external causes, such as an attack by an adversary or a lack of planning to support organizational needs with respect to capacity and bandwidth. Such attacks can occur across a wide range of network protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). A variety of technologies are available to limit or eliminate the origination and effects of DoS events. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain types of packets to protect system components on internal networks from being directly affected by or the source of DoS attacks. Employing increased network capacity and bandwidth combined with service redundancy also reduces the susceptibility to DoS events.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-004866Configure the router to employ organization-defined controls by type of DoS to achieve the DoS objective using the example below: Create a CPM-Filter: - configure system security cpm-filter - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# default-action drop - config>sys>security>cpm-filter# ip-filter - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 10 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "ospf-igp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# src-ip 192.168.1.1/32 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 20 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "pim" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# src-ip 192.168.1.2/32 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 30 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "igmp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# src-ip 224.0.0.0/4 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 40 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "tcp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# src-ip 192.168.100.1/32 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# dst-ip 192.168.100.2/32 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# src-port 179 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 50 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "icmp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 60 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "udp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# dst-port 161 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 70 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "udp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# dst-port 162 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 80 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "tcp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# dst-port 22 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit - config>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter# entry 90 create - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# match protocol "tcp" - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# dst-port 23 - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry>match# exit - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# action accept - cfg>sys>sec>cpm>ip-filter>entry# exit all Create Distributed CPU Protection: - configure system security dist-cpu-protection policy "rate-limit" create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# static-policer "PIM-RATE" create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# rate kbps 2000 mbs 200 - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-p" create >policy# static-policer "ICMP-RATE - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# exit - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# static-policer "ICMP-RATE" create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# rate kbps 2000 mbs 200 - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# exit - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# static-policer "ALL-Other-Rate" - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# rate kbps 2000 mbs 200 - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>static# exit - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# protocol icmp create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# enforcement static "ICMP-RATE" - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# exit - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# protocol pim create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# enforcement static "PIM-RATE" - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# exit - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy# protocol all-unspecified create - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# enforcement static "ALL-Other-Rate" - config>sys>security>dist-cpu-protection>policy>protocol# exit all Apply Distributed CPU Protection to the interface: - configure router interface "TEST" dist-cpu-protection "rate-limit"Verify the router is configured to employ organization-defined controls by type of DoS to achieve the DoS objective. Verify CPM IP-Filter using the example below: - show system security cpm-filter ip-filter entry 10 CPM IP Filter Entry Entry Id : 10 Description : (Not Specified) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Filter Entry Match Criteria : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Log Id : n/a Src. IP : 192.168.1.1/32 Src. Port : n/a Dst. IP : n/a Dest. Port : n/a Protocol : ospf-igp Dscp : Undefined ICMP Type : Undefined ICMP Code : Undefined Fragment : Off Option-present : Off IP-Option : n/a Multiple Option : Off TCP-syn : Off TCP-ack : Off Action : Forward Match Router ID : n/a Dropped pkts : 0 Forwarded pkts : 0 Verify Distributed CPU Protection using the example below: - show system security dist-cpu-protection policy "rate-limit" detail Distributed CPU Protection Policy Policy Name : rate-limit Description : (Not Specified) Policy Type : access-network ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Static Policer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Static Policer : PIM-RATE Description : (Not Specified) Kbps : 2000 kbps MBS : 200 KB Detection Time : 30 seconds Exceed-Action : None Hold-Down Time : none Log Events : enable ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Static Policer : ICMP-RATE Description : (Not Specified) Kbps : 2000 kbps MBS : 200 KB Detection Time : 30 seconds Exceed-Action : None Hold-Down Time : none Log Events : enable ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Static Policer : ALL-Other-Rate Description : (Not Specified) Kbps : 2000 kbps MBS : 200 KB Detection Time : 30 seconds Exceed-Action : None Hold-Down Time : none Log Events : enable ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Local Monitoring Policer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No Matching Entries ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Protocol (Dynamic Policer) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Protocol : icmp Enforcement Type : static Enforcement Plcr: ICMP-RATE Dynamic Policer Parameters -------------------------- Packets : max Within : 1 seconds Initial Delay : none Detection Time : 30 seconds Exceed-Action : None Hold-Down Time : none Log Events : enable ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Protocol : all-unspecified Enforcement Type : static Enforcement Plcr: ALL-Other-Rate Dynamic Policer Parameters -------------------------- Packets : max Within : 1 seconds Initial Delay : none Detection Time : 30 seconds Exceed-Action : None Hold-Down Time : none Log Events : enable ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Protocol : pim Enforcement Type : static Enforcement Plcr: PIM-RATE Dynamic Policer Parameters -------------------------- Packets : max Within : 1 seconds Initial Delay : none Detection Time : 30 seconds Exceed-Action : None Hold-Down Time : none Log Events : enable ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- If the router is not configured to employ organization-defined controls by type of DoS to achieve the DoS objective, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000860<VulnDiscussion>Bogons include IP packets on the public internet that contain addresses that are not in any range allocated or delegated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) or a delegated regional internet registry (RIR) and allowed for public internet use. Bogons also include multicast, IETF reserved, and special-purpose address space as defined in RFC 6890. Security of the internet's routing system relies on the ability to authenticate an assertion of unique control of an address block. Measures to authenticate such assertions rely on the validation the address block forms as part of an existing allocated address block and must be a trustable and unique reference in the IANA address registries. The intended use of a Bogon address would only be to address spoofing in denial-of-service attacks. Hence, it is imperative that IP packets with a source Bogon address are blocked at the network's perimeter.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002403This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the router to block inbound packets with Bogon source addresses using the example below: Create a prefix list: - configure filter match-list ip-prefix-list Bogon-IP-List create - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 0.0.0.0/32 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 10.0.0.0/8 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 100.64.0.0/10 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 127.0.0.0/8 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 169.254.0.0/16 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 172.16.0.0/12 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 192.0.0.0/24 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 192.0.2.0/24 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 192.168.0.0/16 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 192.18.0.0/18 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 198.51.100.0/24 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 203.0.113.0/24 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ prefix 224.0.0.0/3 - config>filter>match-list>ip-pfx-list$ exit all Create an IP filter: - configure filter ip-filter 50 create - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match src-ip ip-prefix-list "Bogon-IP-List" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 20 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 30 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.9/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.1.10/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-port 170 eq - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 40 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.9/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.1.10/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-port 170 eq - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 50 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "icmp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.9/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.1.10/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ icmp-type "echo-request" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 60 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "icmp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.9/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.1.10/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ icmp-type "echo-reply" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter$ default-action drop - config>filter>ip-filter$ exit all Apply the IP filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 50This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Verify the ingress filter is applied on the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : 10 Ingress Filter : 50 If the router is not configured to block inbound packets with source Bogon IP addresses, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000870<VulnDiscussion>Auditing and logging are key components of any security architecture. Security personnel must know what is being done or attempted to be done, and by whom, to compile an accurate risk assessment. Auditing the actions on network devices provides a means to recreate an attack or identify a configuration mistake on the device.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000134Configure an IP filter to log all deny statements using the example below: Create an IP filter: - configure filter ip-filter 60 create - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action drop - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ log 101 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ exit all Apply the IP filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 10Review the IP filter to verify all deny statements are logged. Use the commands below to verify the filter is logged and applied on the interface. - show filter ip 60 Entry : 10 Description : (Not Specified) Log Id : 101 Src. IP : 0.0.0.0/0 Src. Port : n/a Dest. IP : 0.0.0.0/0 Dest. Port : n/a Protocol : Undefined Dscp : Undefined ICMP Type : Undefined ICMP Code : Undefined Fragment : Off Src Route Opt : Off Sampling : Off Int. Sampling : On IP-Option : 0/0 Multiple Option: Off Tcp-flag : (Not Specified) Option-pres : Off Egress PBR : Disabled Primary Action : Drop Ing. Matches : 0 pkts Egr. Matches : 0 pkts - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : 10 Ingress Filter : 10 If packets being dropped are not logged and a filter is not applied, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000880<VulnDiscussion>As currently defined, site local addresses are ambiguous and can be present in multiple sites. The address itself does not contain any indication of the site to which it belongs. The use of site-local addresses could adversely affect network security through leaks, ambiguity, and potential misrouting as documented in section 2 of RFC3879. RFC3879 formally deprecates the IPv6 site-local unicast prefix FEC0::/10 as defined in RFC3513.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Configure the router using authorized IPv6 addresses using the example below: - configure router interface TO-CORE - config>router>if$ ipv6 address 2001:db8:100:1::1/64 - config>router>if$ port 1/1/c8/1 - config>router>if$ exit allReview the router configuration to ensure FEC0::/10 IP addresses are not defined. Use the command below and verify IPv6 addresses are defined for all interfaces: - show router interface "TO-CORE" detail | match "IPv6 Address" IPv6 Address : 2001:db8:100:1::1/64 If IPv6 Site Local Unicast addresses are defined, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000890<VulnDiscussion>As a best practice, a service provider should only accept customer prefixes that have been assigned to that customer and any peering autonomous systems. A multihomed customer with BGP speaking routers connected to the internet or other external networks could be breached and used to launch a prefix deaggregation attack. Without ingress route filtering of customers, the effectiveness of such an attack could impact the entire IP core and its customers.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368Configure all eBGP routers to reject inbound route advertisements from a CE router for prefixes that are not allocated to that customer using the example below: Create a prefix list: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Customer Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 192.168.100.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# exit Create a policy statement: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement "Import Customer Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "Customer Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply the import policy to the BGP group: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" import "Import Customer Prefix"Review the BGP router configuration to verify routing policies are defined to only accept routes for prefixes that belong to each specific customer. Verify the prefix-list, policy-statement, and import policy are applied to the eBGP group using the commands below: - show router policy prefix-list "Customer Prefix" prefix 192.168.100.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - show router policy "Import Customer Prefix" entry 10 from prefix-list "Customer Prefix" exit action accept exit exit default-action drop exit - show router bgp group "eBGP" detail | match "Import Policy" Import Policy : Import Customer Prefix If the router is not configured to reject inbound route advertisements from each CE router for prefixes that are not allocated to that customer, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000900<VulnDiscussion>An RD provides uniqueness to the customer address spaces within the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) layer 3 virtual private network (L3VPN) infrastructure. The concept of the VPN-IPv4 and VPN-IPv6 address families consists of the RD prepended before the IP address. If the same IP prefix is used in several different L3VPNs, it is possible for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to carry several completely different routes for that prefix, one for each VPN. Because VPN-IPv4 addresses and IPv4 addresses are different address families, BGP never treats them as comparable addresses. The purpose of the RD is to create distinct routes for common IPv4 address prefixes. On any given PE router, a single RD can define a VRF in which the entire address space may be used independently, regardless of the makeup of other VPN address spaces. Hence, it is imperative that a unique RD is assigned to each L3VPN and the proper RD is configured for each VRF.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Configure the correct RD for each VRF. Use one of the commands below to configure the RD based on the architecture. RD ID uses the format as number: common value: - configure service vprn 30 customer 1 bgp-ipvpn mpls route-distinguisher 3.3.3.3:30 - configure service vprn 30 customer 1 bgp-ipvpn mpls no shutdownReview the RDs that have been assigned for each VRF according to the plan provided by the information system security manager (ISSM). Review all VRFs configured on CE-facing interfaces and verify the proper RD has been configured for each. Verify the "Route Dist." value for each service using the command below: - show service id 30 base | match "Route Dist" Route Dist. : 3.3.3.3:30 VPRN Type : regular Oper Route Dist : 3.3.3.3:30 If the wrong RD has been configured for any VRF, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000910<VulnDiscussion>An IP directed broadcast is a datagram sent to the broadcast address of a subnet that is not directly attached to the sending machine. The directed broadcast is routed through the network as a unicast packet until it arrives at the target subnet, where it is converted into a link-layer broadcast. Because of the nature of the IP addressing architecture, only the last router in the chain, which is connected directly to the target subnet, can conclusively identify a directed broadcast. IP directed broadcasts are used in the extremely common and popular smurf, or denial-of-service (DoS), attacks. In a smurf attack, the attacker sends Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo requests from a falsified source address to a directed broadcast address, causing all the hosts on the target subnet to send replies to the falsified source. By sending a continuous stream of such requests, the attacker can create a much larger stream of replies, which can completely inundate the host whose address is being falsified. This service should be disabled on all interfaces when not needed to prevent smurf and DoS attacks. Directed broadcast can be enabled on internal facing interfaces to support services such as Wake-On-LAN. Case scenario may also include support for legacy applications where the content server and the clients do not support multicast. The content servers send streaming data using UDP broadcast. Used in conjunction with the IP multicast helper-map feature, broadcast data can be sent across a multicast topology. The broadcast streams are converted to multicast and vice versa at the first-hop routers and last-hop routers before entering and leaving the multicast transit area respectively. The last-hop router must convert the multicast to broadcast. Hence, this interface must be configured to forward a broadcast packet (i.e., a directed broadcast address is converted to the all nodes broadcast address).</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-002385Disable IP directed broadcasts on all layer 3 interfaces using the configuration below: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" no allow-directed-broadcastsReview the router configuration to determine if IP directed broadcast is enabled. By default, the directed broadcast is disabled. There is no command to show the status of the IP directed broadcast configuration, but it can be verified by looking at the configuration for each interface. Use the command below and verify "no allow-directed-broadcasts" is configured: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" - config>router>if# info detail | match allow-directed-broadcasts no allow-directed-broadcasts If IP directed broadcast is enabled on layer 3 interfaces, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000920<VulnDiscussion>An inactive interface is rarely monitored or controlled and may expose a network to an undetected attack on that interface. Unauthorized personnel with access to the communication facility could gain access to a router by connecting to a configured interface that is not in use. If an interface is no longer used, the configuration must be deleted and the interface disabled. For subinterfaces, delete subinterfaces that are on inactive interfaces and delete subinterfaces that are themselves inactive. If the subinterface is no longer necessary for authorized communications, it must be deleted.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001414Delete inactive subinterfaces and disable and delete the configuration of any inactive ports on the router. Disable inactive ports using the configuration below: - configure port 1/1/c2/1 shutdown Disable inactive logical interfaces using the configuration below: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" shutdownReview the router configuration. Verify the logical port is disabled using the command below: show port 1/1/c2/1 | match "Admin State" Admin State : down Oper Duplex : full Verify the logical interface is disabled using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" Interface Table (Router: Base) Interface-Name Adm Opr(v4/v6) Mode Port/SapId IP-Address PfxState ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TO-PE2 Down Down/Down Network 1/1/c1/1 172.22.21.2/30 n/a 2001:acad:1234:21::2/64 INACCESSIBLE fe80::67:47f1:52a9:fb0c/64 INACCESSIBLE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Interfaces : 1 If an interface is not being used but is configured or enabled, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000930<VulnDiscussion>Advertisement of routes by an autonomous system for networks that do not belong to any of its customers pulls traffic away from the authorized network. This causes a denial of service (DoS) on the network that allocated the block of addresses and may cause a DoS on the network that is inadvertently advertising it as the originator. A misconfigured or compromised router within the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) IP core could redistribute Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) routes into BGP, thereby leaking internal routes.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368Configure all eBGP routers to filter outbound route advertisements for prefixes that are not allocated to or belong to any customer or the local AS. Create a prefix list using the configuration below: - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Customer Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 192.168.100.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 192.168.200.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit Create a policy statement using the configuration below: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement "Advertise Customer" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "Customer Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action reject - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit Apply the routing policy to the BGP neighbor using the configuration below: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" export "Advertise Customer"This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify a filter is defined to only advertise routes for prefixes that belong to any customers or the local AS. Use the command below to view the prefix list: - show router policy prefix-list "Customer Prefix" prefix 192.168.100.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 prefix 192.168.200.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 Use the command below to view the policy statement: - show router policy "Advertise Customer" entry 10 from prefix-list "Advertise Customer" exit action accept exit exit default-action drop exit Use the command below to verify the policy is applied to the eBGP group: - show router bgp group "eBGP" detail | match "Export Policy" Export Policy : Advertise Customer If the router is not configured to reject outbound route advertisements that belong to any customers or the local AS, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000940<VulnDiscussion>Access control lists (ACLs) are used to separate data traffic into traffic that will be routed (permitted packets) and traffic that will not be routed (denied packets). Secure configuration of routers uses access lists for restricting access to services on the router and filtering traffic passing through the router. Inbound versus Outbound: Some operating systems' default access lists are applied to the outbound queue. The more secure solution is to apply the access list to the inbound queue for three reasons: - The router can protect itself before damage is inflicted. - The input port is still known and can be filtered on. - It is more efficient to filter packets before routing them.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure an egress ACL bound to the internal interface in an inbound direction to filter traffic leaving the network. Configure an IPv4 filter using the example below: - configure filter ip-filter 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match src-ip 2.2.2.2/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit all Configure an IPv6 filter using the example below: - configure filter ipv6-filter 20 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ match src-ip 2001:acad:1234:200::2/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter# exit all Apply IPv4 and IPv6 filters to the interface in the egress direction: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" egress filter ip 10 - configure router interface "TO-PE2" egress filter ipv6 20This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify the egress ACL is bound to the internal interface in an inbound direction. To verify all interfaces have the ingress filter assigned, verify fields "Egress Filter" and "Egr IPv6 Flt" for all interfaces: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Egress Filter" Egress Filter : 10 Ingress Filter : none - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Egr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : 20 Ingr IPv6 Flt : none If the router is not configured to filter traffic leaving the network at the internal interface in an inbound direction, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000950<VulnDiscussion>Access control lists (ACLs) are used to separate data traffic into traffic that will be routed (permitted packets) and traffic that will not be routed (denied packets). Secure configuration of routers uses access lists for restricting access to services on the router and filtering traffic passing through the router. Inbound versus Outbound: Some operating systems' default access lists are applied to the outbound queue. The more secure solution is to apply the access list to the inbound queue for three reasons: - The router can protect itself before damage is inflicted. - The input port is still known and can be filtered on. - It is more efficient to filter packets before routing them.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure an IPv4 filter using the example below: - configure filter ip-filter 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match src-ip 2.2.2.2/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit all Configure an IPv6 filter using the example below: - configure filter ipv6-filter 20 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter# entry 10 create - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ match src-ip 2001:acad:1234:200::2/128 - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ipv6-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ipv6-filter# exit all Apply the IPv4 and IPv6 filters to the interface in an outbound direction using the configuration below: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 10 - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ipv6 20This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify the ingress ACL is bound to the external interface in an inbound direction. To verify all interfaces have the ingress filter assigned, verify fields "Ingress Filter" and "Ingr IPv6 Flt" for all interfaces using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : 10 Ingress Filter : 10 - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingr IPv6 Flt" Egr IPv6 Flt : 20 Ingr IPv6 Flt : 20 If the router is not configured to filter traffic entering the network at the external interface in an inbound direction, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000960<VulnDiscussion>Accepting route advertisements for Bogon prefixes can result in the local autonomous system (AS) becoming a transit for malicious traffic as it will in turn advertise these prefixes to neighbor autonomous systems.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368Ensure all eBGP routers are configured to reject inbound route advertisements for any Bogon prefixes. Create prefix-lists using the configuration below: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# begin - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Bogon Prefixes" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 0.0.0.0/8 prefix-length-range 8-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 10.0.0.0/8 prefix-length-range 8-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 100.64.0.0/10 prefix-length-range 10-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 127.0.0.0/8 prefix-length-range 8-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 169.254.0.0/16 prefix-length-range 16-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 172.16.0.0/12 prefix-length-range 12-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 192.0.2.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 192.88.99.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 192.168.0.0/16 prefix-length-range 16-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 198.18.0.0/15 prefix-length-range 15-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 198.51.100.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 203.0.113.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 224.0.0.0/4 prefix-length-range 4-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 240.0.0.0/4 prefix-length-range 4-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Permit Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 0.0.0.0/0 prefix-length-range 8-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit Create a policy statement using the configuration below: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement IMPORT-BGP-Prefix - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "Bogon Prefixes" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ entry 20 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "Permit Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ default-action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement$ exit - config>router>policy-options# commit Apply the policy to the eBGP group using the configuration below: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" import "IMPORT-BGP-Prefix"Review the router configuration to verify it will reject routes of any Bogon prefixes. Verify the prefix list using the command below: - show router policy prefix-list "Bogon Prefixes" prefix 0.0.0.0/8 prefix-length-range 8-32 prefix 10.0.0.0/8 prefix-length-range 8-32 prefix 100.64.0.0/10 prefix-length-range 10-32 prefix 127.0.0.0/8 prefix-length-range 8-32 prefix 169.254.0.0/16 prefix-length-range 16-32 prefix 172.16.0.0/12 prefix-length-range 12-32 prefix 192.0.2.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 prefix 192.88.99.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 prefix 192.168.0.0/16 prefix-length-range 16-32 prefix 198.18.0.0/15 prefix-length-range 15-32 prefix 198.51.100.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 prefix 203.0.113.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 prefix 224.0.0.0/4 prefix-length-range 4-32 prefix 240.0.0.0/4 prefix-length-range 4-32 - show router policy prefix-list "Permit Prefix" prefix 0.0.0.0/0 prefix-length-range 8-32 Verify the policy statement using the command below: - show router policy "IMPORT-BGP-Prefix" entry 10 from prefix-list "Bogon Prefixes" exit action drop exit exit entry 20 from prefix-list "Permit Prefix" exit action accept exit exit default-action drop exit Verify the policy is applied to the eBGP group using the command below: - show router bgp group "eBGP" detail | match "Import Policy" Import Policy : IMPORT-BGP-Prefix If the router is not configured to reject inbound route advertisements for any Bogon prefixes, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000970<VulnDiscussion>Accepting route advertisements belonging to the local AS can result in traffic looping or being black holed, or at a minimum using a nonoptimized path.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001368Ensure all eBGP routers are configured to reject inbound route advertisements for any prefixes belonging to the local AS. Create prefix lists using the configuration below: - configure router policy-options - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Deny Prefixes" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 0.0.0.0/8 prefix-length-range 8-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ prefix 10.13.1.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list$ exit - config>router>policy-options# prefix-list "Permit Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>prefix-list# prefix 0.0.0.0/0 prefix-length-range 8-32 Create a policy statement using the configuration below: - config>router>policy-options# policy-statement "IMPORT-BGP-Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# entry 10 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "Deny Prefixes" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# entry 20 - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ from prefix-list "Permit Prefix" - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ action accept - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry>action$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>entry$ exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# default-action drop - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement>default-action# exit - config>router>policy-options>policy-statement# exit - config>router>policy-options# commit - config>router>policy-options# exit all Apply the policy to the eBGP group using the configuration below: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" import "IMPORT-BGP-Prefix"Review the router configuration to verify it will reject routes belonging to the local AS. Verify the prefix lists using the command below: - show router policy prefix-list "Deny Prefixes" prefix 0.0.0.0/8 prefix-length-range 8-32 prefix 10.13.1.0/24 prefix-length-range 24-32 - show router policy prefix-list "Permit Prefix" prefix 0.0.0.0/0 prefix-length-range 8-32 Verify the policy statement using the command below: - show router policy "IMPORT-BGP-PREFIX" entry 10 from prefix-list "Deny Prefixes" exit action drop exit exit entry 20 from prefix-list "Permit Prefix" exit action accept exit exit default-action drop exit Verify the policy is applied to the eBGP group using the command below: - show router bgp group "eBGP" detail | match "Import Policy" Import Policy : IMPORT-BGP-PREFIX If the router is not configured to reject inbound route advertisements belonging to the local AS, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000980<VulnDiscussion>A virtual forwarding instance (VFI) must be created on each participating PE router for each customer VLAN using VPLS for carrier Ethernet services. The VFI specifies the VPN ID of a VPLS domain, the addresses of other PE routers in the domain, and the type of tunnel signaling and encapsulation mechanism for each peer PE router. The set of VFIs formed by the interconnection of the emulated virtual circuits (VCs) is called a VPLS instance, which forms the logic bridge over the MPLS core network. The PE routers use the VFI with a unique VPN ID to establish a full mesh of emulated VCs or pseudowires to all the other PE routers in the VPLS instance. The full-mesh configuration allows the PE router to maintain a single broadcast domain. With a full-mesh configuration, signaling and packet replication requirements for each provisioned virtual circuit on a PE can be high. To avoid the problem of a packet looping in the provider core, thereby adding more overhead, the PE devices must enforce a split-horizon principle for the emulated virtual circuits; that is, if a packet is received on an emulated virtual circuit, it is not forwarded on any other virtual circuit.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000366Enable split horizon on all PE routers deploying VPLS in a full-mesh configuration. Configure VPLS service using mesh-sdp to have split-horizon function on the pseudowire using the example below: - configure service vpls 100 customer 1 vpn 100 create - config>service>vpls# mesh-sdp 40:100 create - config>service>vpls>mesh-sdp$ no shutdown - config>service>vpls>mesh-sdp$ exit - config>service>vpls# no shutdown - config>service>vpls# exit allReview the PE router configuration to verify split horizon is enabled. Verify the VPLS is using mesh-sdp using the command below: - show service id 100 base | match "Service Access & Destination Points" post-lines 4 Service Access & Destination Points ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Identifier Type AdmMTU OprMTU Adm Opr ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sdp:40:100 M(4.4.4.4) Mesh 0 9190 Up Up If the VPLS service SDP type is not mesh, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-000990<VulnDiscussion>A traffic storm occurs when packets flood a VPLS bridge, creating excessive traffic and degrading network performance. Traffic storm control prevents VPLS bridge disruption by suppressing traffic when the number of packets reaches configured threshold levels. Traffic storm control monitors incoming traffic levels on a port and drops traffic when the number of packets reaches the configured threshold level during any one-second interval.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001095Configure QoS SAP-ingress to control broadcast storm for each VPLS bridge domain. Base the suppression threshold on expected traffic rates plus some additional capacity. Configure QoS SAP-ingress using the example below: - configure qos sap-ingress 100 create - config>qos>sap-ingress# policer 10 create - config>qos>sap-ingress>policer# rate 12000 - config>qos>sap-ingress>policer# exit - config>qos>sap-ingress# fc "be" create - config>qos>sap-ingress>fc# broadcast-policer 10 - config>qos>sap-ingress>fc# exit - config>qos>sap-ingress# exit all Apply the QoS SAP-ingress policy to the SAP using the example below: - configure service vpls 20 sap 1/1/c7/1 ingress qos 100Review the router configuration to verify Quality-of-Service (QoS) SAP-ingress is applied on the service access point (SAP), deploying VPLS to control broadcast storm. Verify the QoS SAP-ingress policy is applied to the SAP using the configuration below: - show service id 20 sap 1/1/c7/1 qos | match "Ingress qos-policy" Ingress qos-policy : 100 Egress qos-policy : 1 If the QoS SAP-ingress is not applied to the SAP, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-001000<VulnDiscussion>A rogue router could send a fictitious routing update to convince a site's perimeter router to send traffic to an incorrect or rogue destination. This diverted traffic could be analyzed to learn confidential information about the site's network or used to disrupt the network's ability to communicate with other networks. This is known as a "traffic attraction attack" and is prevented by configuring neighbor router authentication for routing updates. However, using clear-text authentication provides little benefit because an attacker can intercept traffic and view the authentication key. This would allow the attacker to use the authentication key in an attack. Because MD5 is vulnerable to "birthday" attacks and may be compromised, routing protocol authentication must use FIPS 198-1-validated algorithms and modules to encrypt the authentication key. This requirement applies to all IPv4 and IPv6 protocols that are used to exchange routing or packet forwarding information. This includes all Interior Gateway Protocols, such as Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP), and Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS). It also includes Exterior Gateway Protocols, such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP); Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)-related protocols, such as Label Distribution Protocol (LDP); and multicast-related protocols.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-000803Configure routing protocol authentication to use a NIST-validated FIPS 198-1 message authentication code algorithm using the example below: - configure system security keychain "test" tcp-option-number send tcp-ao - configure system security keychain "test" tcp-option-number receive tcp-ao - configure system security keychain "test" direction bi entry 1 key 12345678901 algorithm aes-128-cmac-96 begin-time 2025/12/28 UTC 00:00:00 - configure system security keychain "test" direction bi entry 2 key 12345678901 algorithm aes-128-cmac-96 begin-time 2026/06/28 UTC 00:00:00Review the router configuration to verify it is using a NIST-validated FIPS 198-1 message authentication code algorithm to authenticate routing protocol messages. Use the command below and verify "Algorithm" configured for each keychain is a NIST-validated algorithm: - show system security keychain "test" detail Key chain:test Description : (Not Specified) TCP-Option number send : tcp-ao Admin state : Up TCP-Option number receive : tcp-ao Oper state : Up Used by : BGP Expired : No Key entries for key chain: test Id : 1 Direction : send-receive Algorithm : aes-128-cmac-96 Option : none Admin State : Up RX Valid : Yes TX Active : Yes Tolerance : 300 Begin Time : 2025/12/28 00:00:00 Begin Time (UTC) : 2025/12/28 00:00:00 End Time : 2026/06/28 00:00:00 End Time (UTC) : 2026/06/28 00:00:00 If a NIST-validated FIPS 198-1 message authentication code algorithm is not being used to authenticate routing protocol messages, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-001010<VulnDiscussion>A rogue router could send a fictitious routing update to convince a site's perimeter router to send traffic to an incorrect or rogue destination. This diverted traffic could be analyzed to learn confidential information about the site's network or used to disrupt the network's ability to communicate with other networks. This is known as a "traffic attraction attack" and is prevented by configuring neighbor router authentication for routing updates. This requirement applies to all IPv4 and IPv6 protocols that are used to exchange routing or packet forwarding information. This includes Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Routing Information Protocol (RIP), Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP), Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS), and Label Distribution Protocol (LDP). Satisfies: SRG-NET-000230-RTR-000001, SRG-NET-000168-RTR-000077</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001184CCI-000803Configure authentication to be enabled for every protocol that affects the routing or forwarding tables using the example below: Configure key chain: - configure system security keychain "test" tcp-option-number send tcp-ao - configure system security keychain "test" tcp-option-number receive tcp-ao - configure system security keychain "test" direction bi entry 1 key 12345678901 algorithm aes-128-cmac-96 begin-time 2025/12/28 UTC 00:00:00 - configure system security keychain "test" direction bi entry 2 key 12345678901 algorithm aes-128-cmac-96 begin-time 2026/06/28 UTC 00:00:00 Apply the key chain to the BGP neighbor: - configure router bgp group "eBGP" auth-keychain "test"Review the router configuration. For every protocol that affects the routing or forwarding tables (where information is exchanged between neighbors), verify neighbor router authentication is enabled using the command below: - show system security keychain "test" detail Key chain:test Description : (Not Specified) TCP-Option number send : tcp-ao Admin state : Up TCP-Option number receive : tcp-ao Oper state : Up Used by : BGP Expired : No Key entries for key chain: test Id : 1 Direction : send-receive Algorithm : aes-128-cmac-96 Option : none Admin State : Up RX Valid : Yes TX Active : Yes Tolerance : 300 Begin Time : 2025/12/28 00:00:00 Begin Time (UTC) : 2025/12/28 00:00:00 End Time : 2026/06/28 00:00:00 End Time (UTC) : 2026/06/28 00:00:00 If authentication is not enabled, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-001030<VulnDiscussion>A deny-all, permit-by-exception network communications traffic policy ensures that only connections that are essential and approved are allowed. This requirement applies to both inbound and outbound network communications traffic. All inbound and outbound traffic must be denied by default. Firewalls and perimeter routers should only allow traffic through that is explicitly permitted. The initial defense for the internal network is to block any traffic at the perimeter that is attempting to make a connection to a host residing on the internal network. In addition, allowing unknown or undesirable outbound traffic by the firewall or router will establish a state that will permit the return of this undesirable traffic inbound. Satisfies: SRG-NET-000202-RTR-000001, SRG-NET-000019-RTR-000002</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001109CCI-001414Configure the Nokia router to enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information between interconnected networks in accordance with applicable policy, as shown in the example below: Create an IPv4 filter: - configure filter ip-filter 30 create - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 10 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 20 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.9/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.1.10/30 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-port 179 eq - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 30 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.9/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.1.10/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-port 179 eq - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 40 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "icmp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.9/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.1.10/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ icmp-type "echo-request" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 50 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "icmp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ src-ip 10.12.1.9/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.1.10/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ icmp-type "echo-reply" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ entry 60 create - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ match protocol "tcp" - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-ip 10.12.1.22/32 - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ dst-port 80 eq - config>filter>ip-filter>entry>match$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ action forward - config>filter>ip-filter>entry$ exit - config>filter>ip-filter$ default-action drop - config>filter>ip-filter$ exit all Apply the IPv4 filter on the interface: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" ingress filter ip 30This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify the access control list (ACL) or filter is configured to allow specific ports and protocols and deny all other traffic. Verify the IPv4 filter is applied on the interface using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "Ingress Filter" Egress Filter : none Ingress Filter : 30 If the filter is not configured to allow specific ports and protocols and deny all other traffic, this is a finding. If the filter is not configured inbound on all external interfaces, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-001050<VulnDiscussion>A compromised host in an enclave can be used by a malicious platform to launch cyberattacks on third parties. This is a common practice in "botnets", which are a collection of compromised computers using malware to attack other computers or networks. Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks frequently leverage IP source address spoofing to send packets to multiple hosts that in turn will send return traffic to the hosts with the IP addresses that were forged. This can generate significant amounts of traffic. Therefore, protection measures to counteract IP source address spoofing must be taken. When uRPF is enabled in strict mode, the packet must be received on the interface that the device would use to forward the return packet, mitigating IP source address spoofing.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Configure the router to ensure that an egress filter or uRPF is configured to restrict the router from accepting any outbound IP packet that contains an external IP address in the source field. Configure uRPF using the example below: - configure router interface "TO-PE2" urpf-check mode looseThis requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone. Review the router configuration to verify uRPF or an egress filter has been configured on all internal interfaces to restrict the router from accepting outbound IP packets that contain an illegitimate address in the source address field. Verify uRPF on all internal interfaces and verify the "uRPF Chk" field is set to "enabled" using the command below: - show router interface "TO-PE2" detail | match "uRPF Chk" uRPF Chk : enabled uRPF Chk Mode : loose uRPF Chk Fail Pk*: 0 uRPF Fail Bytes : 0 If uRPF or an egress filter to restrict the router from accepting outbound IP packets that contain an illegitimate address in the source address field has not been configured on all internal interfaces, this is a finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-001070<VulnDiscussion>An incident, whether adversarial or nonadversarial, can disrupt established communications paths used for system operations and organizational command and control. Alternate communications paths reduce the risk of all communications paths being affected by the same incident. To compound the problem, the inability of organizational officials to obtain timely information about disruptions or provide timely direction to operational elements after a communications path incident can impact the organization's ability to respond to such incidents in a timely manner. Establishing alternate communications paths for command and control purposes, including designating alternative decision makers if primary decision makers are unavailable and establishing the extent and limitations of their actions, can greatly facilitate the organization's ability to continue to operate and take appropriate actions during an incident.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-004931Configure the mgmt port address for the out-of-band access using the example below: - bof address 10.10.111.182/24 Configure the VPRN service for in-band management using the example below: - configure service vprn 30 customer 1 create - config>service>vprn# router-id 3.3.3.3 - config>service>vprn# autonomous-system 65100 - config>service>vprn# interface "management-network" create - config>service>vprn>if# address 172.x.x.x/30 - config>service>vprn>if# sap 1/1/c3/1 create - config>service>vprn>if>sap# exit - config>service>vprn>if# exit - config>service>vprn# bgp-ipvpn - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn# mpls - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# auto-bind-tunnel - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls>auto-bind-tunnel# resolution any - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls>auto-bind-tunnel# exit - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# route-distinguisher x.x.x.x:x - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# vrf-target target:x:x - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# no shutdown - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn>mpls# exit - config>service>vprn>bgp-ipvpn# exit - config>service>vprn# no shutdownThere are several alternate communication paths to manage the device. The management port can be used as the first communication path for out-of-band access. The Virtual Private Routed Network (VPRN) service can be used as the second communication path for in-band access. The console port can be used as the third communication path for out-of-band access. Verify the mgmt port address using the command below: - show bof | match address address 10.10.111.182/24 active Verify that only the routes and interfaces belonging to the management VPRN are present using the command below: - show router 30 route-table Route Table (Service: 30) Dest Prefix[Flags] Type Proto Age Pref Next Hop[Interface Name] Metric ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 172.x.x.x/30 Remote BGP VPN 00h07m10s 170 4.4.4.4 (tunneled:RSVP:1) 30 172.x.x.x/30 Local Local 00h20m51s 0 management-network 0 If the mgmt port address and mgmt network are not configured in the VPRN, this is the finding.<GroupDescription></GroupDescription>NOKI-RT-001080<VulnDiscussion>When the production network is managed in-band, the management network could be housed at a NOC that is located remotely at single or multiple interconnected sites. NOC interconnectivity, as well as connectivity between the NOC and the managed network, must be enabled using MACsec tunnels to provide the separation and integrity of the managed traffic.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>DPMS Target Nokia SR OS 25.x RTRDISADPMS TargetNokia SR OS 25.x RTR5746CCI-001097Configure the connection association using the example below: - configure macsec connectivity-association "FJM-MACsec1" - config>macsec>connectivity-association# clear-tag-mode single-tag - config>macsec>connectivity-association# replay-window-size 2 - config>macsec>connectivity-association# replay-protection - config>macsec>connectivity-association# cipher-suite gcm-aes-256 - config>macsec>connectivity-association# static-cak - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak# pre-shared-key 1 encryption-type aes-256-cmac create - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak>pre-shared-key# cak wrlzKvncyuYlYKdRwW3SEUPnGZ6y4qPMTlmCZ0QvnOIx66eDgHY57Q27QnvLiy/x hash2 - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak>pre-shared-key# ckn dead123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890 - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak>pre-shared-key# exit - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak# pre-shared-key 2 encryption-type aes-256-cmac create - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak>pre-shared-key# cak 6aF8QgBi/cWEa9SiYTxte38+RqnQLgeMQemd0PjWb61P2kPOg5Pc9clNySHiwfmA hash2 - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak>pre-shared-key# ckn beef123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890 - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak>pre-shared-key# exit - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak# active-psk 2 - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak# mka-key-server-priority 1 - config>macsec>conn-assoc>static-cak# exit - config>macsec>connectivity-association# no shutdown - config>macsec>connectivity-association# exit all Configure the port using the example below: - configure port 1/1/c15/1 - config>port# ethernet dot1x - config>port>ethernet>dot1x# macsec - config>port>ethernet>dot1x>macsec# sub-port 1 create - config>port>ethernet>dot1x>macsec>sub-port# ca-name FJM-MACsec1 - config>port>ethernet>dot1x>macsec>sub-port# encap-match single-tag 10 - config>port>ethernet>dot1x>macsec>sub-port# max-peer 1 - config>port>ethernet>dot1x>macsec>sub-port# no shutdown - config>port>ethernet>dot1x>macsec>sub-port# exit - config>port>ethernet>dot1x>macsec# exit - config>port>ethernet>dot1x# no shutdown - config>port>ethernet>dot1x# exit - config>port# no shutdown - config>port# exit allVerify the connection association using the command below: - show macsec connectivity-association "FJM-MACsec1" detail Connectivity Association "FJM-MACsec1" Admin State : Up Description : FJM-MACsec1 Delay Protection : Disabled Replay Protection : Enabled Replay Window Size : 2 Macsec Encrypt : Enabled Clear Tag Mode : single-tag Cipher Suite : gcm-aes-256 Encryption Offset : 0 Assigned ports : 1/1/c15/1:1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Static Cak ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MKA Key Server Priority : 1 Active Pre-Shared-Key Index : 2 Hello Interval : 2 Active Pre-Shared-Key CKN : beef12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234 5678901234567890 Encryption Type : aes-256-cmac Verify macsec mks-session using the command below: - show macsec mka-session port 1/1/c15/1 detail MKA Session for port 1/1/c15/1: sub-port 1 encap :10 Security Zone : 14 CA Name : FJM-MACsec1 MKA Oper State : in-service Oper Cipher Suite : gcm-aes-256 Oper Encrypt Offset: 0 CAK Name : beef123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234 567890 MKA Member ID : 8ec720196e42d3ab16921210 Transmit Interval : 2000 Outbound SCI : 0031263b8cc40001 MKA Encapsulation : :10 Message Number : 501 Key Number : 3 Key Server : no Key Server Priority: 1 Latest SAK AN : 2 Latest SAK KI : dcf5a9fd6e055c47744f276c00000003 Latest SAK LPN : 1 Previous SAK AN : 0 Previous SAK KI : 00000000000000000000000000000000 Previous SAK LPN : 0 If the management traffic is not secured via MACsec tunnel, this is a finding.