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Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS (RHCOS) must use USBGuard for hosts that include a USB Controller.


Overview

Finding ID Version Rule ID IA Controls Severity
V-257585 CNTR-OS-001030 SV-257585r921698_rule Medium
Description
USBGuard adds an extra layer of security to the overall OpenShift infrastructure. It provides an additional control mechanism to prevent potential security threats originating from USB devices. By monitoring and controlling USB access, USBGuard helps mitigate risks associated with unauthorized or malicious devices that may attempt to exploit vulnerabilities within the system.
STIG Date
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.12 Security Technical Implementation Guide 2023-08-28

Details

Check Text ( C-61320r921696_chk )
1. Determine if the host devices include a USB Controller by executing the following:

for node in $(oc get node -oname); do oc debug $node -- chroot /host /bin/bash -c 'echo -n "$HOSTNAME "; lspci' 2>/dev/null; done

If there is not a USB Controller, then this requirement is Not Applicable.

2. Verify the USBGuard service is installed by executing the following:

for node in $(oc get node -oname); do oc debug $node -- chroot /host /bin/bash -c 'echo -n "$HOSTNAME "; rpm -q usbguard' 2>/dev/null; done

If the output returns "package usbguard is not installed", this is a finding.

3. Verify that USBGuard is set up to log into the Linux audit log.

for node in $(oc get node -oname); do oc debug $node -- chroot /host /bin/bash -c 'echo -n "$HOSTNAME "; grep -r AuditBackend /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf' 2>/dev/null; done

The output should return:
"AuditBackend=LinuxAudit". If it does not, this is a finding.

4. Verify the USBGuard has a policy configured with by executing the following:

for node in $(oc get node -oname); do oc debug $node -- chroot /host /bin/bash -c 'echo -n "$HOSTNAME "; usbguard list-rules' 2>/dev/null; done

If USBGuard is not found or the results do not match the organizationally defined rules, this is a finding.
Fix Text (F-61244r921697_fix)
If there is not a USB Controller, this requirement is Not Applicable.

1. Install the service by executing the following:

for mcpool in $(oc get mcp -oname | sed "s:.*/::" ); do
echo "apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
metadata:
name: 80-usbguard-extensions-$mcpool
labels:
machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: $mcpool
spec:
config:
ignition:
version: 3.1.0
extensions:
- usbguard
" | oc apply -f -
done

2. Wait for the nodes to reboot.
Note: (>oc get mcp) None of the pools should say Updating=true when the update is done.

3. Enable the service by executing the following:

for mcpool in $(oc get mcp -oname | sed "s:.*/::" ); do
echo "apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
metadata:
name: 80-usbguard-service-enable-$mcpool
labels:
machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: $mcpool
spec:
config:
ignition:
version: 3.1.0
systemd:
units:
- name: usbguard.service
enabled: true
" | oc apply -f -
done

4. Configure USBGuard to log to the audit log:

for mcpool in $(oc get mcp -oname | sed "s:.*/::" ); do
echo "apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
metadata:
name: 80-usbguard-daemon-conf-$mcpool
labels:
machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: $mcpool
spec:
config:
ignition:
version: 3.1.0
storage:
files:
- contents:
source: data:,%23%0A%23%20Rule%20set%20file%20path.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20will%20use%20this%20file%20to%20load%20the%20policy%0A%23%20rule%20set%20from%20it%20and%20to%20write%20new%20rules%20received%20via%20the%0A%23%20IPC%20interface.%0A%23%0A%23%20RuleFile%3D%2Fpath%2Fto%2Frules.conf%0A%23%0ARuleFile%3D%2Fetc%2Fusbguard%2Frules.conf%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Rule%20set%20folder%20path.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20will%20use%20this%20folder%20to%20load%20the%20policy%0A%23%20rule%20set%20from%20it%20and%20to%20write%20new%20rules%20received%20via%20the%0A%23%20IPC%20interface.%20Usually%2C%20we%20set%20the%20option%20to%0A%23%20%2Fetc%2Fusbguard%2Frules.d%2F.%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20is%20supposed%20to%0A%23%20behave%20like%20any%20other%20standard%20Linux%20daemon%20therefore%20it%0A%23%20loads%20rule%20files%20in%20alpha-numeric%20order.%20File%20names%20inside%0A%23%20RuleFolder%20directory%20should%20start%20with%20a%20two-digit%20number%0A%23%20prefix%20indicating%20the%20position%2C%20in%20which%20the%20rules%20are%0A%23%20scanned%20by%20the%20daemon.%0A%23%0A%23%20RuleFolder%3D%2Fpath%2Fto%2Frulesfolder%2F%0A%23%0ARuleFolder%3D%2Fetc%2Fusbguard%2Frules.d%2F%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Implicit%20policy%20target.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20devices%20that%20don%27t%20match%20any%20rule%20in%20the%0A%23%20policy.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20allow%20%20-%20authorize%20the%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20-%20block%20the%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20-%20remove%20the%20device%0A%23%0AImplicitPolicyTarget%3Dblock%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Present%20device%20policy.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20devices%20that%20are%20already%20connected%20when%20the%0A%23%20daemon%20starts.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20allow%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20authorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20deauthorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20remove%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20keep%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20just%20sync%20the%20internal%20state%20and%20leave%20it%0A%23%20%2A%20apply-policy%20-%20evaluate%20the%20ruleset%20for%20every%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20device%0A%23%0APresentDevicePolicy%3Dapply-policy%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Present%20controller%20policy.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20USB%20controllers%20that%20are%20already%20connected%0A%23%20when%20the%20daemon%20starts.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20allow%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20authorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20deauthorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20remove%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20keep%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20just%20sync%20the%20internal%20state%20and%20leave%20it%0A%23%20%2A%20apply-policy%20-%20evaluate%20the%20ruleset%20for%20every%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20device%0A%23%0APresentControllerPolicy%3Dkeep%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Inserted%20device%20policy.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20USB%20devices%20that%20are%20already%20connected%0A%23%20%2Aafter%2A%20the%20daemon%20starts.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20deauthorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20remove%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20apply-policy%20-%20evaluate%20the%20ruleset%20for%20every%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20device%0A%23%0AInsertedDevicePolicy%3Dapply-policy%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Control%20which%20devices%20are%20authorized%20by%20default.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20modifies%20some%20the%20default%20authorization%20state%20attributes%0A%23%20of%20controller%20devices.%20This%20setting%2C%20enables%20you%20to%20define%20what%20value%20the%0A%23%20default%20authorization%20is%20set%20to.%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20keep%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20do%20not%20change%20the%20authorization%20state%0A%23%20%2A%20none%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20every%20new%20device%20starts%20out%20deauthorized%0A%23%20%2A%20all%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20every%20new%20device%20starts%20out%20authorized%0A%23%20%2A%20internal%20%20%20%20%20-%20internal%20devices%20start%20out%20authorized%2C%20external%20devices%20start%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20out%20deauthorized%20%28this%20requires%20the%20ACPI%20tables%20to%20properly%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20label%20internal%20devices%2C%20and%20kernel%20support%29%0A%23%0A%23AuthorizedDefault%3Dnone%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Restore%20controller%20device%20state.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20modifies%20some%20attributes%20of%20controller%0A%23%20devices%20like%20the%20default%20authorization%20state%20of%20new%20child%20device%0A%23%20instances.%20Using%20this%20setting%2C%20you%20can%20control%20whether%20the%0A%23%20daemon%20will%20try%20to%20restore%20the%20attribute%20values%20to%20the%20state%0A%23%20before%20modification%20on%20shutdown.%0A%23%0A%23%20SECURITY%20CONSIDERATIONS%3A%20If%20set%20to%20true%2C%20the%20USB%20authorization%0A%23%20policy%20could%20be%20bypassed%20by%20performing%20some%20sort%20of%20attack%20on%20the%0A%23%20daemon%20%28via%20a%20local%20exploit%20or%20via%20a%20USB%20device%29%20to%20make%20it%20shutdown%0A%23%20and%20restore%20to%20the%20operating-system%20default%20state%20%28known%20to%20be%20permissive%29.%0A%23%0ARestoreControllerDeviceState%3Dfalse%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Device%20manager%20backend%0A%23%0A%23%20Which%20device%20manager%20backend%20implementation%20to%20use.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20uevent%20%20%20-%20Netlink%20based%20implementation%20which%20uses%20sysfs%20to%20scan%20for%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20devices%20and%20an%20uevent%20netlink%20socket%20for%20receiving%20USB%20device%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20related%20events.%0A%23%20%2A%20umockdev%20-%20umockdev%20based%20device%20manager%20capable%20of%20simulating%20devices%20based%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20on%20umockdev-record%20files.%20Useful%20for%20testing.%0A%23%0ADeviceManagerBackend%3Duevent%0A%0A%23%21%21%21%20WARNING%3A%20It%27s%20good%20practice%20to%20set%20at%20least%20one%20of%20the%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20two%20options%20bellow.%20If%20none%20of%20them%20are%20set%2C%20%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20the%20daemon%20will%20accept%20IPC%20connections%20from%20%20%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20anyone%2C%20thus%20allowing%20anyone%20to%20modify%20the%20%20%20%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20rule%20set%20and%20%28de%29authorize%20USB%20devices.%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%21%21%21%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Users%20allowed%20to%20use%20the%20IPC%20interface.%0A%23%0A%23%20A%20space%20delimited%20list%20of%20usernames%20that%20the%20daemon%20will%0A%23%20accept%20IPC%20connections%20from.%0A%23%0A%23%20IPCAllowedUsers%3Dusername1%20username2%20...%0A%23%0AIPCAllowedUsers%3Droot%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Groups%20allowed%20to%20use%20the%20IPC%20interface.%0A%23%0A%23%20A%20space%20delimited%20list%20of%20groupnames%20that%20the%20daemon%20will%0A%23%20accept%20IPC%20connections%20from.%0A%23%0A%23%20IPCAllowedGroups%3Dgroupname1%20groupname2%20...%0A%23%0AIPCAllowedGroups%3Dwheel%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20IPC%20access%20control%20definition%20files%20path.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20files%20at%20this%20location%20will%20be%20interpreted%20by%20the%20daemon%0A%23%20as%20access%20control%20definition%20files.%20The%20%28base%29name%20of%20a%20file%0A%23%20should%20be%20in%20the%20form%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%20%20%5Buser%5D%5B%3A%3Cgroup%3E%5D%0A%23%0A%23%20and%20should%20contain%20lines%20in%20the%20form%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%20%20%3Csection%3E%3D%5Bprivilege%5D%20...%0A%23%0A%23%20This%20way%20each%20file%20defines%20who%20is%20able%20to%20connect%20to%20the%20IPC%0A%23%20bus%20and%20what%20privileges%20he%20has.%0A%23%0AIPCAccessControlFiles%3D%2Fetc%2Fusbguard%2FIPCAccessControl.d%2F%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Generate%20device%20specific%20rules%20including%20the%20%22via-port%22%0A%23%20attribute.%0A%23%0A%23%20This%20option%20modifies%20the%20behavior%20of%20the%20allowDevice%0A%23%20action.%20When%20instructed%20to%20generate%20a%20permanent%20rule%2C%0A%23%20the%20action%20can%20generate%20a%20port%20specific%20rule.%20Because%0A%23%20some%20systems%20have%20unstable%20port%20numbering%2C%20the%20generated%0A%23%20rule%20might%20not%20match%20the%20device%20after%20rebooting%20the%20system.%0A%23%0A%23%20If%20set%20to%20false%2C%20the%20generated%20rule%20will%20still%20contain%0A%23%20the%20%22parent-hash%22%20attribute%20which%20also%20defines%20an%20association%0A%23%20to%20the%20parent%20device.%20See%20usbguard-rules.conf%285%29%20for%20more%0A%23%20details.%0A%23%0ADeviceRulesWithPort%3Dfalse%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20USBGuard%20Audit%20events%20log%20backend%0A%23%0A%23%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20FileAudit%20-%20Log%20audit%20events%20into%20a%20file%20specified%20by%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20AuditFilePath%20setting%20%28see%20below%29%0A%23%20%2A%20LinuxAudit%20-%20Log%20audit%20events%20using%20the%20Linux%20Audit%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20subsystem%20%28using%20audit_log_user_message%29%0A%23%0AAuditBackend%3DLinuxAudit%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20USBGuard%20audit%20events%20log%20file%20path.%0A%23%0A%23AuditFilePath%3D%2Fvar%2Flog%2Fusbguard%2Fusbguard-audit.log%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Hides%20personally%20identifiable%20information%20such%20as%20device%20serial%20numbers%20and%0A%23%20hashes%20of%20descriptors%20%28which%20include%20the%20serial%20number%29%20from%20audit%20entries.%0A%23%0A%23HidePII%3Dfalse
mode: 0600
path: /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf
overwrite: true
" | oc apply -f -
done

5. Create a USBGuard policy:

Below is an example policy. Replace the string in files.contents.source.data with an organizationally approved policy:

for mcpool in $(oc get mcp -oname | sed "s:.*/::" ); do
echo "apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
metadata:
name: 80-usbguard-rules-conf-$mcpool
labels:
machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: $mcpool
spec:
config:
ignition:
version: 3.1.0
storage:
files:
- contents:
source: data:,allow%20with-interface%20one-of%20%7B%2003%3A00%3A01%2003%3A01%3A01%20%7D%20if%20%21allowed-matches%28with-interface%20one-of%20%7B%2003%3A00%3A01%2003%3A01%3A01%20%7D%29
mode: 0600
path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf
overwrite: true
" | oc apply -f -
done